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A. Introduction 
 
 
A.1. Violence and Development 
Although undoubtedly linked to developmental themes such as institutional quality, 
geography, inequality and efficiency, the absence of empirical research into the causes and 
consequences of violence in the larger development debate is glaring (McIlwaine 1999; 
Enamorado et al. 2014). Economics and economic history have tended to research the impacts 
of war on development, with divergent conclusions, or else the opportunity costs of overall 
criminal activity (both violent and non-violent) for economic growth, rather than the impacts 
of interpersonal violence. Rogers (1989) comments on the “assumed link between violence, 
crime and societal development” while Stone (2006) refers to “limited knowledge in the field”. 
Likewise, Enamorado et al. (2014) explains how “scholars have often argued that crime deters 
growth, but the empirical literature assessing such [an] effect is scarce”.  
In the fields of psychology and anthropology, violence has arguably been researched 
more thoroughly, but the focus of these studies has tended to investigate evolutionary1 and 
 
1 Buss and Shackelford (1997) describe violence as a learnt, evolutionary response used to solving seven human 
societal problems: “co-opting the resources of others, defending against attack, inflicting costs on same-sex 
rivals, negotiating status and power hierarchies, deterring rivals from future aggression, deterring mates from 
sexual infidelity, and reducing resources expended on genetically unrelated children”. Evolutionary theories of 
violence have, however, been criticised as fatalist and that they preclude the role of free will in committing 
violent acts. 
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environmental2  drivers of violence rather than its role in development (Accomazzo 2012; 
Feshbach 1990; Goetz 2010). 
Literature of economics and crime mostly stems from studies that investigate violent 
crime as a sub-question of their research topic, though these studies do often find negative 
development impacts (Rogers 1989; McIlwaine 1999). For example, Burnham et al. (2004) 
investigated the influence of certain criminal activities on suburban income growth in the US 
from 1982 to 1997, finding that only violent crime had any significant adverse impact. Further, 
they detected a negative relationship between the strength of this crime-income effect and the 
distance from urban centres, calculating a cut-off point of between 53km and 68km, after which 
the relationship was no longer negative3. This is not to say that only violent crime in urban areas 
has a detrimental effect on income growth, but merely that violent urban crime has a wide-
reaching sphere of influence. Another example is Bourguignon’s (2000) global study which 
estimates the social cost of crime from 1985 to 1995. He estimates that homicides cause 
economic inefficiencies that result in foregone GDP growth of up to 2 percentage points per 
year. 
Traditional economics literature of war and development often focuses on the 
detrimental effects that war has on specific groups. For example, Goldson (1996) and Ibáñez 
and Moya (2006) study the adverse impacts on displaced children globally throughout the 20th 
century. Correspondingly, Rosenheck et al. (1994) find that US military veterans have been 
more likely than the general population to become homeless and unemployed since the war in 
Vietnam, perhaps due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and to difficulties in finding 
employment. On economies in a broader sense, Smith (1977) found a negative impact for 
 
2 Latessa and Lowenkamp (2006) suggest that “low-risk” inmates often leave prisons as more-skilled criminals 
after learning in suboptimal prison environments. 
3 Calculated from table 3’s regression results in Burnham et al. (2004).  
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military expenditure on growth in developed countries, while Deger and Smith (1983) made 
the same conclusion for developing countries. The UN Committee for Development Planning 
also stated that “the single and most massive obstacle to development is the worldwide 
expenditure on national defence activity” (Deger and Smith 1983).  
Additionally, Pinker (2011) showed that the frequency and intensity of all forms of 
violence have declined over the long run, including war. Pinker proposed that increased human 
capital allowed for alternatives to violence when resolving disputes and that increased 
cooperation in trade and commerce made “other people become more valuable alive than dead” 
(Pinker 2011). 
However, Charles Tilly’s (1975) hypothesis also argues that violence in the form of 
international conflict has been development promoting throughout human history. According 
to Tilly, small social groups expanded in order to consolidate their military capabilities and 
improve security, also increasing the scope of economic activities conducted by the group. This 
wider range of economic activities then allowed for occupational specialisation and promoted 
economic development through centralisation, eventually leading to fully-functioning tax 
systems. In contrast, Broadberry and Harrison (2005), argued that this war and development 
relationship is endogenous; that war and development are chiefly related because wealthier 
countries are able to mobilise greater resources and are therefore more likely to win wars. 
A recent branch of literature has revisited the Tilly hypothesis (Dincecco 2015; O’Brien 
2011; Hoffman 2015), focusing on the association between war and tax capacity and arguing 
that societies at war were more willing to accept higher tax rates, resulting in centralised 
development. Authors such as Kaempffert (1941) and Kellner (1999) argue that this effect took 
place through spillovers from military innovation to technology that could be used in 
manufacturing and industry. However, even the role of the state in violence is debated, with 
studies like Acemoglu et al. (2005) maintaining that strong states pose obstacles to development 
Introduction  
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and that institutions which allowed merchant classes to restrict the power of monarchies – 
encouraging technological innovation through stable property rights – were key both to curbing 
conflict and encouraging development. 
In sum, links between violence and development have largely been indirect; tending to 
focus on military conflict and military spending, violent crime as a sub-question to overall 
criminal activity, or the determinants of crime from psychological and anthropometric 
backgrounds. One of the reasons for the lack of direct violence research in development 
contexts is simply the lack of data, especially over the long run. Data is often scarce and 
unreliable due to underreporting because of the illegal nature of violent activity, and because 
victims fear further violence if they do report their stories (Mauro and Carmeci 2007). 
Additionally, long-run homicide series for European countries, which would have facilitated 
long-run development studies, have only reached back as far as the 19th century until recently. 
Data from other world regions usually have an even more limited historical reach and are even 
less convenient for long-run analysis. As such, the lack of violence studies in the development 
literature may reflect a problem of access rather than relevance. 
However, recent advances have been made. First Gurr (1981, for England) and then 
Eisner (2014, for selected countries across Europe) collected city-level homicide data and then 
recreated national homicide series for certain European countries, stretching all the way back 
to the 13th century. Additionally, Eisner (2011) and Cummins (2017) have examined trends in 
interpersonal elite violence using regicide 4  and nobilicide,5  respectively, since the Middle 
Ages. 
One of the main contributions of this dissertation is to build on their ideas and introduce 
a wide-ranging indicator for interpersonal elite violence through which long-run violence 
 
4 The killing of kings and other rulers. 
5 The killing of noblemen. 
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research can be conducted. Using the relative dearth of research into long-run violent activity 
as motivation, this dissertation also aims to contribute towards a number of development-related 
debates by investigating the role of violence.  
 
A.2. Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of three distinct chapters that are referred to as studies or 
papers, following a cumulative thesis approach. Together, they contribute to our understanding 
of the role that violence has played since the 6th century and of the consequences that it 
continues to have today.  
The first two papers, chapters B and C, concern interpersonal elite violence and employ 
the regicide indicator to investigate the interplay between it, elite human capital and state 
capacity between the 6th and 19th centuries. Although chapter C motivates and introduces the 
regicide indicator, it is positioned after chapter B. This is done because these papers were 
written simultaneously and chapter B received more attention at conferences, providing 
motivation to more clearly explain the concepts which overlap the two papers in chapter B. The 
reader is advised to accommodate the regicide indicator as a valid measure of interpersonal elite 
violence in chapter B, before putting it to scrutiny in chapter C. Chapter D then moves the 
analysis of elite violence from this deeply historical period towards the present, analysing the 
global financial market impacts of assassinations since 1970. 
Since the role of violence in economic development has been largely overlooked in 
favour of factors such as institutions and geography, I, along with Jörg Baten,6 test for a causal 
relationship between our new regicide indicator and elite human capital. Human capital is an 
essential ingredient for economic growth as it drives innovation and technological 
 
6 Jörg Baten co-authored chapters B and C, contributing approximately 20% of the work to each paper. 
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development, at least in conjunction with inclusive institutions (see Becker 1962; Mincer 1984; 
Acemoglu and Dell 2010; and Barro 2001). Therefore, we develop a new proxy for elite human 
capital and use our regicide indicator in an instrumental variable setting to determine a causal 
effect of elite violence on elite human capital formation. Since much of the literature on 
economic growth and development focuses on institutions, geography and natural resources 
rather than violence, the causal inverse relationship that we derive is an important result. By 
comparing Eastern and Western Europe, we also find evidence that the Great Divergence – the 
developmental leap that separated Western Europe from the rest of the world – at least partially 
had its roots in violence as far back as the 14th century. 
In chapter C, also with Jörg Baten, the regicide indicator is formally introduced and 
motivated by comparing it to alternative measurements of interpersonal violence and elite 
violence, as well as to the historical narratives of European history between the 6th and 19th 
centuries. After establishing the indicator, the long-run role of the state in European violence is 
investigated. The role of the state in shaping violence has been the subject of conflicting 
hypotheses in the economics literature, with researchers either arguing that states promoted 
violent activity and used military conflict to develop, or that they helped to restrain violent 
activity (Pinker 2011; Broadberry and Harrison 2005; Tilly 1975; Dincecco 2015). We find a 
negative relationship between territorial state capacity and interpersonal elite violence, which 
begins in the 10th century. This result is interpreted as states having had a largely pacifying role 
on trends and regional differences in interpersonal elite violence, at least since the High 
Medieval Period, although the relationship is not necessarily causal.  
From the assassinations of kings and other rulers, the third study moves the dissertation 
to a more modern application of elite violence, the assassinations of modern politicians. 
Specifically, the chapter considers how murdered politicians have signalled shocks to political 
risk and how financial markets have reacted in terms of asset allocation since 1970. How 
Introduction  
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investors allocate their holdings influences the levels of financing available to firms or national 
treasuries, affecting the ability of firms to develop their industries or the ability of governments 
to provide public services and direct fiscal policy. 
Ordinarily, in accordance with modern portfolio theory, investors should reallocate their 
holdings from risky assets toward the risk-free rate in periods of heightened risk (Markowitz 
1952). Generally, much of this reallocation should be a substitution from equity to bonds, and 
sovereign bonds in particular, since they are underwritten by entire governments instead of 
banks or smaller financial institutions. Accordingly, this chapter investigates the rationality of 
investor reactions to political shocks when the government is both the source of the risk and the 
traditional investment safe haven. Additionally, the paper differentiates between developed and 
developing states and finds somewhat disparate effects and responses times. Finally, a fifth 
chapter provides concluding remarks from all three studies as well as an outlook on potential 
future research. 
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B. Elite Violence and Elite Numeracy in Europe from 500 – 1900 
CE: Roots of the Divergence.7 
 
 
Abstract 
We present new evidence of elite numeracy in Europe since the 6th century CE. During 
the early medieval period, Western Europe had no advantage over the east, but the development 
of relative violence levels changed this. After implementing an instrumental variable strategy 
and a battery of robustness tests, we find a substantial relationship between elite numeracy and 
elite violence, and conclude that violence had a detrimental impact on human capital formation. 
For example, the disparities in violence between Western and Eastern or South-Eastern Europe, 
helped to shape the famous divergence movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Co-authored by Jörg Baten. He contributed approximately 20% of the work to this paper. 
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B.1. Introduction 
In this study, we assess the joint evolution of elite violence and elite numeracy across 
Europe over 1400 years (including Asia Minor and the Caucasus). New evidence on elite 
numeracy is presented for the first time and the relationship between elite violence and elite 
numeracy is examined. The study uses a variety of econometric techniques, from panel 
regressions to spatial methods, first difference regressions to instrumental variable estimation. 
We find that declines in violence determined the growth of elite numeracy in certain European 
countries since the medieval period, such as England and the Netherlands. Similarly, higher 
levels of elite violence corresponded to lower elite numeracy in Eastern and South-Eastern 
European countries, for example, leading to Europe’s famous divergence movement (van 
Zanden 2009, 2016, Broadberry 2013). Since war and elite violence might be correlated in early 
periods, our findings also stimulate the theoretical debate that “war generates states” (and state 
capacity to tax in particular; Tilly et al. 1975), by providing contrasting results to this widely 
accepted view. We discuss this question in the following parts of the study. 
Additionally, we contribute to a modestly sized but growing literature on elite 
numeracy. To demonstrate that the upper tail of the knowledge distribution mattered for growth, 
Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2015) use the example of the industrial revolution in France. 
Inspired engineers and bold entrepreneurs were able to establish firms using recently developed 
technologies, and to develop various technologies further. Baten and van Zanden (2008) studied 
advanced human capital using book consumption, and drew parallels with the 16th century when 
several European countries managed to set up growth-promoting institutions due to human 
capital. This resulted in a system of trading cities and merchants who coordinated world trade 
as far back as the 16th century. In this study, given the clear relevance of human capital, we take 
an additional step and uncover the medieval roots of the divergence of elite numeracy in Europe.  
Our approach allows us to resolve crucial questions in European history, such as why 
elite numeracy advanced or declined in certain regions and periods rather than others, and why 
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that process took place at disparate rates. For example, there was a strong increase in elite 
numeracy in Italy and Iberia during the late medieval and renaissance periods, while it stagnated 
in South-Eastern Europe at the same time. Before this period, the European east – which 
included Constantinople as well as certain less densely populated regions – had an elite 
numeracy level at least equal to that of Western Europe. 
The debate around explanations for the Great Divergence, which saw Western Europe 
become the world’s chief economic force during the modern era, has produced advocates for 
geography, institutional design, gender equality, human capital and a host of other explanatory 
factors as key elements of Western Europe’s ascent (Bosker et al. 2013; Allen 2001; Diebolt, 
Le Chapelain and Menard 2017; Diebolt and Perrin 2013 and Broadberry 2013). In this study, 
we suggest that the role of violence has been under-researched and largely neglected (aside 
from certain contributions: Cummins 2017; Findlay and O’Rourke 2009). Therefore, we 
explore the co-evolution of non-violent behaviour and human capital among elites and conclude 
that violence played a significant role in shaping economic development through human capital 
formation. 
Our strategy for approaching this question relies on proxy indicators, as standard 
indicators of violence and human capital are not available for early periods of European history. 
Hence, we establish a new indicator that is able to trace the development of elite numeracy over 
the very long term – the share of rulers for whom a birth year is reported in conventional 
biographical sources. We reason that a ruler’s birth year was regularly reported and entered into 
historical chronologies only if elite bureaucracies around the ruler were capable of processing 
numerical information with ease; otherwise, it was simply forgotten and left unrecorded. Below, 
we discuss a number of potential biases and reason that they do not invalidate our proxy 
indicator for elite numeracy. We also report correlations with other indicators of elite numeracy 
in medieval societies for which both metrics were simultaneously available in the same location. 
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As a proxy indicator for interpersonal violence among the elite, we use the share of 
murdered rulers. If killed, rulers were typically murdered by their own family members or by 
competing nobility (see chapter C). The kingdom’s elite was also affected by the fear of 
becoming victim to violent death themselves if the ruler was killed – murder, particularly of a 
central figure, creates an atmosphere of fear in society. This external effect of violence is even 
supported by 20th century evidence from psychology (OECD 2011, Baten et al. 2014). We have 
also studied to what degree regicide is correlated with nobilicide, the killing of the nobility, as 
Cummins (2017) provides valuable data on this (for nobility killed in military conflicts). The 
correlation is very close, indicating that regicide may also serve as a proxy indicator for the 
wider elite (see appendix, figure A.B.1.). 
Clearly, violence was not the only factor that mattered for elite numeracy. Hence, we 
also include religion, geography, institutional factors such as serfdom and early electoral 
elements of ruler succession, as well as other potential determinants.  
Our work is also clearly related to the “war generates states” hypothesis, going back to 
Tilly et al. (1975). While many influential studies traditionally focused on the strong state as an 
obstacle to development (Acemoglu et al. 2005), a recent strand of the literature picked up the 
Tilly et al. hypothesis, arguing that the experiences of war and conflict allowed tax capacities 
to develop – most notably during the Hundred Years’ War in France, which stimulated 
innovations in tax collection and financed standing armies (North 2000, Hoffman 2012). A 
wider set of related studies focused on war as the basis of a state’s capacity to tax (see, for 
example, Dincecco 2015, O’Brien 2011, Hoffman 2015). In contrast, our study finds that elite 
violence was rather a development hurdle during the medieval and early modern periods. How 
can these seemingly contrasting views be reconciled? Can we gain additional theoretical 
insights from this incongruity? We agree that state capacity had positive effects, in general, as 
Dincecco and Katz (2014) have shown. However, three facts were crucial: firstly, wars might 
have been the trigger rather than the underlying reason for developing tax capabilities. The 
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famous example of France’s development of tax capacity during the Hundred Years’ War first 
took place in a country that had already developed low elite violence and high elite numeracy 
in earlier periods, as we show below, preparing a more serviceable environment for state 
capacity. The trigger of the devastating war with England convinced the French nobility that 
permanent taxation would be necessary, but this would not have been possible in another setting 
with a similarly devastating war, in Bulgaria during the 13th and 14th centuries for example. 
Secondly, tax-financed military expenditure also increased the defensive abilities of states and 
they became able to avoid military conflicts on their own soil. For example, Britain did not 
experience many invasions after 1066 and most of its interstate conflicts were executed on 
foreign territory. France had many military conflicts on German soil and in other countries 
between the Hundred Years’ War, ending in the 15th century, and the late 19th century. The 
Netherlands mostly initiated maritime wars after building the capacity to tax during the 16th 
century. Hence, the general population of these states with high tax capacities arguably did not 
suffer as much from war, nor did the local elites. Whether this was in fact the case is an 
empirical question that we will study in the following. Thirdly, the changes in military 
technology that took place during the early modern period required tax capacity – emphasizing 
gunpowder and the “trace italienne” style of city fortification – but they also protected both the 
general population and elites better than characteristics of the medieval style of warfare ever 
did (Gennaioli and Voth 2015). 
In order to study the relationship between elite violence and elite numeracy, we use a 
battery of econometric techniques. Since endogeneity, spatial autocorrelation or temporal 
autocorrelation may affect our estimates, we use two-stage least squares, controls for spatial 
autocorrelation, unit root tests, time fixed effects and first difference estimates. 
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B.2. Measuring Elite Numeracy 
Our indicator for elite numeracy is the share of known birth years among all rulers 
residing in the capitals of their principalities. We organise these data by century (and two-
century periods for our graphs) based on the end of each ruler’s reign. We propose that for the 
birth year of a ruler to be entered into a kingdom’s historical records, a certain level of numerical 
sophistication is required among the ruling elite. This evidence does not necessarily estimate 
the numerical ability of the rulers themselves but rather that of the government and bureaucratic 
elite around them and, by implication, the elites of the polity in general. This indicator shares 
similarities with A’Hearn et al.’s (2009) ABCC Index, which uses the prevalence of age heaping 
to estimate numerical proficiency – age heaping being the phenomenon of less numerate 
individuals rounding their ages when they are unable to report them accurately. Admittedly, 
one could imagine a situation in which political elites were highly numerate but economic elites 
were not. However, these social groups were usually highly connected (Mokyr 2005). 
As more traditional indicators of education such as literacy rates, school enrolment, or 
age heaping-based numeracy are not available for most medieval European countries, the 
‘known ruler birth year’ proxy allows us to trace elite numeracy in periods and world regions 
for which no other indicators currently exist. 
We assess the validity of this measurement by using insights from alternative sources, 
only including cases where information for at least ten rulers is available. Most notably, Buringh 
and van Zanden (2009) traced elite European education through the number of monastery 
manuscripts that were kept between 700 and 1500 CE, using them to construct a per capita 
indicator. In figure B.1., we document the substantial correlation between their proxy measure 
of elite numeracy and ours for eleven European countries. Although there is naturally a certain 
amount of variation resulting in some observations deviating from the trend line, the correlation 
remains highly significant (correlation coefficient ρ=0.67). 
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Likewise, we compare our indicator to the rate of ‘birth year heaping’ in Cummins’ 
(2017) database of European noblemen from 800 to 1800 CE and again find a highly significant 
correlation (figure B.2.; here, the correlation coefficient is ρ=-0.588). 
Similar comparisons with another indicator can also be made for China. As another large 
and fairly stable world region it can also provide broadly applicable insights into long-run 
development processes. An early indicator of numeracy and human capital used for China 
concerns the number of “literati” among the population. 
During certain phases of Chinese history, most notably after nomadic invasions, the 
literati system was of reduced importance. These periods were also characterised by lower elite 
numeracy rates; as measured by the known ruler birth year proxy and seen in figure B.3.9 In 
sum, the Chinese evidence allows us to complement our comparisons of European monastery 
manuscripts and ‘birth year heaping’ with elite human capital in another world region. 
To estimate elite numeracy via the known birth year rate for medieval Europe, we had 
to make certain methodological decisions. For practical reasons, we assign modern country 
names to the geographic units we study, using the location of historical capitals within modern 
boundaries as our assignment criterion – as the kingdom’s elite mostly lived in these capitals. 
A large number of studies in economic history have used modern countries as their cross-
sectional units of analysis because this approach allows the tracing of long-run determinants, 
even if it invites a certain degree of measurement error. For example, Maddison (1998) traced 
post-Soviet economic growth and populations in former Soviet states back into Soviet times. 
The Clio-Infra database also allows us to study historical country units using their modern 
boundaries. If boundaries change, then using modern countries may seem somewhat 
anachronistic, but the insights gained by analysing the long-term development of these 
 
8 The relationship is negative because heaping measures innumeracy. 
9 Our literati data come from Deng (1993), where the literati indicator is the per capita literati membership rate, 
and exam frequency is measured by the number of exam sittings held per decade. 
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territorial units still provide valuable insights. Nevertheless, for most European countries, such 
as France, the UK and Spain, modern country borders are broadly compatible with historical 
boundaries. 
If there were concurrent rulers within the borders of modern countries (in smaller 
principalities, for example), we also assigned them to a modern country according to where 
their capital was located.10 The alternative, assigning elite numeracy values to grid cells across 
Europe, also leads to measurement error because we do not have measurements for all grid 
cells, only for those containing each capital city. Thus, we cannot measure any difference 
between grid cells containing capitals and those without. In fact, we could more precisely call 
our unit of observation the average elite numeracy of each capital situated in the territory of 
each modern country. For simplicity, we abbreviate this with the name of each modern country. 
The main explanatory variables that we assess below also relate to the same modern 
geographical units described here.  
 
B.3. Potential Biases of the “Known Birth Year” Indicator 
It is conceivable that the ‘known birth year’ indicator may suffer from potential biases 
that capture information unrelated to elite numeracy. We discuss these biases below and 
consider whether or not they are substantial. 
1. Ruler biographies, for example, were often only recorded many years after a ruler’s 
death, and the exact sources on which these were based are often unknown. Therefore, factors 
such as strong research traditions may have contributed to more detailed and complete 
chronologies of ruler birth years – with chronologists perhaps even calculating them based on 
significant events that occurred closer to the birth of an earlier ruler. Specifically, countries with 
 
10 Additionally, several smaller principalities within a modern country frequently allow us to reach our lower-
bound constraint of 10 rulers per country and century (though this lower bound is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, 
our results are not sensitive to it; see table A.B.10.). 
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strong university traditions such as England, France or Germany, might have boasted scholars 
who created detailed accounts of the medieval histories of their countries, leading to more 
accurate approximations of birth years that took place centuries later. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, many of these countries actually had lower known birth year rates in the Middle 
Ages than, for example, the regions in today’s Iraq, Turkey or Greece did (see below and in 
Baten 2018). Consequently, this notion is incompatible with the view that the research intensity 
of the last few centuries might have biased the elite numeracy estimates of medieval times. 
2. A second potential source of bias is the destruction of city archives, which might have 
resulted in the loss of previous records. However, royal chronologies were traditionally copied 
(Hanawalt and Reyerson 2004: 39). Even if one city archive were destroyed, prominent 
information such as that concerning a ruler would likely have been preserved in other libraries, 
books and supplementary written media. Moreover, we observe that the proportion of known 
ruler births often declined over time (figure B.18.). If the destruction of city archives were a 
core determinant of this indicator, we would have expected near zero values for the earlier 
centuries, which would suddenly reach 100% in later centuries. This does not occur in any of 
our series. Clearly, we should not assume a linear loss, but if some loss occurred due to the 
destruction of archives, one would expect some downward bias for known birth years to have 
occurred. However, we argue that since ruler lists were considered highly important pieces of 
information, they were usually kept by different people in different places and were therefore 
not lost after the destruction of one or even several city archives. Victorious invaders were also 
not necessarily interested in burning all written records, because keeping information about 
their newly conquered territories was vital. Hence, the burning of city archives was usually 
isolated and accidental. Even during the famously brutal Tamerlan invasions, not all cities and 
their archives were destroyed, because certain cities surrendered. Gaining power over cities and 
territories was Tamerlan’s main aim, not destroying them, though destruction did occur in 
several cases to generate terror (Kunt and Woodhead 1995: 857). 
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3. Third, and more relevantly for South-Eastern Europe, rulers who assumed the throne 
after an invasion might have been different from rulers born in the countries that they later 
ruled. For example, some rulers originated from less numerate, nomadic societies in Central 
Asia – such as the first of the early Bulgarian rulers. Here, we have to distinguish between a 
truly lower level of elite numeracy among these rulers and their elites, what we want to measure, 
and a bias that stems from a lack of information about their births in foreign and possibly distant 
lands. Being born elsewhere might imply less knowledge about the first generation of settlers, 
but the second generation should have already undergone a catch-up period in which to learn 
and record the second ruler’s birth year. Therefore, using a sufficient number of cases per period 
should mitigate any degree of bias that could potentially lead to concern. One famous example 
of a new political entity formed after a migration movement was the Bulgarian Empire (on the 
following, see Shepherd 2002). Originating on the plains of West Asia, the semi-nomadic 
Bulgars moved to the Balkans in several stages. Asparuh was the first ruler of the Bulgarian 
Empire after settling north of the Byzantine Empire. No birth year is known for him and it 
seems plausible that the human capital of his early imperial elite was modest, consistent with 
the above hypothesis. Contrastingly, his successor, Tervel, reorganised the empire. He 
cooperated with the Byzantines at first, before conflict later took place. Correspondingly, for 
him a birth year is known. These are individual examples and, hence, only have limited 
representativity, but they aptly illustrate the considerations above. 
4. A fourth possible bias could be that rulers who spent more time on the throne could 
have better established themselves and their policies, giving chronologists more reason and 
more time to document their birth years. We control for this potentially biasing effect by 
including the length of the ruler’s reign as a control variable, finding no relationship with the 
proportion of known ruler birth years (table B.3.). 
5. Finally, and possibly the most challenging potential bias to alleviate, the birth years 
of more famous rulers might have been better recorded. It is conceivable that events in the lives 
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of lesser rulers, who were placed under the suzerainty of an emperor, for example, would be 
less diligently documented. However, birth years for several of the most famous rulers in world 
history, such as Charlemagne, were not documented; this is a first hint that ‘fame bias’ may not 
have been so crucial. Nevertheless, we can also control for this ‘fame bias’ to a certain extent 
by controlling for whether the rulers of each kingdom were under the suzerainty of an overlord. 
Rulers with a more dependent, governor-type function most likely attracted less attention from 
chronologists.11 We find, in table B.3., that rulers who served this governor-type function were 
not significantly different to their overlords in terms of elite numeracy, after controlling for 
country and century fixed effects. In conclusion, these developments speak against any fame 
bias under the assumption that fame and suzerainty are related. 
Furthermore, we include the area of each kingdom as a second control variable against 
more famous or powerful rulers being better documented. Although not all powerful rulers held 
large territories, rulers of powerful kingdoms such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Ottoman 
Empire, Poland-Lithuania and the Kievan Rus certainly did. Nevertheless, like our indicator for 
suzerainty, kingdom area does not exhibit any relationship with the proportion of known ruler 
birth years. Throughout the paper, we compare our regression specifications both with and 
without these ‘elite controls’. 
 
B.4. Measuring Potential Determinants of Elite Violence 
Elite violence could potentially be an important determinant of elite numeracy. 
Cummins (2017) argues that a substantial share of noblemen in the medieval period died 
through acts of violence, including kings, and particularly on the battlefield. Given that 
lifespans and the prevalence of violence are negatively correlated – though not perfectly, as 
 
11 As we use the location of a kingdom’s capital in order to link kingdoms to modern countries, some countries 
might have had multiple rulers simultaneously. Consequently, we use the ‘autonomy’ indicator variable to 
distinguish between the decision-making powers of these rulers. 
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other factors also influence lifespans – we argue that part of the underinvestment in elite human 
capital during this early period was caused by lower lifespans. Individuals had had fewer 
incentives to invest in numerical human capital if they expected to die early. While we measure 
the murders of rulers, external effects on the kingdom’s elite are very likely. The wider elite is 
also affected by the fear of becoming victims to violence if the ruler is killed – murder, 
particularly of a central figure, creates an atmosphere of fear in society (on recent evidence of 
the external effects of murder, see OECD 2011, Baten et al. 2014). Moreover, after the repeated 
killing of rulers – both in battle or in non-battle situations – specific value systems often 
developed, typically related to “cultures of revenge” (Pust 2019). While most inhabitants of 
wealthy modern societies consider ‘blood revenge’ outdated and unimaginable, the 
contemporaries of the 14th century, for example, considered it imperative. It was closely related 
to the ‘culture of honour’, which led aristocrats to die in duels even as late as in the 19th century, 
attempting to enact revenge for insults or violence against their relatives. The persistence of 
these cultures of honour has also been studied for the Southern United States (see Nunn 2012). 
Elias (1939) described a long-term process in which societies and elites in particular 
became less violent over time, adopting and accepting greater state capacities and a culture of 
increasingly civil, non-violent behaviour. He termed this humankind’s “civilising process”. In 
societies of high state capacity – or even a widely accepted monopoly of the state to execute 
violence – returns to investments in education by meritocratic elites were certainly higher. 
Eisner (2014) argued that the complex interaction between more education and less violence in 
a society sets a “swords to words” process in motion, in which potential conflicts were 
increasingly solved through negotiation rather than violence (Gennaioli and Voth 2015; Pinker 
2011). Cummins (2017) finds that increasingly fewer European nobility were killed in battles 
after 1550 CE. Baten and Steckel (2018) also studied the history of interpersonal violence in 
Europe by tracing the proportion of cranial traumata cases among 4738 skeletons that cover the 
period 300 to 1900 CE, finding that interpersonal violence remained very high until the late 
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Middle Ages before rapidly declining. Eisner (2011) also collected evidence on 45 European 
kingdoms, documenting a decline in the rate of regicide over time – regicide being the 
assassination of kings and other rulers. If killed, rulers were usually the victims of their own 
families or competing nobility. The rates of regicide and of rulers killed in battles declined 
strongly between the early medieval period and the modern era (see chapter C for an 
econometric analysis with a strongly expanded European sample and figure B.7. on regional 
regicide rates). 
To crosscheck the plausibility of our own evidence of declining violence over time, as 
well as the relationship between elite and population-wide violence, we compare evidence on 
regicide and homicide for a number of European countries for which Eisner (2014) presented 
early evidence of homicide rates. In figure B.4., we can see that both series showed very similar 
trends across the countries where data are available. Moreover, deviations from the general 
downward trend also often occurred at similar times (one exception being Italy during the 19th 
century). This strong relationship also validates our use of regicide as a proxy for interpersonal 
elite violence, discussed in more depth in chapter C). 
Although these subfigures all display strong declines, the panel unit root tests that we 
run in the appendix (table A.B.2.) lead us to conclude that regicide, over the whole panel, is a 
stationary process. Nevertheless, we include time fixed effects as a measure against non-
stationarity in our empirical analysis. Finally, temporal autocorrelation does not play a strong 
role because our main results also hold in first differences (see appendix, tables A.B.7 and 
A.B.8.). 
For the Middle East, Baten (2018) adopted a similar strategy by analysing the number 
of rulers who were killed in battles and by other forms of regicide, mostly due to conflicts over 
who should rule. Interestingly, we found that Europe tends to display diametrically opposite 
trends to the Middle East. For a large portion of the period that Baten (2018) studied, both battle 
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deaths and murder rates within the ruling houses increased, whereas they declined in Europe, 
as we describe in detail below. 
For the remainder of this paper, we use regicide as our indicator of elite violence. Our 
regicide dataset was initially built using the rulers found in Eisner’s (2011) original regicide 
study, comprising 1513 rulers from across 45 kingdoms. We then strongly expanded this dataset 
with an array of supplementary sources, chiefly Morby’s (1989) ‘Dynasties of the World’ and 
Bosworth’s (1996) ‘The New Islamic Dynasties’ as well as many other individual biographies 
and encyclopaedia entries. The expanded dataset consists of 4066 rulers from 92 kingdoms 
across the period 500–1900 CE and comprises all of Europe (see chapter C for more details). 
We differentiate ‘battle death’ from killing outside of battle. Admittedly, the two 
variables are not always perfectly distinguishable, but our definition of battle violence is to be 
killed in a battle.  
Finally, our regicide evidence covers all states, for almost all periods. This is not 
possible for other indicators such as conflict counts. Pinker (2011) studied conflicts over time, 
arguing that both overall and interpersonal elite violence declined despite the number of 
conflicts in some countries seeming to increase over time. Accordingly, Pinker criticised simple 
conflict counts as uninformative due to three different biases. First, the number of casualties 
per capita needs to be measured accurately, which is not often done. Secondly, the number of 
conflict victims per capita needs to be quantified, particularly because simple conflict counts 
are higher in more densely populated countries with larger populations. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most importantly, psychologists have identified a strong perception bias – we know much more 
about minor conflicts in Northern France or Germany than, for example, in Ukraine or in the 
Balkans during the 15th century. Conflicts between neighbouring Ukrainian cities during the 
late medieval period would probably not have been documented, whereas similar conflicts 
between two Western German cities, for example, might have indeed been recorded. 
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B.5. Regional Patterns of Elite Numeracy 
When looking at regional trends in elite numeracy (figure B.5.; see table A.B.1. for 
regional classifications), we see that North-Western Europe did not always lead the way. Rather 
South-Western Europe led with Iberia and Italy, while South-Eastern Europe had the highest 
levels of numeracy during the early Middle Ages, led by the East Roman Empire, although it 
fell back thereafter. North-Western Europe was on a more stable growth path, however, taking 
the lead in the 10th – 13th centuries. By the 14th and 15th centuries, Iberia and Italy had caught 
back up to North-Western Europe, as described by Broadberry (2013). By then, however, the 
UK had already reached full elite numeracy under our indicator. 
Eastern Europe began the sixth century with approximately 20% of its ruler birth years 
known, or just slightly lower. Its developmental path for numeracy would occur at a much 
slower rate, particularly in Romania, where the proportion of known ruler birth years was less 
than 5% when its kingdoms began to emerge in the 12th century. Only later does Romania 
exhibit a strong growth rate in elite numeracy. In the period between the 12th and 18th centuries, 
other Eastern European countries lagged significantly behind their North-Western counterparts. 
South-Eastern Europe is an interesting case in which we can clearly see the impact of 
historical developments.12 Admittedly, we have few observations for the East Roman Empire 
in the first period (with its capital located in today’s Turkey), but our figure (B.5.) shows a clear 
deterioration of elite numeracy during the decline of the Byzantine Empire, followed by 
stagnation in the years that followed. This stagnation also coincided with various invasions 
from Central Asia. Finally, South-Eastern Europe exhibited strong growth in elite numeracy 
after the Great Plague, catching up to both groups of Western European countries by the 18th 
century, a lag of approximately 400 years. Central European trends are not shown here because 
 
12 Additionally, it should also be noted that South-Eastern Europe is heavily influenced by the East Roman Empire 
in the earlier centuries of our sample. Before its decline, the Byzantine Empire displayed much less violence and 
higher rates of numeracy than are associated with its neighbouring kingdoms at the time. 
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they have a very high starting point and quickly reach 100%. However, they are presented as a 
group in figure B.6., which plots elite numeracy for broader regions in a single figure. 
In figure B.6., two clear patterns emerge within Europe’s regional development in elite 
numeracy. Although it is difficult to confidently assert initial positions in the 6th century, it 
seems that all regions aside from Central Europe had roughly similar levels of elite numeracy 
– ca. 40% – around the 10th century, before diverging drastically. While Central, North-Western 
and South-Western Europe (with a small lag) exhibit strong increases from this point onwards, 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe display stagnant or even declining series that only begin to 
increase during the period 1500–1700 CE. Eastern Europe only catches up to Central and 
Western Europe towards the end of the study period. 
Moreover, the similarity in trends of neighbouring regions makes our estimates more 
plausible. For the remainder of our analysis, we will revert to country-level units instead of the 
regional level used in the figures above. The advantage of using more aggregated units for 
figures is that we obtain smoother trends, while this is less important for regression analysis. 
When using regional units, we find the same overall regression results, but they are less robust 
due to smaller sample sizes (see table A.B.10. for a robustness check at the regional level). 
We study a very long time-frame of elite violence and elite numeracy in this paper and 
it is quite likely that the relationship between the two variables may have changed, especially 
as military technology transformed, state organization developed and the intensity of nomadic 
invasions varied. Hence, we look at a series of scatterplots, first separating the study period by 
the first three centuries (6th to 8th centuries) and then bicentennial periods thereafter (9th and 
10th  centuries, 11th and 12th century etc.; figures B.8. to B.12). We invert violence into ‘non-
violence’, as this makes the graphic easier to read. The relationship between elite non-violence 
and elite numeracy is already clearly visible in the eighth century, with Spain (es) holding one 
of the highest elite numeracy values when Al-Andalus had reached its peak (figure B.8.). In 
contrast, Spain had some of the worst values in terms of elite violence and elite numeracy under 
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the west Gothic rulers of the sixth century. The decline of the East Roman Empire (tr) is also 
apparent here. Russia (ru) and Ukraine (ua) were more extreme, with all rulers in Russia being 
killed violently. 
The following period was characterised by the Hungarian invasions that affected large 
parts of Europe, as well as more localised conflicts in South-Eastern Europe (figure B.9.; the 
Arabic and Bulgarian invasions of the East Roman Empire (tr), for example, and the Vikings 
in the north-west). Muslim Spain (es) was still among the low-violence and high-numeracy 
cases, as was the Holy Roman Empire (de); although the population suffered terribly from 
Hungarian invasions, the Emperors were not killed. Ukraine (ua), and the states and 
principalities on the area of modern Turkey (tr) suffered the most. 
The following period of the 11th and 12th centuries had no major nomadic invasions 
(rather, European states invaded in the Middle East), and European principalities reached a 
greater stage of feudal development (figure B.10.; also see Hehl 2004). We observe that the 
relationship between elite violence and elite numeracy was weaker during this ‘high medieval 
peace period’ – violence was less detrimental for overall development. This changed during the 
13th and 14th centuries with the arrival of nomadic Mongolian invasions. During this period, the 
impact of violence was larger again, as can be seen by the slope of the regression line (figure 
B.11.). During this period, state organization continued to develop and France made particularly 
strong progress in tax institutions during the Hundred Years’ War (North 2000).13  
Finally, during the 15th and 16th centuries, we observe an even stronger east-west 
disparity. A cluster of Western and Central European countries had almost no elite violence by 
 
13 Another substantial change that took place during this period was the ‘infantry revolution’. How did the infantry 
revolution affect battle violence of the elite? We might expect that the reduced importance of heavy cavalry and 
its substitution for infantry reduced battle-related violence among the elite. However, this reduction might have 
taken time to come into effect. During the 14th and 15th centuries, the number of battle deaths among noblemen 
might have even increased. The famous battle of Crécy is a good example, as many noblemen were killed by 
English longbows or other military innovations. 
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this time, along with near complete rates of elite numeracy. In contrast, Ukraine (ua), Albania 
(al) and other Eastern and South-Eastern countries lagged far behind during this period. Some 
outliers combine high violence and low numeracy (see Cyprus [cy], Luxembourg [lu] etc. in 
figure B.10.), but these were small principalities with lower observational densities. During this 
period, the new, resource-intensive city protection of the ‘Trace Italienne’ began to require 
increasingly greater tax resources for military success (Gennaioli and Voth 2015). Western 
powers such as Britain (uk), France (fr) and the Netherlands (nl) were better suited to develop 
these tax capabilities, and the evidence from regicide and battle deaths suggests that this 
resulted in a decline of violent deaths among the elite. 
 
B.6. Empirical Analysis 
The independent variables used in this analysis fall into two distinct groups: those that 
control for potential biases that may cause the known ruler birth year indicator to diverge from 
a ‘true’ measurement of elite numeracy, and those that constitute explanatory variables – 
variables that help to assess the potential impact of elite violence on elite numeracy. 
Because a longer reign may provide greater opportunity for chronologists to record a 
ruler’s birth year, we control for the average length of reign across each country and century. 
To control for the power and influence of each kingdom, we use their areas in square kilometres 
(Nüssli 2010) as well as whether rulers had the freedom to act and set policy autonomously, as 
opposed to being under the suzerainty of an overlord. Table B.3. shows that neither reign length 
nor autonomy significantly affects the likelihood of a ruler’s birth year being recorded, although 
kingdom area becomes marginally significant when other explanatory variables and controls 
are included.14 
 
14 As a precaution, the full fixed effects specification from section B.6.1. is repeated using the predicted values for 
the known-birth indicator in the appendix. Although some of the coefficients change marginally, all of our 
conclusions remain the same. 
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Our first explanatory variable is the ‘proportion of rulers killed in battle’. This variable 
provides information on civil wars and external military pressures on each kingdom, which may 
have affected elite numeracy through the destruction of educational infrastructure or reduced 
incentives to invest in elite numeracy due to lower life expectancies (Cummins 2017). 
Moreover, battle deaths and regicide are correlated, meaning that excluding battle deaths as a 
control variable could lead to an overstatement of any effect of regicide on elite numeracy.  
Urbanisation rates are widely used in the economic history literature and act as a broad 
control variable for factors that could confound the relationship between elite violence and elite 
numeracy. They have also been employed as a proxy indicator for income among early societies 
in which other income proxy data are unavailable (Bosker et al. 2013; De Long and Shleifer 
1993; Acemoglu et al. 2005; Nunn and Qian 2011; Cantoni 2015). Bosker et al. (2013) 
hypothesise that part of this relationship works through agricultural productivity, because a 
productive agricultural sector is required to support a large urban centre and urban areas cannot 
produce their own agricultural goods. We admit that, as urbanisation may be endogenous, there 
may be a trade-off between including an endogenous control and allowing omitted variable bias 
to enter the model. Therefore, we only include urbanisation in a subset of regression models. 
We also introduce a measure of institutional quality as a potential determinant of elite 
numeracy. Our indicator for this is the mode of ruler succession, as this captures a certain 
preference for the division and limitation of dynastic power.15 We use a three-category indicator 
to describe whether a ruler obtained their position through inheritance, partial election or full 
election by the aristocracy (as in Venice, for example).16 The differences in institutional quality 
between states, seen through modes of succession, are not as large as those between democracy 
 
15 Division and limitation of power among other elites, since universal suffrage is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
16 Among partial electoral systems, we include ceremonial systems in which a vote took place but the current 
ruler’s heir was consistently elected. For example, a ceremonial system was always in place in the Holy Roman 
Empire between 1453 and 1740, where a member of the House of Habsburg was consistently elected. We propose 
that ceremonial elections at least indicate a preference for dividing power over autocracy. 
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and autocracy, but evidence on democratic structures does not exist for the earlier periods under 
study here. However, a preference for the division of power reduces the likelihood of 
unconstrained totalitarianism. Again, we expect this aspect of institutional quality to be 
positively correlated with elite numeracy. 
Next, we use estimates of pastureland area from Goldewijk et al. (2017). We transform 
the variable to pastureland per square kilometre per capita and then standardise it to a [0, 1] 
index. Motivation for including this control is that pastureland provides nutritional advantages, 
and improved nutrition is known to have positive implications for human capital (Schultz 1997; 
Victoria et al. 2008). Second, numerous studies have used pastureland and pastoral productivity 
as means of estimating female labour force participation, providing information on female 
autonomy and gender inequality, and perhaps elite human capital as a result (Alesina et al. 2013; 
de Pleijt et al. 2016; Voigtländer and Voth 2013; Baten et al. 2017). This mechanism functions 
through women’s comparative physical disadvantage, relative to men, when ploughing fields 
and performing other tasks required when crop farming. Over time, this tendency developed 
into a social norm that saw men work in the fields while women took care of ‘the home’ 
(Alesina et al. 2013). However, when cattle and other domestic animals were present, their care 
became the task of women, boosting female labour participation and the contributions of 
women to household income. With increased income contributions, female autonomy increases 
and gender inequality is reduced, allowing women to develop their own human capital and 
contribute to economic development (Diebolt and Perrin 2013). 
Fourth, as a counterweight to the pasture variable, we also use cropland. Like 
pastureland, cropland should describe agricultural and nutritional development but should also 
emphasise gender inequality for the reasons just mentioned. Therefore, its coefficient should be 
positive if nutrition, in terms of calories, is more important for elite numeracy, and negative if 
gender inequality is. The cropland variable is also transformed into per square kilometre per 
capita terms and then standardised (Goldewijk et al. 2017). 
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Last, we include a variable for the second serfdom to assess whether the inequality that 
it wrought had any impact on elite numeracy in Eastern Europe. This is coded as a dummy 
variable for all of Eastern Europe from the 16th until the 18th century and until the 19th century 
in Russia, where serfdom was only officially abolished under Tsar Alexander II in 1861. 
In a section estimating random effects models (section B.6.3.), we also include religious 
and geographical factors, which are mostly time-invariant. 
 
B.6.1. Fixed Effects Specification 
We undertake an empirical analysis that consists of three parts. We first employ a fixed 
effects specification to test the existence and robustness of the relationship between elite 
violence and elite numeracy. Thereafter we implement an instrumental variable strategy and 
endeavour to find a causal effect of elite violence on elite numeracy and, lastly, we run a random 
effects specification to add time invariant (or almost invariant) factors.17 
The fixed effects specification is set up as follows: 
 
 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑘𝜓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
where αi are country fixed effects, γt are two-century fixed effects, ψit is a vector of the 
control variables described above and εit is an error term that captures time-variant 
unobservables. We also make use of clustering at the country level, as it would be unrealistic 
to assume that within-country observations are entirely independent of one another, and 
estimate robust standard errors. We also use bootstrapped standard errors by employing the 
wild bootstrap procedure of Cameron et al. (2008, see notes to table B.4.). 
 
17 We also conduct spatial regressions (appendix B.10.3.) to uncover the effects of spatial autocorrelation. 
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We immediately see that both the regicide and battle death indicators enter into each 
regression model significantly and with a negative coefficient (table B.4.). These coefficients 
are also fairly stable across our specifications, implying that our control variables are less 
important for elite numeracy than violence. The coefficient for regicide remains between 
approximately -0.42 and -0.51, which can be interpreted as a one percentage point increase in 
regicide being associated with a 0.42 to 0.51 percentage-point decrease in the rate of known 
birth years. Alternatively, a one standard deviation increase in elite violence is associated with 
a 7.4-to-8.9 percentage point decrease in elite numeracy, which is a substantial effect. However, 
in the same way that violence could have acted as a restraining factor on the growth of elite 
numeracy over time, it is also possible that causality runs in the other direction. 
Like regicide, the battle indicator also yields significant and negative coefficients that 
are robust to the introduction of control variables. These coefficients are approximately one-
third larger than those for regicide (in absolute terms) and fall between approximately -0.66 and 
-0.70. However, the distribution of battle death frequency is narrower than that for regicide, 
meaning that a one standard deviation increase in battle deaths is associated with a 5.4 to 5.8 
percentage point decline in elite numeracy. 
None of the control variables appear to have significant impacts in estimating elite 
numeracy after including both country and two-century fixed effects, although the results for 
pastureland and cropland (proportions per square kilometre, per capita) are still interesting. In 
isolation, neither of these variables enters into any of the regressions significantly; however, 
together they reveal drastically disparate results. If either the cropland or pastureland variables 
had significantly and positively entered into regressions four and five, this would have provided 
evidence for the hypothesis that nutrition improves numeracy and human capital. This is not 
the case here, but because the coefficient for pastureland is significantly positive while the 
coefficient for cropland is significantly negative when the variables enter together in regressions 
six to eight, this may have implications for gender inequality in accordance with the Alesina et 
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al. (2013) and de Pleijt et al. (2016) hypothesis. Consequently, this result also hints that 
improved gender equality may have improved elite numeracy in Europe. 
Residual scatterplots allow us to compare our dependent variable and independent 
variable of interest more directly. We first run our standard fixed effects regression from table 
B.4. while omitting elite violence, and then regressing elite violence on all other explanatory 
variables.18 Figure B.13. shows the relationship between the residuals of both regressions, 
allowing us to conclude that the controlled relationship between elite numeracy and elite 
violence is indeed strongly negative. This also allows us to conclude that the results are not 
driven by a small number of outliers. 
Observations from the 6th century territories of today’s Russia (ru) and Montenegro 
(me), and from Lithuania (lt) in the 14th century, show high residual violence and low residual 
elite numeracy. Conversely, there are cases such as the East Roman Empire (with its capital in 
what is today Turkey [tr]) that have low residual violence and high residual elite numeracy in 
the 6th century. Another interesting aspect of figure B.13. pertains to the cases located north-
east of the regression line, e.g., Hungary (hu) in the 11th century and Sweden (se) in the 12th 
century. These regions reached relatively high levels of elite numeracy despite remaining fairly 
violent. This is not true for the examples on the other side of the spectrum, such as Romania 
(ro) in the 14th century. In general, we observe a close relationship between residual violence 
and residual elite numeracy. 
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the role that spatial autocorrelation may have 
played. Kelly (2019) recently argued that many results in the economic persistence literature 
could have arisen from random spatial patterns and that the likelihood of this problem is higher 
if the effects of spatial autocorrelation are not controlled. In this study, spurious relationships 
may form due to numeracy or violence spillovers rather than as a result of truly economic 
 
18 We include our ‘elite controls’ as explanatory variables in both of these regressions. 
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interactions. Therefore, we make use of spatial econometric techniques first formalised by Jean 
Paelinck and Leo Klaasen (1979) in appendix B.10.3. The results from these spatial regressions 
provide remarkably similar results to those from the fixed effect model (equation 1). Hence, 
spatial autocorrelation does not seem to be a notable source of endogeneity in this study. 
 
B.6.2. Instrumental Variable Specification 
Although the fixed effects regressions (and spatial regressions) provide a robust 
assessment of the conditional correlations between elite violence and elite numeracy, 
endogeneity in the form of simultaneity could still exist. Accordingly, we use an instrumental 
variable analysis to circumvent this endogeneity issue and assess whether any causal effects 
exist. Clearly, finding suitable instruments for the medieval period is a substantial challenge, 
but certain events that took place had the characteristics of ‘natural experiments’. We use the 
nomadic invasions from Central Asia because their origins were determined by climatic forces 
– mainly droughts in Central Asia (Bai and Kung 2011) – and by military capacity. 
Pinker  (2011) found that the major nomadic invasions represented three of the six most 
violent and victim-intensive events in all of human history.19 For European history during our 
6th to 19th century timeline, the Hungarian and Mongolian invasions were the most influential. 
Although other invasions (the Arab-Berber invasions of Spain, the Bulgarians, the Vikings, and 
the Seljuks/Ottomans and others) were also relevant, they were more localised. Here, we 
analyse how these invasions affected European elites. 
 
19 He reanalysed White’s (2011) list of “death tolls of wars, massacres, and atrocities” by deflating the number of 
victims of each event by the population of each respective century. Pinker argued that with a larger population, 
more victims are likely. Deflating by population, the wars of the 20th century are still among the most terrible 
atrocities, but are less exceptional. The Mongolian invasions were the most influential of all nomadic invasion-
related events (ranked second of all atrocities in human history). Other events related to nomadic invasions 
included the end of the Ming dynasty in China (and the Manchurian invasion related to it) as well as the end of 
the West Roman Empire (and the Hunnic and Germanic invasions related to it; see Pinker 2011). 
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First, some of the nomadic invaders created new vassal states in their newly conquered 
territories, often leading to additional conflicts because local elites disputed the legitimacy of 
their regimes (Fennell 1986). For example, the Mongolians set up client rulers and partially 
dependent rulers in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Yury, the prince of Moscow, even 
received military support from the Mongolians when trying to conquer Tver, Russia, in 1317 
(see Fennell 1986 on the following): After being defeated, Yury was called to the ‘Golden 
Horde’20 to be put on trial for his failure. Before any inquiry could take place, he was killed by 
Dmitry “the Terrible Eyes”, who the son of Mikhail of Tver. Dmitry was later executed by the 
‘Horde’ himself. In sum, the behaviour of the rulers under Mongolian suzerainty was unusually 
violent (Fennell 1986). 
Secondly, after the nomadic invaders had killed several European rulers, the 
psychological hurdles for Europeans to assassinate their own rulers had been lowered. 
Previously, particularly during the high Middle Ages, the lives of rulers were accepted as 
sacrosanct more widely than before or after (there were exceptions, of course, see Hehl 2004). 
During the 13th and 14th centuries, rulers were often killed by their own knights or other 
personnel, and not only by competing nobility or neighbouring rulers. For example, Richard 
Orsini, the count of Cephalonia, was killed in 1303 by one of his own knights (Nicol 1984). 
Thirdly, the manner of killing rulers changed dramatically after the nomadic invasions. 
In the medieval period, death by sword was considered more honourable and appropriate for 
rulers, whereas many other ways of killing were reserved for criminals. That rulers were 
subjected to alternative means of killing was initially inconceivable. For example, the Byzantine 
historian and chronicler Leo the Deacon describes the death of Igor I of the Kievan Rus with 
some horror: "They [a neighbouring nomadic tribe] had bent down two birch trees to the 
prince’s feet and tied them to his legs; then they let the trees straighten again, thus tearing the 
 
20 The division of the Mongolian Empire that had offered Yury military aid. 
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prince’s body apart." (Kane, 2019). As another example, Aleksandr of Tver was quartered in 
Sarai in 1339 (Fennell, 1986). 
Fourthly, and with a long run impact, taking revenge rose in cultural value. The 
traumatic impact of the additional frequency of violence against rulers produced psychological 
responses from the upper classes, forming a ‘culture of revenge’ which was applied if they felt 
that their honour had been violated (Pust 2019). This ‘culture of revenge’ phenomenon was 
most persistent in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. One act of revenge spurred the next, and 
the increase in the cultural value of taking revenge became a strong hurdle against development. 
In societies that favour revenge, trust of foreigners also develops at a slower rate (Pust 2019).  
In conclusion, this ‘natural experiment’ of nomadic invasions first increased the existing 
levels of violence, as many individual examples show. Several mechanisms were at work and 
not all of these examples took place on the battlefield. Even more effectively, the trauma from 
violence had a relatively persistent effect via the development of a ‘culture of revenge’, 
particularly in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. 
The Hungarians, Mongols, Huns and other equestrian-driven nomads had a distinctive 
style of warfare. The secret to their success was the combination of horsemanship, mounted 
archers and the incitement of terror against civilian populations (Adshead 2016). Their military 
efficacy was often so superior that even Europe’s strongest empires were unable to protect their 
constituents. For example, the Holy Roman Empire was helpless against Hungarian raids for 
more than a century, and it took them almost two centuries to defeat the Hungarian armies at 
the Battle of Lechfeld in 955 CE (Bowlus 2006). Likewise, in the 13th century, the powerful 
and by then European Kingdom of Hungary offered little resistance to Mongol invasions (Sinor 
1999).21 
 
21 The Hungarians had already settled in today’s Hungary by late 9th century and had, by the beginning of the 11th 
century, abandoned their nomadic lifestyles in favour of a more settled, somewhat urban lifestyle. 
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How did these nomadic invaders succeed against Europe’s strongest empires? Military 
historians agree that their equestrian-based military tactics were the most critical factors (Sinor 
1999). Central Asia was the world’s equine capital at the time. It has been estimated that by 
approximately 1200 CE, half of the world’s horse population was based between what is today 
Eastern Russia, Mongolia and the Ural mountains, whereas only a tiny fraction of the world’s 
human population resided there (Adshead 2016: 61). Each Central Asian warrior could 
therefore possess up to 15 or 20 horses (Adshead 2016: 61), providing easy remounts each time 
a horse was wounded. Complimentarily, these nomads were expert archers and military 
strategists. For example, they employed the “Parthian shot”, which was a Parthian military 
tactic of mounted archers firing at their enemies while in actual or staged retreat. The 
manoeuvre became famous when used against the Roman Empire in the first century BCE, a 
particularly noteworthy example being the defeat of the Romans by the Parthians at the Battle 
of Carrhae in South-Eastern Turkey – on the border of the Roman and Persian Empires in 53 
BCE (Mattern-Parkes 2003).  
The innovative equestrian strategies and the bowmanship of the Asian nomads were 
impressive and could have been emulated by European armies, but the strength of their cavalry, 
with 15-20 horses per warrior, could not be provided by Europeans at the time. 
Inciting terror was also a tactic used by many armies before then, but only in 
combination with the speed of horses was it so exceptionally effective. On the other hand, the 
unique military supremacy provided by their horsemanship and the sheer number of horses that 
they possessed resulted in geographic constraints that we use for our instrumental variable 
strategy. Short campaigns to Italy, France or North-Central Europe were possible, but Central 
Asian invaders quickly returned to the sparsely populated regions of Eastern Europe or to 
Central Asia itself. For example, the Mongols suddenly left for the Russian Steppe in 1242 after 
conquering most of East-Central Europe (Sinor 1999). As a consequence, the closer a European 
territory was to Central Asian and Eastern European horse bases, the larger an “import of 
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violence” it experienced. As a reaction to frequent raids and terror, Eastern and Central 
European societies militarised and favoured power and values such as loyalty over mercantile 
activities or trade. Hence, we can use the distance to Central Asia as an instrument for the 
additional violence that was imported through these nomadic invasions.  
Clearly, the Hungarians and Mongols were not the only groups that spread violence over 
such large distances.22 The Viking raids of the 9th and 10th centuries, the Arab-Berber invasions 
of Iberia and parts of Italy, as well as the Ottoman invasions in the Balkans – to name just a 
few – added to European violence too. However, we argue that these activities were more 
localised, whereas Central Asian nomads affected almost all of Europe. Moreover, it is unclear 
that the Muslim rulers of Spain were more violent than Spain’s earlier Gothic rulers (Pérez 
Artés and Baten 2018). Likewise, although the Vikings were far more violent than the 
incumbent inhabitants of the lands that they conquered, historians have explained that their 
reputation was, to a degree, overstated by monks in Western European monasteries who sought 
to disseminate propaganda against the “mighty heathens of the north” (Winroth 2014). Winroth 
(2014) adds that since the victims were from societies more literate than themselves, Viking 
raids constitute a rare historical case where history was not written by the ‘victors’. 
Additionally, the Vikings began to settle in the United Kingdom and Normandy well before 
1050 and ceased their tradition of raiding (Griffiths 2010). 
Because we use these nomadic invasions from Central Asia as an instrumental variable, 
endogeneity could result from heterogeneous levels of economic development along the east-
west gradient. However, we observe that this gradient is a feature of the last few hundred years 
and does not exist for the early medieval period. We have seen, in figure B.6., that elite 
numeracy was highest in South-Eastern Europe during the 6th to 7th centuries, when the East 
Roman Empire was the gravitational centre of European development. The second highest 
 
22 Our period of study does not include the Hunnic invasions but, as nomadic invaders of Europe, their history is 
still relevant to the discussion of our instrument.  
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levels at the time were found in South-Western Europe, particularly in Italy. The economic 
dominance of Europe’s north-west only arose later, during the period when Eastern and Central 
Europe were affected by the Hungarian invasions. Indeed, the East Roman Empire was not 
overwhelmed by the Hungarian invasions, although much of its economic base in the Balkans 
was devastated. Furthermore, the Roman occupations of Gaul and Britain did not cause an east-
west divergence in the early medieval period, according to our evidence. Figure B.17. supports 
this line of reasoning through the coefficients from regressions of elite numeracy on longitude 
over time.23 Here, we see that being further east was actually associated with higher elite 
numeracy during the early Middle Ages and that the traditional, negative gradient effect is 
reduced (and insignificant) during this high medieval peace period. 
In sum, a strong east-west gradient did not exist before the period of the Hungarian 
invasions but developed thereafter. The strongest emergence of an east-west gradient arose after 
the Mongolian invasions ceased during the 14th century. During this period, our instrument 
loses its econometric value, as the gradient would have become correlated with factors 
associated with the stronger economic development of the west. Therefore, we argue that for 
much of the formative period of Europe’s path-dependent processes in the Middle Ages, the 
nomadic invasions from Central Asia are a suitable instrument for violence. 
European history offers a placebo test for studying the exclusion restriction of our 
instrument. The period between the respective episodes of invasions by the Hungarians and 
Mongolians, namely, the High Middle Ages of the 11th and 12th centuries. Europe did not 
experience any major invasions at this time (instead, it acted as an aggressor by invading the 
Middle East during the crusades). Cummins (2017) provides some initial evidence for the high 
medieval peace period when analysing his database of noblemen. He shows a small but clear 
decline in battle deaths as well as a corresponding increase in average lifespans at the time, 
 
23 Longitude measured by geographic centroids for modern countries from Donnelly (2012). 
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which sharply reversed as the Mongol invasions begun and again as the Great Plague took 
effect. Hence, the proximity to Central Asia should be unimportant for violence during this high 
medieval peace period, given the absence of nomadic invasions, which would also provide 
additional evidence against any simple east-west effect.  
Before we execute our IV regressions, we need to consider other potential factors that 
could prevent our instrument from meeting the exclusion restriction. Specifically, our 
instrument becomes invalid if any characteristics of the nomadic invasions that are not 
associated with military or interpersonal violence affected elite numeracy in Europe. Such 
characteristics are not immediately apparent, but, for example, any diseases that the nomads 
brought with them could have influenced numeracy and human capital through demographic 
channels. However, we find no evidence of this. The Justinian Plague ravaged much of South-
Eastern Europe and parts of the Middle East from the sixth to the early eighth century, but this 
was clearly before the period of the Hungarian invasions. Likewise, the Great Plague erupted 
in the mid-14th century, approximately 150 years after the Mongols had begun invading Europe. 
Therefore, the spread of diseases from Central Asia can only have had a very indirect effect on 
elite numeracy at most. Another potential factor that could violate the exclusion restriction is 
the transfer of technological ideas from Central Asia to Europe, brought by the nomads. Again, 
we cannot find any obvious examples. As discussed earlier, the horse and bow were already 
widely used throughout Europe by the time of the first nomadic invasions, and military tactics 
such as the “Parthian shot” had already been known in Europe for centuries. 
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In table B.5., we treat the three periods 800–1000, 1000–1200 and 1200–1400 CE 
separately and run the following instrumental variable specification, restricting our sample to 
each of the three periods mentioned above: 
 
First Stage: 
 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
 
Second Stage: 
 
 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝜓𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6) 
 
where proximityit is the logged inverse distance to Central Asia, ψit is a vector of control 
variables, α is a constant and εit is an error term that captures the effects of any unobservables. 
Admittedly, the number of cases in each period is small, but this should bias the tests 
towards insignificance. Instrumented regicide exhibits a significantly negative effect on elite 
numeracy during the two invasion periods of the Hungarians and Mongolians, circa 800–1000 
CE and 1200–1400 CE, respectively. During the High Middle Ages, when no Central Asian 
invasions occurred, the relationship between elite numeracy and the invasions from Central 
Asia becomes insignificant. Although the absence of significance does not rule out the existence 
of a relationship, this result hints that our IV only influences elite numeracy through violence 
during the invasion periods. Additionally, this result disputes the possible criticism that our IV 
only captures the east-west development gradient of more modern times. As such, it provides 
tentative evidence (despite the small N) of a causal impact of elite violence on elite numeracy. 
In table B.6., we pool all evidence on nomadic invasions from Central Asia in the 
periods 800–1000 and 1200–1400 as an instrument, including all explanatory variables that 
have been identified before, finding negative and significant coefficients for regicide. We again 
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find a positive and significant coefficient for partially democratic political systems as well as 
our pasture variable, while we find a negative and significant coefficient for our crop variable. 
 
B.6.3. Random Effects Specification with Time-Invariant Factors 
As a further robustness test, we also apply a random effects specification because it does 
not eliminate the confounding effects of omitted time-invariant factors. 
These controls first include variables concerning religion. Although religion is not 
perfectly time invariant, there are not many examples of major religious changes within 
European kingdoms that occur on a mass scale after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Major 
religious changes that occurred include the Great Schism between the Catholic and Orthodox 
Churches in the 11th century, the Protestant Reformation, the spread of Islam under the Ottoman 
Empire, and the Arab-Berber conquest and Reconquista in Spain. We coded the majority 
religion using the ruler’s religion from our regicide sources and the summaries of historical 
religion in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2019). 
Our first additional variable for the random effects specification is an indicator of the 
most prominent religion in each country during each century – Islam, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, 
Catholicism (the reference group) and an ‘other’ category; comprising Pagan, tribal and pre-
Christian religions. This indicator variable was included to capture the effects of cultural 
characteristics that are associated with religion. We find similar levels of numeracy across 
Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam, with some evidence of lower levels for Orthodoxy and 
our ‘other’ category. Surprisingly, despite numerous results from previous literature, 
Protestantism is not associated with higher levels of numeracy (see Becker & Woessmann 2009 
and 2010 for an alternative expectation). 
We also include a dummy for religious diversity (Baten and van Zanden 2008). This 
could have either have had a positive effect on numeracy, perhaps via competition – stimulating 
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book consumption, for example – or a negative effect via conflict through social 
fractionalisation (Easterly and Levine 1997). However, we find no evidence of an effect at all. 
Our final religious variable is a dummy for the presence of a substantial Jewish minority, 
which we include because Jews were, on average, better educated than other religious groups 
among whom they lived. These data are from a combination of Anderson et al. (2017), Botticini 
and Eckstein (2012) and the Encyclopaedia Judaica (1972). This dummy provides a positive 
and significant association with elite numeracy of approximately 7-13%. 
The rest of our new controls for the random effects model are geographic and wholly 
time invariant. We use ruggedness because numerous studies have associated it with violence 
and lower economic development in a broader sense. For example, Mitton (2016) finds flatter 
landscapes to be associated with higher GDP per capita, while Bohara et al. (2006), O’Loughlin 
et al. (2010) and Idrobo et al. (2014) all describe different situations where rugged terrain 
provides advantages for instigators of violence. In contrast, Nunn and Puga (2012) describe 
how ruggedness protected parts of Africa from the adverse effect of the slave trade between 
1400 and 1900. The ruggedness data that we use come from Nunn and Puga (2012). As spatial 
controls, we again include latitude and longitude for each country. Next, we use the percentage 
of each country that is covered by fertile soil and the percentage of each country that lies within 
100 km of ice-free coast. Both variables come from Nunn and Puga (2012) and control for any 
additional agricultural effects or the effects that maritime trade may have had on elite numeracy, 
respectively. 
The random effects regressions also show largely similar results as the initial fixed 
effects specification, although the sizes of the coefficients differ modestly. The coefficients for 
elite violence are approximately 10-20% smaller under random effects, whereas those for battle 
deaths are between 5% and 15% larger. These variables both remain consistently negative and 
significant across specifications. Likewise, the coefficients for pasture and crop areas are 
approximately 40% smaller, though this is somewhat due to multicollinearity after the inclusion 
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of the soil fertility variable. The soil fertility variable is frequently significant at the 10% level, 
though it is negative like the crop area variable. The fertile soils of Southern and Eastern Europe 
were often used for grain production, whereas the less fertile Northern European soils were 
more often used for cattle farming. During later periods, higher elite numeracy developed in 
Northern Europe. 
Finally, we further assess the robustness of our results using quantile regressions to 
ensure that they do not depend on specific clusters of the overall data distribution (see section 
B.10.6.). We find that the results are robust. 
 
B.7. Conclusion  
In this study, we provide a 1400-year overview of elite numeracy in European history, 
using the share of rulers for whom a birth year was recorded as a new indicator. We carefully 
evaluate this measure, finding high correlations with other proxies for elite numeracy as well 
as dramatic shifts in elite numeracy throughout Europe. 
The south-east was the first region to undergo transformation, led by the East Roman 
Empire (figure B.6.). Shortly afterwards, the south-west was slightly superior. All European 
regions were displayed comparable rates of elite numeracy around the year 1000, while North-
Western and Central Europe did not begin to display their divergent patterns before the High 
Middle Ages. After this period, both the east and south-east entered into decline, and by 1400, 
a development path was firmly established that divided the east and the west of the continent. 
Iberia and Italy grew to similarly high levels as the north-west during the renaissance period. 
We also assessed a number of potential explanatory variables that might either 
determine or interact with elite numeracy. For example, the existence of a substantial Jewish 
minority is associated with greater elite numeracy – what we observe might be external human 
capital effects from the Jews to the Christian elite. Finally, regions that specialised in cattle 
farming developed greater elite numeracy than grain-intensive regions, although this variable 
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only becomes significant when both agricultural specialisations (cattle and crops) are included 
in our estimations simultaneously. A growing body of literature finds a relationship between 
agricultural specialisation in animal husbandry and the relatively strong position of women 
economically, which might also have influenced the upper tail of numeracy and human capital. 
A consistent negative correlation is observable with violence – both violence during 
battles and ‘ordinary’, interpersonal violence among the elite. We also employ a relatively 
exogenous import of violence from the Central Asian nomadic invasions of ca. 800–1000 and 
1200–1400 as an instrumental variable because these invasions acted contagiously and 
motivated additional intra-European violence. Interestingly, Europe did not experience 
invasions from Central Asia during the High Middle Ages, and European numeracy did not 
follow any east-west pattern at this time (figure B.15., panel b). By using the ‘natural 
experiment’ characteristics of the nomadic invasions, we observe casual effects from violence 
to elite numeracy. This is a crucial finding for understanding the divergence movement in 
Europe’s developmental history, because it stands in contrast to Tilly’s (1975) hypothesis that 
“war generated states”. However, wars might have been the trigger rather than the underlying 
reason for developing tax capabilities. For example, France had already developed lower elite 
violence and higher elite numeracy in the centuries before the Hundred Years’ War took place, 
already having prepared a more conducive environment for state capacity. The trigger of the 
devastating war with England convinced the French nobility that permanent taxation would be 
necessary, but this would not have been possible in another setting with a similarly devastating 
war, in South-Eastern Europe during the late medieval period, for example. 
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B.9. Figures and Tables24 
 
Figure B.1. Manuscripts vs Birth Known Rate (11 European countries, 700–1500 CE) 
Note: Number of monastery manuscripts per million inhabitants (correlation coefficient ρ =0.67; or ρ=0.71 where 
the birth known rate is less than 100%). Source: Buringh and van Zanden (2009). 
 
 
Figure B.2. Birth Year Heaping vs Birth Known Rate (7 European Regions, 800–1800 CE) 
Note: Birth year heaping calculated from Cummins’ (2017) sample of 115 650 European noblemen (correlation 
coefficient ρ =-0.58; or ρ=-0.54 where the birth known rate is less than 100%). Source: Cummins (2017). 
 
24 All figures plotted using Stata’s graph or spmap functions 
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Figure B.3. Elite Numeracy and the “Literati” (China, 0 – 1800 CE) 
Note: By 605 CE, China had introduced an unusual system for appointing their bureaucratic elites (Deng, 1993). 
If a candidate succeeded in passing the exam, they became a member of the educational nobility, the “literati”, 
with considerable social status and a substantial income. Economically, China fared exceptionally well under this 
system during the medieval period (Baten 2016).  
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Figure B.4. Regicide vs homicide: Evidence for the Plausibility of the Regicide Indicator 
(Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, 1300-1900 CE) 
 
Note: The figure shows declines in violence and the relationship between elite violence (regicide, defined as the 
share of rulers who were killed) and interpersonal violence (homicide per 100,000 population). The grey circles 
indicate periods during which both homicide and regicide rose simultaneously. Sources: Homicide data from 
Eisner (2014).  
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Figure B.5. Sub-regional Trends in Elite Numeracy 
 
Notes: The year is the middle year of each two-century period, 600 for the 6th and 7th century etc. Abbreviations 
refer to the following: Benelux (ben – Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg); France and Monaco (fra); 
Scandinavia (sca –  Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Sweden); United Kingdom and Ireland (uki); 
Caucasus (cau – Armenia, Georgia); Romania (rom); Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (rua); Iberia (ibe – Portugal, 
Spain); Italy (ita); Greece and Cyprus (gre); Turkey (tur);: Balkans (bal – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bal 
Elite Violence and Elite Numeracy in Europe from 500 – 1900 CE: Roots of the Divergence.  
58 
 
 
Figure B.6. Inter-Regional Trends in Elite Numeracy 
Note: The legend refers to Central Europe (ce), Eastern Europe (ee), North-Western Europe (nw), South-Eastern 
Europe (se) and South-Western Europe (sw). 
 
 
Figure B.7. Inter-Regional Trends in Regicide  
Note: Regicide for the early medieval period in Eastern Europe was omitted here, as its 50% regicide rate would 
have obscured the graphic. 
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Figure B.8. Elite Numeracy and Non-Violence (6th – 8th Century) 
Note: Scatter plot weighted by observations. Labels refer to countries (see table A.B.1. for country codes) and 
centuries. 
 
Figure B.9. Elite Numeracy and Non-Violence (9th – 10th Century) 
Note: Scatter plot weighted by observations. Labels refer to countries (see table A.B.1. for country codes). 
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Figure B.10. Elite Numeracy and Non-Violence (11th – 12th Century) 
Note: Scatter plot weighted by observations. Labels refer to countries (see table A.B.1. for country codes). 
 
 
Figure B.11. Elite Numeracy and Non-Violence (13th – 14th Century) 
Note: Scatter plot weighted by observations. Labels refer to countries (see table A.B.1. for country codes). 
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Figure B.12. Elite Numeracy and Non-Violence (15th – 16th Century) 
Note: Scatter plot weighted by observations. Labels refer to countries (see table A.B.1. for country codes) 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.13. Residual Scatterplot (All Regressors and Controls Included) 
Note: The labels, above, refer to Turkey (tr), Hungary (hu), Sweden (se), Russia (ru), Montenegro (me), 
Lithuania (lt) and Romania (ro), respectively. The numbers denote the century of each observation e.g. ro_14 
refers to 14th century Romania. (ρ = -0.36)  
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Figure B.14. Elite Numeracy (500–1900) 
Note: The darker colours exhibit greater elite human capital.  
 
 
  
a) 500 – 900 CE b) 1000 – 1300 CE 
  
c) 1300 – 1500 CE d) 1600 – 1900 CE 
 
Figure B.15. Elite Numeracy by Period 
Note: The darker colours exhibit greater elite human capital.  
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Figure B.16. Elite Numeracy (1600 – 1900 CE, Adjusted Bin Widths) 
Note: The known ruler birth year measurement means that elite numeracy was consistently high by the early 
Modern Period (most countries are dark in figure B.15., panel d for 1600-1900). This bin-width adjustment 
merely allows for a clearer distinction between countries. The darker colours exhibit greater elite human capital.  
 
 
Figure B.17. No Western European advantage before 800: Regression Coefficients of Elite 
Numeracy on Longitude 
Note: A positive coefficient means that longitude shares a positive relationship with elite numeracy; i.e. that 
being further east was associated with higher levels of numeracy. When the coefficient is negative, being further 
west was associated with higher levels of numeracy. Panel A refers to regressions for each century whereas 
Panel B uses two-century time periods for an increased sample size.  
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Figure B.18. Examples of Decreasing Elite Human Capital 
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European Region 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 
        
Central (1) (6) 69 105 158 120 87 
Eastern 56 26 51 155 151 189 108 
North-Western 147 162 255 220 150 106 103 
South-Eastern 14 53 73 189 331 36 39 
South-Western 44 59 145 97 235 233 93 
 
Table B.1. Number of Cases 
Note: Central Europe 600 and 800 are not included in the regression analyses. 
 
 
            
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
      
Birth Known 227 0.69 0.32 0 1 
Regicide 226 0.18 0.18 0 1 
Battle 226 0.06 0.08 0 0.40 
Urbanisation 227 0.08 0.10 0 0.63 
Pasture Area 202 0.11 1.39 -0.17 16.32 
Crop Area 202 0.11 1.36 -0.19 15.58 
Mode of Succession           
● Partially Elected 227 0.05 0.22 0 1 
● Fully Elected 227 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Autonomy 227 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Reign Length 227 16.21 5.88 3.67 43.25 
Area 227 292958 426134 0 2618188 
Second Serfdom 227 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Proximity to Central Asia 227 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.28 
Religion           
● Catholicism 227 0.53 0.50 0 1 
● Islam 227 0.07 0.26 0 1 
● Orthodoxy 227 0.27 0.45 0 1 
● Protestant 227 0.08 0.27 0 1 
● Other 227 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Religious Diversity 227 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Jewish Minority 227 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Ruggedness 227 1.44 1.23 0.04 6.61 
Latitude 227 48.21 6.92 35.05 64.99 
Longitude 227 17.78 20.24 -18.59 96.71 
% Fertile Soil 227 51.98 19.26 0 88.65 
% Within 100 km. of Ice-
Free Coast 
227 41.90 34.05 0 100 
            
Table B.2. Descriptive Statistics  
Note: Measured using country-century units. Pasture area and crop area are indices per capita, per square 
kilometre. Area is set to zero if the kingdom is not autonomous since the ruler does not control it personally. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Birth Known Birth Known Birth Known Birth Known 
         
Kingdom Area -1.56e-08 -1.67e-08 -1.72e-08 -6.73e-08* 
  (3.89e-08) (3.99e-08) (3.96e-08) (3.51e-08) 
Reign Length   0.00298 0.00298 -0.000405 
    (0.00296) (0.00294) (0.00370) 
Autonomy     0.00715 -0.0332 
      (0.0561) (0.0682) 
Constant 0.326*** 0.291** 0.285** 0.621*** 
  (0.116) (0.112) (0.132) (0.193) 
         
Observations 227 227 227 201 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.386 0.383 0.439 
Explanatory Variables NO NO NO YES 
Country Fes YES YES YES YES 
Time Fes YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors clustered by country 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table B.3. Regressions of Elite Numeracy on Elite Controls 
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Table B.4. Fixed Effects Regressions  
Note: The reference category for institutional factors is hereditary succession; for “second serfdom”, it is the 
regions and periods not affected. Since there are 36 clusters when clustering by country, we also crosschecked 
our results using Cameron et al.’s (2008) wild bootstrap procedure (using 1000 replications). We find very 
similar results to table B.4. and regicide and battle always remains significant, at least at a 98% confidence level 
(t-statistics from -2.58 to -3.47 and corresponding p-values from 0.019 to 0.001).  
  
                
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
                
Regicide -0.416*** -0.429*** -0.427*** -0.436*** -0.436*** -0.509*** -0.474*** 
  (0.139) (0.143) (0.141) (0.152) (0.152) (0.138) (0.125) 
Battle -0.686*** -0.698*** -0.703*** -0.694*** -0.686*** -0.665** -0.661** 
  (0.214) (0.218) (0.216) (0.249) (0.247) (0.244) (0.254) 
Urbanisation   -0.216 -0.217 -0.206 -0.197 -0.227 -0.174 
    (0.203) (0.203) (0.220) (0.220) (0.214) (0.178) 
Mode of Succession  
(Base=Hereditary):           
● Partially Elected     -0.0833 -0.0251 -0.0269 -0.0337 0.00838 
      (0.0726) (0.0669) (0.0666) (0.0760) (0.0897) 
● Fully Elected     0.0247 0.00864 0.00866 -0.0122 -0.0168 
      (0.0875) (0.0899) (0.0897) (0.0837) (0.0849) 
Pasture Area       0.0151   0.342*** 0.338*** 
        (0.0105)   (0.0789) (0.0787) 
Crop Area         0.00769 -0.362*** -0.363*** 
          (0.00824) (0.0813) (0.0831) 
Second Serfdom -0.0277 -0.0431 -0.0431 -0.0364 -0.0334 -0.0775 -0.0620 
  (0.0759) (0.0790) (0.0792) (0.0853) (0.0859) (0.0834) (0.0841) 
Constant 0.562*** 0.574*** 0.568*** 0.598*** 0.595*** 0.643*** 0.549*** 
  (0.157) (0.161) (0.170) (0.199) (0.199) (0.193) (0.139) 
                
Observations 226 226 226 201 201 201 201 
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.458 0.453 0.419 0.417 0.440 0.439 
Elite Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors clustered by country       
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Hungarian 
Invasions 
High Medieval 
Peace 
Mongolian 
Invasions 
 
(9th and 10th 
centuries) 
(11th and 12th 
centuries) 
(13th and 14th 
centuries) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 LIML LIML LIML 
  Birth Known Birth Known Birth Known 
     
Regicide -1.036*** -1.001 -3.183*** 
  (0.328) (1.237) (1.101) 
Constant 0.594*** 0.811*** 1.225*** 
  (0.105) (0.233) (0.174) 
     
Observations 14 23 33 
Adjusted (Centred) R2 0.362 -0.301 -2.364 
Uncentred R2 0.795 0.857 0.392 
F-Statistic 6.067 0.0597 15.390 
Standard errors clustered by country 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
        
Table B.5. IV Regressions of Elite Numeracy25: Comparing Invasion Periods. 
  
 
25 See appendix for first stage regressions (tables A.B.12. and A.B.13.). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  LIML LIML LIML LIML LIML LIML LIML 
  
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
                
Regicide -2.105*** -2.113*** -2.363*** -2.235*** -2.005*** -2.010*** -1.777*** 
  (0.762) (0.758) (0.878) (0.802) (0.712) (0.717) (0.642) 
Battle   -0.193 -0.258 -0.168 -0.288 -0.283 -0.371 
    (0.425) (0.455) (0.437) (0.427) (0.428) (0.391) 
Urbanisation     -1.085 -0.705 -0.693 -0.705 -0.619 
      (0.829) (0.776) (0.744) (0.746) (0.679) 
Mode of Succession  
(Base=Hereditary) 
              
● Partially Elected       0.340** 0.374** 0.379** 0.352** 
        (0.149) (0.155) (0.156) (0.142) 
● Fully Elected       -0.0615 -0.150 -0.152 -0.132 
        (0.137) (0.145) (0.145) (0.132) 
Pasture Area         0.00542   0.491* 
          (0.0220)   (0.256) 
Crop Area           0.00297 -0.508* 
            (0.0229) (0.266) 
Constant 0.813*** 0.822*** 0.908*** 0.878*** 0.848*** 0.849*** 0.797*** 
 (0.139) (0.135) (0.170) (0.163) (0.157) (0.159) (0.143) 
                
Observations 120 120 120 120 106 106 106 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. (Centered) R2 -0.658 -0.678 -0.947 -0.735 -0.487 -0.492 -0.256 
Uncentered R2 0.701 0.701 0.655 0.698 0.726 0.725 0.771 
F-Stat 14.31 14.97 16.07 15.32 12.99 12.94 10.69 
Standard errors clustered by 
country 
      
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
                
 
Table B.6. Instrumental Variable Regressions (Central Asian Invasions: 800 – 1400 CE)26 
Note: The reference category for institutional factors is hereditary succession; for “second serfdom”, it is the 
regions and periods not affected by the experience. 
 
 
  
 
26 See appendix for first stage regressions. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
                
Regicide -0.392** -0.377*** -0.385*** -0.375** -0.374** -0.389*** -0.383*** 
  (0.159) (0.143) (0.146) (0.160) (0.161) (0.150) (0.130) 
Battle   -0.720*** -0.729*** -0.742*** -0.740*** -0.757*** -0.745*** 
    (0.205) (0.207) (0.243) (0.243) (0.245) (0.240) 
Urbanisation     -0.165 -0.183 -0.183 -0.239 -0.228 
      (0.177) (0.184) (0.183) (0.187) (0.156) 
Pasture Area       0.00310   0.164* 0.190** 
        (0.0123)   (0.102) (0.0757) 
Crop Area         0.00115 -0.168* -0.196** 
          (0.0113) (0.106) (0.0807) 
Mode of Succession  
          
(Base=Hereditary) 
● Partially Elected 0.0146 0.00179 0.00260 0.0863 0.0876 0.113 0.0544 
  (0.0789) (0.0744) (0.0734) (0.0910) (0.0937) (0.110) (0.0913) 
● Fully Elected -0.00529 -0.00654 -0.00765 -0.0550 -0.0551 -0.0483 -0.0398 
  -0.0867 -0.0837 -0.0839 -0.0822 -0.0827 -0.0863  (0.0878) 
Second Serfdom -0.0935 -0.0794 -0.0892 -0.103 -0.103 -0.112 -0.0846 
  (0.0709) (0.0661) (0.0674) (0.0685) (0.0685) (0.0689) (0.0693) 
Religion               
● Islam -0.137* -0.0948 -0.0977 -0.112 -0.112 -0.111 -0.118 
  (0.0744) (0.0760) (0.0775) (0.0800) (0.0800) (0.0815) (0.0742) 
● Orthodoxy -0.173** -0.121 -0.124 -0.196** -0.195** -0.186** -0.143* 
  (0.0805) (0.0744) (0.0754) (0.0810) (0.0810) (0.0816) (0.0784) 
● Protestantism -0.0525 -0.0785 -0.0680 -0.0541 -0.0553 -0.0266 -0.0559 
  (0.0586) (0.0542) (0.0502) (0.0698) (0.0702) (0.0767) (0.0738) 
● Other -0.215** -0.161** -0.158** -0.164** -0.165** -0.148* -0.138* 
  (0.0874) (0.0721) (0.0721) (0.0807) (0.0808) (0.0809) (0.0785) 
Religious Diversity -0.0389 -0.0517 -0.0506 -0.0548 -0.0550 -0.0594 -0.0474 
  (0.0338) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0386) (0.0361) 
Jewish Minority 0.0679* 0.0804** 0.0867** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 
  (0.0367) (0.0358) (0.0377) (0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0385) (0.0384) 
Ruggedness -0.0284 -0.0232 -0.0260 -0.0386 -0.0385 -0.0436* -0.0446 
  (0.0267) (0.0248) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0262) (0.0282) 
Latitude 0.00231 0.00589 0.00527 0.000631 0.000689 -0.00108 -8.86e-05 
  (0.00680) (0.00696) (0.00680) (0.00722) (0.00722) (0.00765) (0.00738) 
Longitude -0.000511 -0.00234 -0.00226 -0.000955 -0.000992 -0.000689 -0.00135 
  (0.00170) (0.00156) (0.00158) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00159) (0.00151) 
% Fertile soil -0.00180 -0.00227 -0.00232 -0.00379* -0.00377* -0.00392* -0.00400* 
  (0.00211) (0.00205) (0.00204) (0.00199) (0.00199) (0.00209) (0.00208) 
% Within 100 km. 
of ice-free coast 
-0.000280 -0.000422 -0.000338 -0.000169 -0.000166 -9.82e-07 0.000352 
  (0.000978) (0.000949) (0.000934) (0.000942) (0.000943) (0.000978) (0.00104) 
Constant 0.582 0.512 0.545 0.816* 0.813* 0.901* 0.803* 
  (0.451) (0.448) (0.443) (0.463) (0.462) (0.483) (0.472) 
                
Observations 226 226 226 201 201 201 201 
Overall R2 0.506 0.527 0.525 0.548 0.549 0.552 0.558 
Country FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Elite Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Standard errors clustered by country           
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
                
Table B.7. Random Effects Regressions 
Note: The reference category for institutional factors is hereditary succession; for “second serfdom”, it is the 
regions and periods not affected by the experience.  
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B.10. Appendices 
B.10.1. Regional Classifications 
Since there are no universal standards for assigning countries to European sub-regions, 
some of our classifications may seem unorthodox. However, in these cases their allocations 
follow historical narratives. For example, some may suggest that Lithuania and Latvia be 
defined as Eastern European countries because of their shared histories with the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet Union, or else Central Europe because of their participation in the Kingdom of 
Prussia or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, being countries that were heavily 
influenced by Baltic trade and by the Swedish Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries, we assign 
them to Scandinavia as a compromise. Moreover, they exhibit trends that are more in line with 
Scandinavia than either Eastern- or Central European countries. These include high rates of 
regicide in the High and late Middle Ages before exhibiting a sharp decline, as well as early 
development in elite numeracy. 
 
Greater Region Narrower Region Countries and Regional Abbreviations 
   
Central Europe German speaking Austria (at), Germany (de) 
 East-Central Europe Czech Republic (cz), Hungary (hu), Poland (pl) 
Eastern Europe Caucasus Armenia (am), Georgia (ge) 
 Romania Romania (ro) 
 Russia Belarus (by), Russia (ru), Ukraine (ua) 
North-Western Europe Benelux Belgium (be), Luxembourg (lu), Netherlands (nl) 
 France France (fr), Monaco (mc) 
 Scandinavia Denmark (dk), Iceland (is), Lithuania (lt), Latvia (lv), 
Norway (no), Sweden (se) 
 United Kingdom and Ireland Ireland (ie), United Kingdom (uk) 
South-Eastern Europe Greece Cyprus (cy), Greece (el) 
 Turkey* Turkey (tr) 
 Balkans Albania (al), Bosnia and Herzegovina (ba), Bulgaria (bg), 
Croatia (hr), Montenegro (me), Serbia (rs) 
South-Western Europe Iberia Portugal (pt), Spain (es) 
 Italy Italy (it) 
 
Table B.8. Aggregation of European Countries to Broader Regions 
*Note: Early Turkey refers to the East Roman (Byzantine) Empire 
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B.10.2. Unit Root Tests 
Although all of our regression specifications include time fixed effects, the presence of 
non-stationary series may mean that our regressions capture spurious relationships and 
invalidate our inferences. Since we have an unbalanced panel with gaps in certain individual 
time series, a unit root meta-analysis, such as a Fisher-type test, needs to be carried out. We use 
both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests before conducting our Fisher-
type meta-analysis. 
Table A.B.2. shows that, among our variables of interest, only elite numeracy and battle 
deaths display any kind of non-stationarity, and only with a 200 year lag or longer. Since we 
use 200 year fixed effects, unit roots should not have affected our results. Of course, variables 
like urbanisation rates are non-stationary by nature, but these are only used as control variables 
in this study.  
 
Test Lags Regicide Elite Numeracy Battle  
   χ² (df) P-Value χ² (df) P-Value χ² (df) P-Value 
        
ADF 0 chi2(70) = 322.36 0.0000 chi2(70) = 95.81 0.0220 chi2(70) = 490.53 0.0000 
ADF 1 chi2(64) = 215.55 0.0000 
chi2(66) = 
155.08 
0.0000 chi2(64) = 83.64 0.0503 
ADF 2 chi2(62) = 86.09 0.0232 chi2(62) = 33.23 0.9990 chi2(62) = 23.37 1.0000 
ADF 3 chi2(48) = 111.57 0.0000 chi2(48) = 11.69 1.0000 chi2(48) = 27.34 0.9929 
Phillips–Perron 0 chi2(70) = 320.60 0.0000 chi2(70) = 95.81 0.0220 chi2(70) = 490.53 0.0000 
Phillips–Perron 1 chi2(70) = 382.91 0.0000 chi2(70) = 91.87 0.0410 chi2(70) = 427.13 0.0000 
Phillips–Perron 2 chi2(70) = 292.71 0.0000 
chi2(70) = 
101.65 
0.0080 chi2(70) = 447.94 0.0000 
Phillips–Perron 3 chi2(70) = 330.39 0.0000 
chi2(70) = 
115.35 
0.0005 chi2(70) = 470.56 0.0000 
H0: Series contains a unit-root 
 
Table B.9. Unit Root Tests 
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B.10.3. Spatial Regressions 
As mentioned in the main text, while the results from our fixed effects specification 
provide a solid point of departure for our co-evolution hypothesis, we must acknowledge the 
role that spatial autocorrelation may have played. Kelly (2019) recently argued that many 
results in the persistence literature could have arisen from random spatial patterns and that the 
likelihood of this problem is greater if the effects of spatial autocorrelation are not controlled. 
Our study is less affected by this issue because our explanatory and dependent variables are 
coded for contemporaneous time units, but we still need to control for spatial autocorrelation. 
Spurious relationships may form due to numeracy or violence spillovers rather than as a result 
of truly economic interactions. Here, we make use of spatial econometric techniques, first 
formalised by Jean Paelinck and Leo Klaasen (1979), to combat these effects, which may be 
particularly important in our study because disparities in levels of development between Eastern 
and Western Europe could conceivably have driven our earlier results. 
We first constructed an inverse distance weighting matrix based on the coordinates of 
the geographic centroids of our geographical units from Donnelly (2012). In this way, our 
models control for spatial effects in a linear manner – with neighbouring countries having a 
greater weight than those further away – as opposed to only capturing the effects of immediate 
neighbours or using an alternative system with an unequal weighting mechanism that reflects 
historical characteristics, for example. 
Because spatial methods require a weighting matrix to link each observation of the 
dependent variable to every contemporaneous observation from a different geographical unit’s 
dependent and independent variables, they require strongly balanced panels. Unfortunately, as 
with most studies in social science, we do not have a perfectly balanced panel and must resort 
to an alternative strategy. This is a common problem in the spatial econometrics literature, with 
researchers either having to drop all panels with any missing data whatsoever or having to revert 
to imputation (for sources on multiple imputation in spatial econometrics, see Griffith and 
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Paelinck 2011; Griffith et al. 1989; Bihrmann and Ersbøll 2015; Stein 1999; LeSage and Pace 
2004; and Baker et al. 2014, among others). 
To perform our imputation, we used Stata’s mi command with its multivariate regression 
option, using this statistical simulation technique to effectively create 50 new datasets of 
predicted values for each panel. The following analysis is then performed on each simulated 
dataset separately before the results are pooled using Rubin’s Rule (Rubin 1987). 
According to Rubin (1987), these estimates afford valid inferences despite the increased 
sample size of the underlying analysis, provided that data are missing at random. Because the 
availability of our data improves over time and is itself associated with development in 
numeracy, as discussed above, we cannot make this claim. Therefore, before proceeding with 
our imputed spatial analysis, we first run the following models on the two panels where we 
have the most observations, 1300 and 1400 (tables A.B.5. and A.B.6.), observing results that 
are remarkably analogous and lead us to believe in the validity of our imputed spatial results. 
Our spatial analysis utilises the three most simple spatial econometric models, the 
Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR Model; equation 2, table A.B.3.), the Spatially Lagged X 
Model (SLX Model; equation 3, table A.B.4.) and the Spatial Error Model (SEM; equation 4, 
table A.B.3.). 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜌𝑾𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝑿𝒊𝒕𝛽 + 𝑎𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑿𝒊𝒕𝛽 + 𝑾𝑿𝒊𝒕𝛩 + 𝑎𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑿𝒊𝒕𝛽 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑾𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (4) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a vector for the elite numeracy variable in time period t; 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a matrix of 
all time-varying regressors for time period t; 𝑎𝑖  is a vector of country fixed effects; 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is a 
vector of spatially lagged errors; 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is a stochastic error term; W is an inverse distance 
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weighting matrix constructed using the coordinates of modern geographic country centroids; β 
is a vector of ordinary regression coefficients; and 𝜌, 𝛩 and 𝜆 are coefficients of the spatial 
characteristics described below. 
The SAR model controls for the direct effect that variation in the dependent variable of 
other countries may have on country i (measured by ρ) i.e. the effect of elite numeracy spillovers 
from neighbours. Likewise, the SLX model controls for spillover effects from the independent 
variables of other countries (measured by Θ), such as the effect of neighbouring elite violence 
on elite numeracy in country i. Last, the SEM model controls for any effect that unexplained 
variation from other countries may have on elite numeracy in country i (measured by λ), such 
as the effect of an omitted variable. While more complex models can be estimated, these often 
suffer from multicollinearity, or else fail to converge (Burkey 2017). 27  Additionally, our 
estimates of 𝜌, 𝛩 and 𝜆  from each of these simpler specifications indicate that spatial 
correlation is not very influential in our analysis (tables A.B.3. and A.B.4.). 
Our results show similar coefficients for regicide and battles, although these are 
surprisingly somewhat larger (in absolute terms) than those from the fixed effects specification 
in section B.6.1. (equation 1, table B.4.); between approximately -0.6 and -0.8 for regicide, and 
-0.75 to -0.9 for battles. Further, the coefficient for urbanisation is positive and significant, 
between 0.5 and 1.0, and while no other coefficients are significant in the SAR and SEM 
models, additional coefficients in the SLX model turn out significant. The SLX model shows a 
positive and significant coefficient of approximately 0.05 for more participative succession 
systems, while the coefficients for pasture and crop areas fall in line with the fixed effects 
results, although they are only approximately half as large. The regicide and battle coefficients 
 
27 For example: The Spatial Durbin Model (SDM; LeSage and Pace, 2009) simultaneously captures spillover 
effects from neighbouring dependent and independent variables, the Kelejian-Prucha Model (Kelejian and 
Prucha, 1998) considers spillovers from the dependent variable and error term, while all three spatial terms are 
included in the Manski Model (Manski, 1993). 
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may be larger, partially because none of the spatial models converged when time fixed effects 
were also included, leading to their unfortunate omission. However, in order to ensure that the 
omission of time dummies is not driving our results, we run all three spatial models in first 
differences, bringing our results more in line with those from the fixed effects specification 
from equation 1. Under first differences, each of the models yield regicide and battle 
coefficients that are approximately 30-40% smaller than under equation 1, while pasture and 
crop areas provide similar trends. In addition, the SLX model shows a negative and significant 
coefficient of approximately -0.15 for the second serfdom dummy. 
Although the results from these spatial regressions provide undoubtedly interesting 
interpretations, they are remarkably similar to those from the fixed effect model (equation 1). 
Additionally, the 𝛩 parameter is never significant, and the 𝜌 and 𝜆 parameters are 
insignificant in all but a few specifications. This leads us to believe that despite limited 
evidence of dependent variable and error term spillovers across countries, spatial 
autocorrelation is not a notable source of endogeneity in this study. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Birth Known sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem 
                                      
Regicide -0.782*** -0.778*** -0.691*** -0.689*** -0.661*** -0.661*** -0.604*** -0.604*** -0.577*** -0.577*** -0.580*** -0.581*** -0.579*** -0.579*** -0.585*** -0.585*** -0.614*** -0.614*** 
  (0.130) (0.130) (0.128) (0.129) (0.124) (0.124) (0.128) (0.128) (0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.124) (0.123) 
Battle         -0.905*** -0.913*** -0.814*** -0.823*** -0.807*** -0.816*** -0.814*** -0.823*** -0.811*** -0.820*** -0.836*** -0.844*** -0.771*** -0.784*** 
          (0.254) (0.258) (0.253) (0.256) (0.247) (0.250) (0.249) (0.251) (0.248) (0.251) (0.244) (0.247) (0.248) (0.251) 
Urbanisation             0.516** 0.525** 0.549** 0.560** 0.552** 0.562** 0.550** 0.560** 0.537** 0.547** 0.738*** 0.743*** 
              (0.236) (0.237) (0.240) (0.241) (0.238) (0.239) (0.239) (0.240) (0.241) (0.242) (0.233) (0.235) 
Mode of 
Succession                 0.0582 0.0575 0.0572 0.0564 0.0573 0.0566 0.0578 0.0569 0.0483 0.0474 
                  (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0359) (0.0358) 
Pasture Area                     0.00510 0.00506     0.112 0.109 0.0792 0.0766 
                      (0.0178) (0.0179)     (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) 
Crop Area                         0.00375 0.00374 -0.110 -0.107 -0.0750 -0.0725 
                          (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) 
Second 
Serfdom 0.0197 0.0190 0.0305 0.0342 0.0279 0.0325 0.0294 0.0353 0.0301 0.0372 0.0308 0.0378 0.0308 0.0378 0.0287 0.0356 0.0174 0.0224 
  (0.0637) (0.0707) (0.0613) (0.0660) (0.0574) (0.0607) (0.0560) (0.0582) (0.0562) (0.0582) (0.0567) (0.0586) (0.0567) (0.0585) (0.0574) (0.0593) (0.0616) (0.0647) 
                                      
Observations 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Elite Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Rho 0.274**   0.237*   0.206*   0.176   0.171   0.170   0.170   0.170   0.193   
  (0.127)   (0.125)   (0.124)   (0.125)   (0.125)   (0.126)   (0.125)   (0.126)   (0.129)   
Lambda   0.268*   0.225   0.201   0.173   0.154   0.153   0.154   0.149   0.192 
    (0.141)   (0.139)   (0.139)   (0.146)   (0.150)   (0.154)   (0.153)   (0.154)   (0.152) 
Sigma2_e 0.0798*** 0.0800*** 0.0736*** 0.0738*** 0.0682*** 0.0684*** 0.0663*** 0.0664*** 0.0649*** 0.0651*** 0.0646*** 0.0647*** 0.0646*** 0.0648*** 0.0641*** 0.0643*** 0.0687*** 0.0688*** 
  (0.00896) (0.00897) (0.00830) (0.00828) (0.00789) (0.00789) (0.00783) (0.00784) (0.00770) (0.00770) (0.00766) (0.00767) (0.00768) (0.00768) (0.00758) (0.00758) (0.00804) (0.00804) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                                 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                 
                                      
Table B.10. Spatial Fixed Effects Regressions: Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) and Spatial Error (SEM) Models 
Note: The reference category for institutional factors is hereditary succession; for “second serfdom”, it is the regions and periods not affected by the experience. 
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Table B.11. Spatial Fixed Effects Regressions: Spatially Lagged X Model (SLX)  
Note: The theta (Θ) columns indicate the coefficients for each spatially lagged independent variable. This shows that the spatial independent variable spillovers from other 
countries are insignificant, while the direct effect of the regressors from within countries can be interpreted as usual from the columns labelled slx. 
The reference category for institutional factors is hereditary succession; for “second serfdom”, it is the regions and periods not affected by the experience. 
                                      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Birth Known slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ 
                                      
Regicide -0.743*** -0.31 -0.663*** -0.375 -0.639*** -0.267 -0.583*** -0.13 -0.555*** -0.133 -0.559*** -0.082 -0.558*** -0.094 -0.563*** -0.053 -0.59*** 0.012 
  (0.074) (0.394) (0.076) (0.428) (0.074) (0.428) (0.074) (0.446) (0.074) (0.451) (0.075) (0.456) (0.075) (0.456) (0.074) (0.460) (0.074) (0.431) 
Battle         -0.815*** 0.068 -0.727*** 0.518 -0.727*** 0.557 -0.733*** 0.538 -0.73*** 0.534 -0.759*** 0.654 -0.715*** 0.766 
          (0.156) (0.713) (0.155) (0.767) (0.154) (0.767) (0.154) (0.779) (0.154) (0.780) (0.154) (0.785) (0.158) (0.771) 
Urbanisation             0.539*** 0.499 0.576*** 0.515 0.583*** 0.64 0.58*** 0.621 0.575*** 0.658 0.766*** 0.982** 
              (0.146) (0.653) (0.146) (0.657) (0.146) (0.677) (0.146) (0.677) (0.146) (0.683) (0.141) (0.625) 
Mode of  
Succession 
                0.052*** -0.009 0.052*** 0.025 0.052*** -0.002 0.054*** 0.026 0.043*** -0.002 
                  (0.020) (0.118) (0.020) (0.120) (0.020) (0.120) (0.020) (0.122) (0.020) (0.119) 
Pasture Area                     0.006 0.025     0.163*** 0.527 0.134*** 0.345 
                      (0.009) (0.040)     (0.078) (0.44) (0.080) (0.415) 
Crop Area                         0.004 0.022 -0.162*** -0.528 -0.132** -0.326 
                          (0.009) (0.042) (0.081) (0.457) (0.082) (0.431) 
Second Serfdom 0.027 0.156 0.052 0.099 0.054 0.074 0.068 -0.004 0.073 -0.022 0.072 -0.017 0.072 -0.021 0.063 0.006 0.051 0.004 
  (0.073) (0.164) (0.071) (0.162) (0.069) (0.159) (0.068) (0.166) (0.068) (0.169) (0.067) (0.171) (0.067) (0.171) (0.067) (0.174) (0.069) (0.175) 
                                      
Observations 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Elite Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Sigma2_e 0.291***   0.278***   0.269***   0.264***   0.261***   0.26***   0.261***   0.259***   0.268***   
  (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.009)   
Robust standard errors in parentheses                                 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Birth Known sar sar sar sar sar sar sar sar sar 
                    
Regicide -0.491 -0.334 -0.331 -0.328 -0.303 -1.200*** -1.038** -1.160*** -1.000*** 
  (0.304) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) (0.313) (0.455) (0.474) (0.434) (0.299) 
Battle     0.115 0.0847 0.104 -0.239 0.0565 -0.803 -0.614 
      (0.692) (0.706) (0.706) (0.648) (0.659) (0.709) (0.702) 
Urbanisation       -0.118 -0.0666 0.275 0.239 0.217 0.133 
        (0.689) (0.701) (0.627) (0.657) (0.597) (0.601) 
Mode of Succession         0.0368 -0.119 -0.0909 -0.114 -0.0813 
          (0.0949) (0.104) (0.108) (0.0990) (0.0828) 
Pasture Area           0.263***   0.845** 0.843** 
            (0.0927)   (0.374) (0.387) 
Crop Area             0.242** -0.653 -0.694 
              (0.106) (0.407) (0.424) 
Second Serfdom 0.637*** 0.332 0.315 0.334 0.306 0.909*** 0.763** 0.998*** 0.943*** 
  (0.200) (0.234) (0.260) (0.271) (0.282) (0.326) (0.327) (0.315) (0.204) 
                    
Observations 26 26 26 26 26 24 24 24 24 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Elite Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Rho 0.212 0.0850 0.0947 0.0788 0.0685 -0.171 -0.0954 -0.280 -0.121 
  (0.285) (0.298) (0.313) (0.315) (0.313) (0.296) (0.306) (0.290) (0.256) 
Standard errors clustered by country        
Robust standard errors in parentheses               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
                    
Table B.12. Spatial Regression without Interpolation (Cross Section: 1300) 
Note: Although the regicide coefficients in the first five specifications are imprecisely measured due to a very 
small sample, the sign remains negative and the coefficient is nevertheless quite substantial. 
                    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Birth Known sar sar sar sar sar sar sar sar sar 
                    
Regicide -0.923*** -1.112*** -1.031*** -0.818** -0.868** -1.183*** -1.170*** -1.222*** -1.030*** 
  (0.317) (0.323) (0.316) (0.326) (0.346) (0.367) (0.366) (0.365) (0.345) 
Battle     -0.932 -0.926 -0.945 -1.037 -1.008 -1.171* -0.848 
      (0.616) (0.587) (0.589) (0.656) (0.653) (0.668) (0.575) 
Urbanisation       1.817* 1.704 0.787 0.808 0.549 0.955 
        (1.085) (1.113) (1.163) (1.167) (1.185) (1.138) 
Mode of Succession         -0.0337 -0.167 -0.164 -0.177* -0.176* 
          (0.0831) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.103) 
Pasture Area           0.0301   0.320 0.105 
            (0.0409)   (0.362) (0.337) 
Crop Area             0.0245 -0.271 -0.0875 
              (0.0382) (0.337) (0.317) 
Second Serfdom 0.899*** 0.664** 0.559* 0.363 0.411 0.851** 0.849** 0.897** 1.027*** 
  (0.181) (0.307) (0.304) (0.312) (0.325) (0.377) (0.378) (0.376) (0.227) 
                    
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 24 24 24 24 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Elite Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Rho -0.0465 -0.128 0.0575 0.134 0.138 -0.207 -0.193 -0.273 -0.178 
  (0.270) (0.281) (0.299) (0.289) (0.290) (0.359) (0.358) (0.363) (0.292) 
Standard errors clustered by country        
Robust standard errors in parentheses               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
                    
Table B.13. Spatial Regression without Interpolation (Cross Section: 1400) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
ΔBirth Known sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem sar sem 
                                      
ΔRegicide -0.295** -0.295** -0.301** -0.301** -0.299*** -0.299*** -0.298*** -0.298** -0.297** -0.297** -0.296*** -0.296*** -0.308*** -0.307*** -0.342*** -0.342*** -0.334*** -0.334*** 
  (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.114) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.114) (0.115) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) 
ΔBattle         -0.422** -0.420** -0.421** -0.418** -0.421** -0.418** -0.392* -0.389* -0.377* -0.374* -0.382* -0.379* -0.381* -0.378* 
          (0.197) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.197) (0.198) (0.201) (0.202) (0.201) (0.202) (0.199) (0.200) (0.195) (0.196) 
ΔUrbanisation             0.0102 0.00776 0.00258 0.000392 0.0214 0.0192 0.0310 0.0289 0.0317 0.0298 0.0131 0.0107 
              (0.268) (0.269) (0.264) (0.265) (0.262) (0.263) (0.259) (0.259) (0.257) (0.258) (0.251) (0.252) 
ΔMode of 
Succession                 -0.0150 -0.0147 -0.0152 -0.0150 -0.0149 -0.0146 -0.0132 -0.0130 -0.0176 -0.0174 
                  (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0291) (0.0291) 
ΔPasture Area                     -0.111 -0.111     0.507 0.507 0.504 0.505 
                      (0.0906) (0.0911)     (0.342) (0.343) (0.350) (0.352) 
ΔCrop Area                         -0.138* -0.138* -0.549* -0.548* -0.542* -0.543* 
                          (0.0787) (0.0794) (0.295) (0.296) (0.303) (0.304) 
ΔSecond Serfdom 0.0124 0.0110 0.0120 0.0107 0.00356 0.00294 0.00335 0.00261 0.00324 0.00258 0.00312 0.00251 0.00337 0.00279 0.00474 0.00428 0.00493 0.00445 
  (0.0586) (0.0561) (0.0581) (0.0557) (0.0569) (0.0546) (0.0568) (0.0545) (0.0563) (0.0540) (0.0558) (0.0538) (0.0555) (0.0535) (0.0550) (0.0530) (0.0553) (0.0532) 
                                      
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Elite Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Rho -0.139   -0.141   -0.150   -0.150   -0.150   -0.148   -0.148   -0.147   -0.145   
  (0.193)   (0.189)   (0.190)   (0.189)   (0.189)   (0.187)   (0.186)   (0.187)   (0.189)   
Lambda   -0.134   -0.139   -0.134   -0.135   -0.137   -0.131   -0.128   -0.126   -0.124 
    (0.198)   (0.195)   (0.196)   (0.193)   (0.194)   (0.193)   (0.191)   (0.193)   (0.191) 
Sigma2_e 0.0465*** 0.0465*** 0.0457*** 0.0457*** 0.0434*** 0.0435*** 0.0432*** 0.0433*** 0.0430*** 0.0431*** 0.0426*** 0.0426*** 0.0422*** 0.0423*** 0.0415*** 0.0415*** 0.0421*** 0.0421*** 
  (0.00632) (0.00630) (0.00603) (0.00602) (0.00529) (0.00529) (0.00522) (0.00522) (0.00518) (0.00518) (0.00519) (0.00519) (0.00520) (0.00520) (0.00516) (0.00516) (0.00527) (0.00527) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                                 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                                                        
Table B.14. Spatial Fixed Effects in First Differences: Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) and Spatial Error (SEM) Models 
Note: The reference category for institutional factors is hereditary succession; for “second serfdom”, it is the regions and periods not affected by the experience. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
ΔBirth Known slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ slx Θ 
                                      
ΔRegicide -0.254*** 0.033 -0.261*** 0.032 -0.271*** 0.083 -0.278*** 0.084 -0.28*** 0.093 -0.298*** 0.104 -0.322*** 0.117 -0.355*** 0.137 -0.343*** 0.113 
  (0.052) (0.248) (0.052) (0.267) (0.051) (0.263) (0.052) (0.274) (0.052) (0.276) (0.052) (0.284) (0.052) (0.288) (0.053) (0.3) (0.053) (0.28) 
ΔBattle         -0.456*** 0.373 -0.455*** 0.381 -0.453*** 0.402 -0.395*** 0.382 -0.383*** 0.381 -0.395*** 0.376 -0.397*** 0.342 
          (0.097) (0.464) (0.098) (0.483) (0.098) (0.488) (0.098) (0.522) (0.097) (0.517) (0.097) (0.522) (0.097) (0.5) 
ΔUrbanisation             -0.09 0.085 -0.089 0.046 -0.058 0.055 -0.044 0.049 -0.05 0.02 -0.049 -0.155 
              (0.162) (0.911) (0.161) (0.922) (0.16) (0.922) (0.159) (0.915) (0.158) (0.931) (0.153) (0.87) 
ΔMode of 
Succession 
                0.007 0.032 0.004 0.033 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.033 -0.003 0.007 
                  (0.02) (0.104) (0.019) (0.105) (0.019) (0.104) (0.019) (0.106) (0.018) (0.092) 
ΔPasture Area                     -0.179*** 0.090     0.409** -0.248 0.408** -0.232 
                      (0.055) (0.275)     (0.188) (1.131) (0.187) (1.054) 
ΔCrop Area                         -0.187*** 0.093 -0.512*** 0.301 -0.499*** 0.303 
                          (0.045) (0.221) (0.155) (0.915) (0.154) (0.862) 
ΔSecond Serfdom -0.164*** 0.086 -0.158*** 0.079 -0.14*** 0.066 -0.141*** 0.071 -0.137*** 0.079 -0.134*** 0.078 -0.137*** 0.082 -0.145*** 0.086 -0.154*** 0.086 
  (0.046) (0.193) (0.047) (0.202) (0.046) (0.199) (0.046) (0.202) (0.047) (0.207) (0.046) (0.208) (0.046) (0.206) (0.046) (0.209) (0.045) (0.199) 
                                      
Observations 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Elite Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Sigma2_e 0.238***   0.235***   0.229***   0.228***   0.226***   0.222***   0.220***   0.218***   0.221***   
  (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008)   
Robust standard errors in parentheses                               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                 
                                      
 
Table B.15. Spatial Fixed Effects in First Differences: Spatially Lagged X Model (SLX) 
Note: The theta (Θ) columns indicate the coefficients for each spatially lagged independent variable. This shows that the spatial independent variable spillovers from other 
countries are insignificant, while the direct effect of the regressors from within countries can be interpreted as usual from the columns labelled slx. 
Note: The reference category for institutional factors is hereditary succession; for “second serfdom”, it is the regions and periods not affected by the experience. 
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B.10.4. Using Predicted Values 
To test whether collinearity between our variables that could potentially alleviate bias 
(from table B.3.) and variables of interest has any effect on the relationships we obtained, we 
run a regression specification using predicted values for elite numeracy. We first regress elite 
numeracy on our variables that could potentially alleviate bias before regressing the predicted 
values from this regression on our variables of interest. Here, we see that our core results 
concerning elite violence, battle deaths, crop area and pasture area remain intact, and that no 
changes in signs or significance occur. 
          
  
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
              
Regicide -0.386*** -0.396*** -0.397*** -0.388*** -0.389*** -0.452*** 
  (0.127) (0.129) (0.130) (0.137) (0.138) (0.125) 
Battle -0.690*** -0.700*** -0.698*** -0.711*** -0.704** -0.686** 
  (0.219) (0.221) (0.221) (0.259) (0.257) (0.255) 
Urbanisation   -0.189 -0.190 -0.177 -0.172 -0.202 
    (0.180) (0.181) (0.185) (0.185) (0.186) 
Mode of Succession  
(Base=Hereditary)         
● Partially Elected     -0.0246 0.0279 0.0276 0.0161 
      (0.0878) (0.0954) (0.0953) (0.0972) 
● Fully Elected     0.00681 -0.0586 -0.0601 -0.0114 
      (0.0821) (0.0826) (0.0825) (0.0855) 
Pasture Area       0.0123   0.328*** 
        (0.00823)   (0.0746) 
Crop Area         0.00523 -0.350*** 
          (0.00588) (0.0789) 
Second Serfdom -0.0134 -0.0253 -0.0261 -0.0107 -0.00908 -0.0484 
  (0.0753) (0.0767) (0.0770) (0.0814) (0.0818) (0.0803) 
Constant 0.208* 0.214* 0.214* 0.197 0.198 0.226 
  (0.115) (0.116) (0.124) (0.139) (0.139) (0.136) 
              
Observations 226 226 226 201 201 201 
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.107 0.099 0.084 0.082 0.115 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors clustered by country     
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
              
Table B.16. Fixed Effects Regressions with Predicted Values 
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B.10.5. Changing the Spatial Unit of Observation 
Next, we implement another robustness test by changing our spatial unit of observation 
from modern countries to the broader regions specified in table A.B.1. Again, our key findings 
are largely unaffected, although neither the pasture nor crop variables become at all significant; 
while the second serfdom now has a negative and significant impact. 
Table B.17. Regional Fixed Effects Regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
                
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) 
  
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
                
Regicide -0.284* -0.289* -0.295* -0.326** -0.326** -0.326** -0.296** 
  (0.151) (0.152) (0.154) (0.150) (0.147) (0.151) (0.132) 
Battle -0.603** -0.615** -0.597** -0.532* -0.529* -0.527* -0.518* 
  (0.271) (0.273) (0.270) (0.255) (0.254) (0.263) (0.261) 
Urbanisation -0.137 -0.144 -0.127 -0.124 -0.123 -0.107 
    (0.162) (0.161) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.180) 
Mode of Succession  
          
(Base=Hereditary) 
● Partially Elected   -0.0322 -0.0390 -0.0390 -0.0374 -0.0374 
      (0.0649) (0.0683) (0.0687) (0.0693) (0.0624) 
● Fully Elected   -0.0352 -0.0429 -0.0427 -0.0425 -0.0465 
      (0.0874) (0.0872) (0.0872) (0.0887) (0.0830) 
Pasture Area     0.0115   -0.00528 -0.0152 
        (0.00950)   (0.0684) (0.0587) 
Crop Area         0.0127 0.0179 0.0268 
          (0.00848) (0.0678) (0.0596) 
Second Serfdom -0.110** -0.120*** -0.129*** -0.135** -0.133** -0.133** -0.122** 
  (0.0384) (0.0381) (0.0423) (0.0490) (0.0483) (0.0496) (0.0397) 
Constant 0.446** 0.448** 0.461** 0.488** 0.487** 0.486** 0.429** 
  (0.183) (0.184) (0.193) (0.195) (0.195) (0.200) (0.146) 
                
Observations 155 155 155 149 149 149 149 
Adjusted R2 0.656 0.655 0.651 0.621 0.621 0.618 0.621 
Elite Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors clustered by country      
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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B.10.6. Quantile Regression 
Next, we use quantile regression to detect whether using median responses rather than 
mean responses in our regressions yields contrasting outcomes. Another advantage of quantile 
regression is that it is less sensitive to outliers than ordinary linear models and is therefore better 
equipped to face any noise that we may have introduced to the data by summarising individuals 
as countries and centuries. We did introduce a minimum requirement of ten rulers per country-
century unit as a precaution against potential measurement error and outliers, but quantile 
regression offers this additional advantage in the presence of noisy variables. It should also be 
noted that Keywood and Baten (2018) use binary choice models, namely linear probability 
models and logistic regression, as robustness tests to inspect whether summarising our data 
affects our results in the context of regicide and our elite numeracy proxy. They find comparable 
results. 
The conclusions drawn from our quantile regression at the median are largely the same 
as those of the fixed effects specification. The only real difference between the two estimators 
is that model five of the quantile regression shows none of our regressors to be significant. 
However, the remarkable similarity of the other results leads us to believe that this is an 
anomaly and that it does not invalidate any of our previous results.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
Birth 
Known 
                
Regicide -0.416*** -0.429*** -0.429*** -0.436*** -0.434 -0.503*** -0.473*** 
  (0.108) (0.112) (0.112) (0.167) (0.351) (0.173) (0.130) 
Battle -0.686*** -0.698*** -0.697*** -0.700** -0.695 -0.675* -0.662*** 
  (0.202) (0.206) (0.206) (0.343) (0.720) (0.354) (0.283) 
Urbanisation   -0.217 -0.215 -0.192 -0.172 -0.194 -0.171 
    (0.192) (0.192) (0.277) (0.570) (0.286) (0.211) 
Mode of Succession                
(Base=Hereditary)               
● Partially Elected     -0.0177 0.0501 0.0503 0.0384 0.00884 
      (0.0853) (0.132) (0.277) (0.138) (0.121) 
● Fully Elected     0.00462 -0.00256 -0.00247 -0.00590 -0.00838 
      (0.0303) (0.0433) (0.0906) (0.0452) (0.0368) 
Pasture Area       0.0154   0.344*** 0.339*** 
        (0.0128)   (0.117) (0.0937) 
Crop Area         0.00818 -0.365*** -0.363*** 
          (0.0272) (0.129) (0.103) 
Second Serfdom -0.0292 -0.0429 -0.0435 -0.0383 -0.0364 -0.0839 -0.0626 
  (0.0721) (0.0748) (0.0750) (0.111) (0.232) (0.116) (0.0891) 
                
Observations 226 226 226 201 201 201 201 
Elite Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors clustered by country      
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
                
Table B.18. Quantile Regressions (Median) 
 
The robustness tests that we conduct in this appendix show that our fixed effects 
regression may slightly overstate the effect of regicide on elite numeracy and cast doubt on the 
effect of battle deaths; but that the remaining variables, especially crop and pasture areas, seem 
to be consistent across model specifications. In sum, our fixed effects results seem robust and 
provide clear evidence for our key conclusions; particularly that elite violence does seem to 
have a causal impact on elite numeracy. 
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B.10.7. Instrumental Variable Regressions 
Tables A.B.12. and A.B.13. show the first stage regressions to the IV regressions from 
tables B.5. and B.6. respectively. 
        
  
Hungarian 
Invasions 
High Medieval 
Peace 
Mongolian 
Invasions 
  
(9th and 10th 
centuries) 
(11th and 12th 
centuries) 
(13th and 14th 
centuries) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  LIML LIML LIML 
  Regicide Regicide Regicide 
        
Invasion Proximity -0.120*** -0.0507 -0.0535* 
  (0.0364) (0.0349) (0.0306) 
Constant 0.920*** 0.483** 0.489*** 
  (0.218) (0.201) (0.178) 
        
Observations 14 23 33 
R-squared 0.474 0.091 0.090 
Adjusted R2 0.431 0.048 0.060 
Standard errors clustered by country 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
    
        
First Stage IV Regressions to: Table B.5. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  LIML LIML LIML LIML LIML LIML LIML 
  Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide 
                
Invasion Proximity 2.049*** 2.064*** 1.955*** 2.007*** 2.220*** 2.207*** 2.290*** 
  (0.692) (0.692) (0.710) (0.706) (0.760) (0.760) (0.776) 
Battle   0.180 0.157 0.199 0.139 0.141 0.132 
    (0.179) (0.183) (0.183) (0.201) (0.202) (0.203) 
Urbanisation     -0.228 -0.173 -0.145 -0.147 -0.139 
      (0.315) (0.322) (0.342) (0.342) (0.344) 
Mode of Succession                
(Base=Hereditary)               
● Partially Elected       0.0774 0.0622 0.0632 0.0611 
        (0.0611) (0.0731) (0.0731) (0.0734) 
● Fully Elected       -0.0709 -0.0861 -0.0862 -0.0862 
        (0.0546) (0.0621) (0.0621) (0.0623) 
Pasture Area         0.0125   0.0802 
          (0.00981)   (0.138) 
Crop Area           0.0126 -0.0703 
            (0.0102) (0.143) 
Constant -0.186 -0.204 -0.169 -0.184 -0.221 -0.219 -0.233 
  (0.129) (0.130) (0.139) (0.139) (0.152) (0.152) (0.154) 
                
Observations 120 120 120 120 106 106 106 
R-squared 0.084 0.092 0.096 0.124 0.155 0.154 0.157 
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.060 0.057 0.069 0.085 0.084 0.078 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors clustered by country 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
              
Table B.19. First Stage IV Regressions to: Table B.6. 
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B.10.8. Regicide and Nobilicide 
 
Figure B.19. Regicide versus Nobilicide (Nobilicide from Battles) 
Note: centuries are rounded up and abbreviated, i.e. 15 refers to the 15th century. Regional disaggregation 
follows Cummins (2017) where S. Europe refers to Southern Europe, C. Europe refers to Central Europe and N. 
Europe refers to Nothern Europe. Source: Nobilicide data from Cummins (2017). 
 
B.10.9. Description of Variables 
1. Elite Numeracy 
In order to estimate elite numeracy, we employ the share of rulers for whom a birth year 
is reported in conventional biographical sources. We propose that for the birth year of a ruler 
to be entered into a kingdom’s historical records, a certain level of numerical sophistication is 
required among the ruling elite. This evidence does not necessarily estimate the numerical 
ability of the rulers themselves but rather that of the government and bureaucratic elite around 
them and, by implication, the elites of the polity in general.  
As more traditional indicators of education such as literacy rates, school enrolment, or 
age heaping-based numeracy are not available for most medieval European countries, only the 
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‘known ruler birth year’ proxy allows us to trace elite numeracy in periods and world regions 
for which no other indicators are available. 
The data for the elite numeracy measure come from our regicide dataset, which was 
initially built using the rulers found in Eisner’s (2011) original regicide study, comprising 1513 
rulers from across 45 kingdoms. We then strongly expanded this dataset with an array of 
supplementary sources, chiefly Morby’s (1989) “Dynasties of the World” and Bosworth’s 
(1996) “The New Islamic Dynasties” as well as many other individual biographies and 
encyclopaedia entries. The expanded dataset consists of 4066 rulers from 92 kingdoms across 
the period 500 – 1900 CE and comprises all of Europe (see Keywood and Baten 2018 for more 
details). 
 
2. Elite Violence 
Elite violence could potentially be an important determinant of elite numeracy. If the 
risk of being killed were high, elite families would likely have substituted some of their 
children’s education for military training or instruction in self-defence. Similarly, elites 
surrounding the ruler would have been selected based on criteria concerning strategic combat 
and defence rather than on sophisticated skills in negotiation and trade. Additionally, violence 
may have prevented students from travelling to educational facilities, and these institutions may 
even have been destroyed through violent acts.  
We use the regicide rate as our indicator for elite violence after comparing evidence on 
regicide and homicide for a number of European countries for which Eisner (2014) presented 
early evidence of homicide. The data for the elite violence variable come from our regicide 
dataset. 
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3. Battle Violence 
Battle violence provides information on civil wars and external military pressures on 
each kingdom, which may have affected elite numeracy through the destruction of educational 
infrastructure or lowered incentives to invest in elite numeracy due to lower life expectancy 
(Cummins 2017). Moreover, battle deaths and regicide are correlated, meaning that not 
including them as a control variable could lead to an overstatement of any effect of regicide on 
elite numeracy. Consequently, because we aim to use regicide as a proxy for interpersonal 
violence, we must differentiate between it and violence stemming from external sources. The 
data for the battle violence variable come from our regicide dataset. 
 
4. Urbanisation 
Urbanisation rates are widely used in economic history literature, and act as a broad 
control variable for factors that could confound the relationship between elite violence and elite 
numeracy. They have also been employed as a proxy indicator for income among early societies 
in which other income proxy data are unavailable (Bosker et al. 2013; De Long and Shleifer 
1993; Acemoglu et al. 2005; Nunn and Qian 2011; Cantoni 2015). Bosker et al. (2013) 
hypothesise that part of this relationship works through agricultural productivity because a 
productive agricultural sector is required to support a large urban centre, and urban areas cannot 
produce their own agricultural goods. We constructed our urbanisation variable using Bosker 
et al.’s (2013) estimates of urban populations and calculated urbanisation rates using McEvedy 
and Jones’ (1978) measurements of country populations by century. 
 
5. Institutional Quality 
We also introduce a measure of institutional quality as a potential determinant of elite 
numeracy. Our indicator is the mode of succession of rulers, as this captures a preference for 
Elite Violence and Elite Numeracy in Europe from 500 – 1900 CE: Roots of the Divergence. 
91 
 
the division of power and the willingness to forego executive decision-making in the interests 
of democracy. We use a three-category indicator to describe whether a ruler obtained their 
position through inheritance, partial election or full election by the nobility or a business 
aristocracy (as in Venice, for example). The differences in institutional quality between states, 
seen through modes of succession, is not as large as those between democracy and autocracy, 
of course, but evidence on democratic structures does not exist for the first centuries under 
study here. However, a preference for the division of power reduces the likelihood of 
unconstrained totalitarianism. We expect institutional quality to be positively correlated with 
elite numeracy. The data for the institutional quality variable come from our regicide dataset. 
 
6. Pastureland 
Next, we use estimates of pastureland area from Goldewijk et al. (2017). We transform 
the variable to pastureland per square kilometre per capita. Motivation for including this control 
is that pastureland provides nutritional advantages, and improved nutrition is known to have 
positive implications for human capital (Schultz 1997; Victoria et al. 2008). Second, numerous 
studies have used pastureland and pastoral productivity as means of estimating female labour 
force participation, which is lined to female autonomy gender inequality, human capital and 
numeracy as a result (Alesina et al. 2013; de Pleijt et al. 2016; Voigtländer and Voth 2013; 
Baten et al. 2017). This mechanism functions through women’s comparative physical 
disadvantage relative to men when ploughing fields and performing other tasks required when 
crop farming. Over time, this tendency developed into a social norm that saw men work in the 
fields while women took care of ‘the home’ (Alesina et al. 2013). However, when cattle and 
other domestic animals were present, their care became the task of women – boosting female 
labour participation and their contributions to household income, thereby increasing female 
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autonomy and reducing gender inequality – allowing women to develop skills in human capital 
and contribute to economic development (Diebolt and Perrin 2013). 
 
7. Cropland 
As a counterweight to the pastureland variable, we use cropland as a comparative 
indicator. Like pastureland, cropland should describe agricultural and nutritional development 
but should also emphasise gender inequality for the reasons above. Therefore, its coefficient 
should be positive if nutrition, in terms of calories, is more important for elite numeracy, and 
negative if gender inequality is. The cropland variable is also transformed into per square 
kilometre per capita terms; and comes from Goldewijk et al. (2017). 
 
8. Second Serfdom 
We include a variable for the second serfdom to assess whether the inequality that it 
wrought had any impact on elite numeracy in Eastern Europe. This is coded as a dummy 
variable for all of Eastern Europe from the 16th until the 18th century and until the 19th century 
in Russia, where serfdom was only officially abolished under Tsar Alexander II in 1861. 
 
9. Nomadic Invasions 
We use the nomadic invasions of Europe from Central Asia as an instrument for elite 
violence because they resulted in an external import of violence to Europe. Additionally, 
nomadic invasions meet the exclusion restriction their origins were determined by climatic 
forces, such as droughts in Central Asia (Bai and Kung 2011), and by military capacity. To 
estimate the impact of these invasions, we use the logged inverse distance of each kingdom’s 
capital to Avarga, Mongolia, the location of the first capital of the Mongolian Empire.  
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10. Length of Reign 
The next three variables are used to control for ruler specific characteristics, labelled 
“elite controls” in the text. First, rulers who spent more time on the throne could have better 
established themselves and their policies, giving chronologists more reason and more time to 
document their birth years. We control for this potentially biasing effect by including the length 
of the ruler’s reign as a control variable. The data for the reign length variable come from our 
regicide dataset. 
 
11. Fame of Ruler 
Second, the birth years of more famous rulers might have been better recorded. It is 
conceivable that events in the lives of lesser rulers, who were placed under the suzerainty of an 
emperor, for example, would be less diligently documented. We can also control for this “fame 
bias” to a certain extent by controlling for whether the rulers of each kingdom were always 
under the suzerainty of an overlord, whether this applies to a part of each period, or whether it 
was never the case. Rulers with a more dependent, governor-type function most likely attracted 
less attention from chronologists than those who had the freedom to act and set policy 
autonomously. The data for the ruler fame variable come from our regicide dataset. 
 
12. Power of Ruler 
We include the area of each kingdom in square kilometres as a third control variable 
against more famous or powerful rulers being better documented. Although not all powerful 
rulers held large territories, rulers of powerful kingdoms such as the Holy Roman Empire, the 
Ottoman Empire, Poland-Lithuania and the Kievan Rus certainly did. The data for the ruler 
power variable come from Nüssli (2010). 
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13. Religion 
As an additional variable for the random effects specification we use the most prominent 
religion in each country during each century – Islam, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Catholicism 
(our reference group) and an ‘other’ category; comprising Pagan, tribal or pre-Christian 
religions. This indicator variable was included to capture the effects of cultural characteristics 
that are associated with religion. We coded the majority religion by using the ruler’s religion 
from our regicide sources and the summaries of historical religion in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica (2019). 
 
14. Religious Diversity 
We also include a dummy for religious diversity from Baten and van Zanden (2008). 
This could have either a positive effect on numeracy, perhaps via competition – stimulating 
book consumption, for example – or a negative effect via conflict through social 
fractionalisation (Easterly and Levine 1997).  
 
15. Jewish Minority 
Our final religious variable is a dummy for the presence of a substantial Jewish minority, 
which we include because Jews were, on average, better educated than other religious groups 
among whom they lived. These data are from a combination of Anderson et al. (2017), Botticini 
and Eckstein (2012) and the Encyclopaedia Judaica (1972). 
 
16. Ruggedness 
We use ruggedness because numerous studies have associated it with violence and lower 
economic development in a broader sense. For example, Mitton (2016) finds flatter landscapes 
to be associated with higher GDP per capita, while Bohara et al. (2006), O’Loughlin et al. 
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(2010) and Idrobo et al. (2014) all describe different situations where rugged terrain provides 
advantages for instigators of violence. In contrast, Nunn and Puga (2012) describe how 
ruggedness protected parts of Africa from the adverse effect of the slave trade between 1400 
and 1900. The ruggedness data that we use come from Nunn and Puga (2012).  
 
17. Coordinates 
Latitude and longitude are used as general spatial controls, and are measured by the 
geographic centroids for modern countries from Donnelly (2012).  
 
18. Percentage Fertile Soil 
We use the percentage of each country that is covered by fertile soil as an additional 
control for any agricultural impact on elite numeracy. The fertile soil data come from Nunn and 
Puga (2012). 
 
19. Percentage within 100 km of ice-free coast 
We use the percentage of each country that that lies within 100 km of ice-free coast as 
an additional control for the effects that maritime trade may have had on elite numeracy. The 
within 100 km of ice-free coast data come from Nunn and Puga (2012).  
 
  
  
 
 
C. Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE.28 
 
 
Abstract 
We present new evidence for elite violence using regicide, the killing of kings, and 
investigate the role of the state in European violence between the 6th and 19th centuries. First, 
regicide is critically assessed as a proxy for interpersonal elite violence, but it survives this 
scrutiny. We present a close relationship between regicide and homicide, and compare 
qualitative trends in regicide with events that take place throughout Europe’s economic history. 
We also investigate territorial state capacity by studying which states could keep or even expand 
their territories. A series of empirical tests are then conducted to illustrate that territorial state 
capacity likely had a largely pacifying role on trends and regional differences in interpersonal 
elite violence, at least since the High Middle Ages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Co-authored by Jörg Baten. He contributed approximately 20% of the work to this paper. 
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C.1. Introduction 
Tilly (1975), Dincecco (2015), and Hoffman (2015) assert that war is a crucial 
determinant of state capacity, arguing that a high degree of tax capacity developed in France as 
a direct result of the Hundred Years’ War. In contrast, Pinker (2011) and Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) maintain that state capacity and the policing function associated with it helps to contain 
interpersonal violence. We will assess, in the following, which of these two views is supported 
by long run European data from 500 to 1900 CE.  
Interpersonal violence is a challenging topic to study over the very long run, particularly 
as homicide rates have traditionally been used as its standard unit of measurement among 
economic historians. Homicide data does not often extend further back in time than the 19th 
century, even in countries with the most rigorous traditions of record-keeping. However, by 
building on an approach by Eisner (2011) and using regicide – the killing of kings and other 
rulers – as a proxy indicator for interpersonal elite violence, we are able to study more than a 
millennium of the history of violence. After exploring these trends in elite violence, we assess 
its relationship with state capacity.  
How can state capacity be measured for the Middle Ages? During the medieval period, 
states aimed to keep their territory or expand it if possible; there was strong competition 
between the existing principalities and many of them disappeared from the landscape, whereas 
others kept their territories or even expanded. Hence, our proxy indicator for state capacity is 
the retention or even expansion of territory, which we will name ‘territorial state capacity’ in 
the following. We do not necessarily see expansion as positive, but it is a side effect of territorial 
state capacity. Correspondingly, territorial state capacity would also have been determined by 
marriage patterns, with ruling families of more successful states being able to arrange marriages 
strategically, in order to acquire valuable territories. This strategy allows us to assess the 
correlation between violence and state capacity, two crucial components of development. 
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Although we cannot claim causality from our estimates, we expand the literature on violence 
and state capacity by investigating which of the hypotheses – that expanding kingdoms or 
principalities were violence-promoting or violence-restricting – is supported by European data 
since 500 CE. 
Evidence about the relationship between violence and state capacity, both for earlier 
and more recent periods, but especially for the 20th century, is very mixed. The most famous 
definition of ‘the state’ was coined by Max Weber (1919) a century ago; he characterised it as 
an organisation holding a “monopoly of legitimate violence” – that states curb interpersonal 
violence through a policing-type function but are still able to enact violence themselves through 
legal systems or warfare. However, as mentioned previously, Tilly (1975) proposed that only 
states with the capability to raise taxes and support armies could protect their constituents, and 
that the threat of war was necessary to make the nobility comply with plans to generate tax 
capacity. More recently, Dincecco (2015), O’Brien (2011) and Hoffman (2012, 2015) studied 
cases where war is associated with tax capacity and conclude that war-induced state capability 
was one of the core reasons for Europe’s economic rise. 
Conversely, another branch of the literature finds that state capacity has a significant 
conflict-restraining function. As mentioned, Pinker (2011) proposed that states developed 
policing capabilities to restrict violence, but he also suggested that high capacity states 
promoted certain value systems which favoured cooperation and negotiation, helping to stem 
violence further.  
Correspondingly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) study the origins of global civil war between 
the Second World War and the turn of the millennium. They find that weak state capacity, along 
with poverty and large populations, has been a stronger predictor of violence than more intuitive 
drivers of civil violence, such as inequality, state discrimination against minorities, colonial 
legacies and ethnic or religious fractionalisation. Further, Richani (2010) also agrees with 
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Pinker’s (2011) findings, reasoning that eroded state capacities cause interpersonal violence 
through increased opportunities for corruption, weakening service provision and potentially 
causing heightened financial and macroeconomic instability, as well as fluctuations in goods 
prices. 
Bell et al. (2013) largely agree that high state capacity tends to limit violence, but also 
contend that strong, centralised states can incite and contribute to violence through human rights 
violations and political imprisonment, for example. However, they maintain that the 
relationship is not simply due to institutions that allow for political freedom, asserting that 
restrictions on citizen coordination such as enforcing curfews or banning gatherings is likely to 
reduce violence. 
Heldring (2019) examines a particularly interesting example, the impact of state 
capacity on the intensity of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. He finds a positive relationship 
using subnational units before implementing an instrumental variable strategy and concludes 
that state capacity caused genocide.29 
Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2010) discuss how certain investments in state capacity can 
lead to civil wars. They use a game-theoretical model to outline a situation in which the elites 
in command of a polity with weak institutions must choose whether or not to strengthen their 
army in order to acquire a monopoly on violence and quell a hypothetical rebellion. Doing so, 
however, could grant the army implicit political influence or even endanger the personal safety 
and political positions of the elite if the army decides to execute a coup.30  
 
29 Heldring used geographical cattle suitability as an instrument. Cattle constituted the foremost store of value 
during precolonial times and acquiring cattle was the main goal of conquering neighbouring principalities. 
Modern state capacity was then simpler to develop in regions where precolonial state capacity already existed. 
This causal effect also fits one of the main findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, that the 
genocide was planned and that the perpetrators leveraged political positions to enact genocide. 
30 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) provide an example of this by outlining how Siaka Stevens, president of Sierra 
Leone from 1971 to 1985, crippled his own country’s army in favour of individual paramilitaries under his direct 
control. 
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Clearly, evidence on the relationship between state capacity and violence is mixed. Our 
strategy for studying the relationship between state capacity and violence is to study the last 
1400 years of European history, which provide a new arena in which to explore this 
relationship.  
 
C.2. Assessing the Regicide Indicator 
C.2.1. Regicide and Homicide 
Although homicide is the academic standard when measuring interpersonal violence, 
historical evidence of it only begins to be recorded from the 14th century. Even then, it is only 
available for major cities – chiefly in Western Europe – and a small number of countries, while 
most European states begin to document homicides from the early 19th century. Initially, 
homicide statistics began to be recorded because they were considered significant and unusual 
events, unlike more frequent experiences such as births and weather patterns or metrics like 
education standards or trade volumes; data for which usually appear later or are inferred by 
economic historians, perhaps never being used in a contemporaneous setting.  
The use of regicide as a proxy for interpersonal violence was first explored by Manuel 
Eisner (2011), who noticed a strong association between European homicide and regicide rates 
in Western Europe as far back as the 13th century. Like homicide, regicide records were 
collected because of their value as both significant and unusual events within societies, though 
to an appreciably greater extent. Accordingly, accounts of regicide were amassed from much 
earlier times, providing far lengthier data series. Unlike early homicide records, which would 
have been confounded by poor base rate estimates, since formal population censuses only 
became widespread during the 19th century, regicide rates are calculated from comprehensive 
dynastic lists. Documenting rulers was always deemed important regardless of whether they 
were killed. 
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Although studying regicide clearly offers far fewer observations and consequently 
requires greater periodicity than homicide, the habit of recording the lives and deaths of rulers 
permits an analysis that begins far earlier than alternative indicators of interpersonal violence 
have traditionally allowed. 
 
C.2.2. Comparisons with other Indicators 
Elias (1939) studied descriptions of medieval brutality and put forward a hypothesis that 
violence has declined over multiple centuries. Later, he characterised this as part of 
humankind’s ‘civilising process’ – an appreciation for elevated speech, table manners and the 
rise of chivalry – a process which steadily evolved into a distaste for violence in favour of 
negotiation as the preferred tool for resolving conflicts. Many scholars have declared this 
process decisive in altering universal levels of welfare over time (Eisner 2001, 2011; Meeus 
and Raaijmakers 1986, Steinert 2003). 
In order to motivate regicide as a proxy indicator for interpersonal violence, we compare 
it to homicide statistics from Eisner (2014) in the context of the civilising process. Figure C.1., 
below, compares our estimates of regicide with homicide records in Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. Evidence of the relationship between the two series as well as the 
civilising process is immediately evident, as high rates of interpersonal violence are visible 
from the 13th century before gradually declining toward modern levels and flattening during the 
early modern period. At 65-70 homicides per 100 000 people, Italy’s 14th century homicide rate 
was comparable to that of El Salvador and Honduras today, while Germany, Spain and the UK 
were comparable to Columbia, Brazil or South Africa at about 30 homicides per 100 000 people 
(UNODC 2019).  
In Germany, we see a strong decline in violence from the 13th century which takes on a 
steady concave pattern, despite overcorrections between 1400 and 1500. The relationship is 
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also clear in Italy until the 18th century, when regicide diverges from homicide and increases 
strongly in the last century – due to the assassinations which took place in the build up to Italy’s 
unification. In Spain, although fluctuations in regicide appear larger than in homicide, their 
correlation over time is extraordinary. Finally, the two series also display a largely common 
trend in the United Kingdom, despite missing values in the homicide series between 1400 and 
1600.  
One criticism of these simple comparisons could be that both regicide and homicide 
follow a common declining trend which may expose a spurious relationship. However, the 
circles indicated in figure C.1. provide evidence that the correlation is not only dependent on 
time by illustrating cases where the two series simultaneously increase. Indeed, every instance 
of increasing violence in these four countries is followed by both indicators, aside from Italy in 
the 19th century and in Germany, where the discrepancies reflect differences in periodicity. 
Additional evidence on the relationship between regicide and elite violence can also be 
obtained through comparisons with the rates of nobilicide (the killing of noblemen) calculated 
by Cummins (2017; using the proportion of battlefield deaths among noblemen). Figure C.2. 
illustrates how both series, aggregated at the European level, decline from the 6th and 8th 
centuries, respectively. However nobilicide also deviates from this downward trend in the 14th 
century, which coincides with the Mongolian invasions and the beginning of the Hundred 
Years’ War in Western Europe. Further, figure C.3. provides evidence of this relationship 
disaggregated to the regional levels that were used by Cummins (2017). 
 
C.2.3. A Timeline of Regicide 
To assess the plausibility of our regicide indicator further, we also compare trends in 
regicide with the major economic developments that took place since 500 CE, such as major 
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invasions, episodes of plague and the ‘second serfdom’. These major economic developments 
are often mentioned in the economic history literature and are therefore discussed here. 
When we disaggregate European violence into six regions, we observe interesting 
deviations in each series (figure C.4.). For example, at the end of the Viking Age, during the 
High Middle Ages (11th – 12th century), Scandinavia introduced more centralised monarchies, 
but they initially lacked common acceptance, and regicide very often took place.31  
Likewise, North Eastern Europe deviated towards increased regicide in the period of the 
Mongolian invasions (13th – 14th century), though with more persistent consequences. Keywood 
and Baten (2019) explain why this invasion period resulted in interpersonal violence and 
regicide, even without considering battlefield violence. In the following period, the 15th – 19th 
centuries, North-Eastern Europe remained the second most violent European region while 
South-Eastern Europe became the most violent. 
Another potential determinant could be the second serfdom in Eastern Europe. The 
second serfdom was an event through which feudal systems were reintroduced into Eastern 
Europe after increased state centralisation had dismantled earlier feudal systems in order to 
better organise labour in the aftermath of the Great Plague (Ogilvie and Edwards 2000). This 
period, lasting approximately between the 16th and late 18th centuries (although serfdom in 
Russia was only abolished in 1861 under Tsar Alexander II) is commonly thought to have been 
the result of the low agricultural output and a high land-labour ratio in Eastern Europe that was 
caused by The Plague (Acemoglu and Wolitzky 2011). Alternatively, the combination of scarce 
labour and abundant land in the aftermath of the Great Plague resulted in substantially higher 
wages as a result of increased labour demand, attracting labourers from Western Europe. From 
the 16th to the 18th century, working conditions increasingly deteriorated and it became difficult 
 
31 This was the setting for Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
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for serfs to leave since they had no movable assets. Landlords subsequently grew powerful due, 
in part, to Western Europe-bound exports (Kula 1976; Blum 1957), amassing militias and 
gaining bargaining power over rulers and peasants alike. Keeping peasants as serfs would have 
increased inequality (Ogilvie and Edwards 2000) and potentially led to further interpersonal 
violence. From figure C.4., we also gain evidence that the second serfdom might be associated 
with persistently high rates of regicide. While most European series seem to steadily drop 
toward the low levels of modern violence experienced after the Plague, regicide stagnates in 
Eastern Europe. Eastern European regicide rates settled well above 10% as opposed to the 
steady declines towards 5% that were experienced in Western and Central Europe by the 19th 
century. 
 
C.2.4. Regional Differences in Violence by Period 
In addition to European trends, country-specific trends in regicide also allow for the 
detection of certain events throughout Europe’s history. The maps in figures C.6. and C.7. show 
the distribution of violence over time, grouped by countries as opposed to principalities for the 
purposes of the mapping software. The figures that follow describe the respective states of 
regicide during four periods of European development.  
We compare these general trends to key events that took place within each region – 
often referring to battles with foreign powers as any spillover effects from organised conflict 
may have led to interpersonal violence. Figure C.6. describes the average state of regicide for 
each country over our entire sample period. 
Bulgaria, Armenia, Turkey and Cyprus – in that order – exhibit the highest rates of 
regicide over our entire period of study, all above 30%. Conversely, the central European 
countries of Germany, Austria and Poland – along with Portugal – display the lowest rates, all 
under 8%. Broadly, Europe seems to have had a peaceful centre with violent frontiers. Until the 
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end of the High Middle Ages, Ireland and parts of Scandinavia all saw comparatively higher 
levels of regicide with considerable numbers of deaths in battle. As such, the notion of a 
peaceful centre with violent frontiers becomes even clearer when including battle deaths and in 
the periodic maps that follow (figures A.C.2. and A.C.3.).  
During the early Middle Ages (figure C.7., panel a), violence was extreme and nine of 
the eighteen countries for which we have data exhibit regicide rates of over 25%. From the 
beginning of this period until the 8th century, the Justinian Plague may have had some effect in 
inducing the violence that we see in Turkey and Italy as it ravaged the Mediterranean states, 
killing up 50 million people or an estimated 15% of the world’s population (Caspermeyer 
2016). At the same time, principalities within Germany, the Czech Republic and Serbia had low 
regicide rates. 
The 10th to 13th centuries are probably the closest match to our map encompassing the 
entire period; as northern European regicide appears to gain prominence due the pacification of 
the Vikings and the subsequent generation of non-yet fully-accepted monarchies. This shift 
becomes particularly clear when examining the map including battle deaths, as a 
disproportionate number of Scandinavian rulers died in battle (figure A.C.3., panel b). Indeed, 
the ratio of battle deaths to regicide is 1.75 for Norway and 2 for Iceland as opposed to the 
average ratio of 0.49 across all countries and periods. 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom all experience surges in 
regicide between the 10th and 13th centuries, relative to the previous period. At this time, the 
Second Bulgarian Empire was the main power within South-Eastern Europe, although it was 
under constant pressure due to ceaseless invasion attempts by the Mongols, Byzantines, 
Hungarians and Serbs (Wolff 1949). Meanwhile, their neighbours in Romania experienced a 
particularly low-regicide period in comparison to their country average (3.1% as opposed to 
19.3%), driven by the Kingdom of Transylvania. Additionally, Georgia transitioned from one 
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of the most violent regions in the early Middle Ages to one of the most peaceful in the High 
Middle Ages (from 42.9% to 5%). This period coincides with the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of 
Georgia which followed the earlier conflicts that the Kingdom of Iberia had fought against the 
Persians and Byzantines (de Waal 2011). This so-called ‘Golden Age’ saw Georgia control the 
entire south Caucasus region before much of it was conquered by the Mongols in the late 13th 
century. 
The 13th to 15th centuries are characterised by near universal trends away from regicide 
in Europe’s west and centre while Eastern Europe’s violence levels persist or even strengthen 
in the cases of Romania, Georgia and Hungary. Here, a strong case can be made for divergence 
between east and west. Indeed, the only Western European country that still exhibits a ‘very 
high’ level of regicide in this period is Denmark which, along with the United Kingdom, is the 
only western country to sustain a regicide rate above 20%. Conversely, Bulgarian regicide 
remains fairly high during the Ottoman expansion while Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine 
constitute a region of substantial conflict as the rulers of Poland and Lithuania first fought off 
the Mongols during the early 14th century before the Ottomans conquered much of Ukraine’s 
Black Sea coastline during the 1470s, including Crimea.  
The early modern period (panel d) then saw drastic declines in regicide, with only 
Ukraine (considered Eastern Europe) and Romania (South-Eastern Europe) displaying rates 
comparable to those in earlier periods. However, despite these widespread declines in violence 
we can still identify a clear east-west divide, as regicide in Spain and Luxembourg become the 
only western countries with regicide rates over 10% 
After comparing regicide to estimates of homicide and nobilicide, we conclude that 
there is substantial evidence that regicide measures interpersonal elite violence. This was also 
confirmed by Baten and Steckel’s (2018) comparison of regicide with bio-archaeological 
evidence; using the share of violent cranial traumata and weapon wounds in Europe. 
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Additionally, we can see some evidence of Europe’s historical narrative reflected in the series 
as well as the civilising process, encouraging us to proceed with our analysis by using regicide 
as a proxy for interpersonal elite violence and investigating the role of the state. 
 
C.3. Data 
C.3.1. State Capacity  
The literature on state capacity and development is well established, but research of its 
role in violence, as outlined above, is multi-facetted. Throughout the literature, state capacity 
is estimated in a multitude of ways, attempting to capture the effects of military capacity, 
bureaucratic or administrative capacity, and the quality of political institutions collectively 
(Hendrix 2010). As such, previous measurements range from military personnel per capita 
(Hendrix 2010; Kocher 2010) to territorial variation (Soifer 2008), corruption (Fortin 2010) 
state fragility (Besley and Persson 2011), tax compliance (Ottervik, 2013), road network density 
(Hanson and Sigman 2011) and the ease of doing business (Cardenas 2010).  
The key right-hand-side variable in this paper is the territorial retention or expansion of 
principalities, measured by the percentage changes in their areas. This idea stems from the role 
that military capacity plays as a core component of state capacity as well as the assumption that 
it is always in the interest of states to keep their territories. The development of state sizes 
describes a competitive situation between states, as in the 9th to 12th centuries, when some 
smaller principalities disappeared at the expense of others. Additionally, we use the percentage 
change in territory in order to show a relationship between elite violence and the development 
of state capacity instead of absolute changes, which would cause our results to be driven solely 
by large territories such as the Holy Roman or Ottoman Empires. 
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Although state capacity has been estimated using the array of indicators listed above, 
we are hesitant to refer to state capacity in its entirety and prefer to name our variable an 
indicator of ‘territorial state capacity’, placing emphasis on the capacity to defend territory and 
expand as opposed to other features of state capacity such as its bureaucratic or administrative 
capabilities. However, Lake and O’Mahoney (2004) propose that state sizes are determined by 
a balancing act between military capabilities (required both for defence or conquest) and certain 
economies of scale in bureaucratic tasks and service provision (geographical limits to tax 
collection, transportation, communication and state infrastructure, for example).  
Additionally, there is precedent for using territorial expansion to approximate state 
capacity. Archaeologist and anthropologist Charles S. Spencer (2010) proposed a 
simultaneously causal relationship between state capacity and territorial expansion, arguing that 
bureaucratic capacity is required for states to grow and that larger states cause greater 
bureaucratic capacity by providing a larger tax base and access to additional natural resources. 
Although this causal claim is heavily criticised (Claessen & Hagesteijn 2012), the correlation 
itself seems to be robust.  
Further, Rotberg (2002) discusses the interplay between state capacity, territorial 
changes and interpersonal violence, using global examples from throughout the 20th century. 
He describes how low capacity states are more likely to lose territory and that this is associated 
with increased criminal, interpersonal violence. Diehl and Goertz (1988) empirically assess 
global territorial changes between 1816 and 1980 and find that international conflicts are more 
common if the territory of the belligerents is contiguous (shares a land border) and if the 
difference in state capacity between them is large.32   
 
32 Congruently, Kocs (1995) observes that wars are more frequent if the existing boundary is not recognised by 
international law. This is more importantly for the 20th and 21st centuries, when international law was used for 
legitimisation, or legal disregard resulted in a loss of state reputation. 
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Our variable for territorial state capacity comes from digitised and georeferenced data 
that was created using Nüssli’s (2010) maps of European principalities since the first century 
CE. When matched to our regicide data, this leaves 34 principalities over the timespan 500 – 
1900 CE. When principalities died and formed new principalities, these were matched 
whenever there was internal continuity within the region, as opposed to conquests. For example, 
West Francia was matched with the Kingdom of France with the rise of the Capetian Dynasty 
in 987 CE. Dying principalities are unrecorded as opposed to assigning them -100% changes in 
territory. It may be argued that this decision introduces certain selectivity biases, but we decided 
to focus on gradual changes in territories rather than extreme cases. Likewise, we exclude cases 
where principalities grew by over 500%, such as 14th century Lithuania; which, according to 
our calculations, grew by 1055% over the century after merging with Poland. Similarly, no 
record is provided for emerging principalities. When in doubt, the historical record provided 
enough information to justify matching principalities. 
Figures C.8. to C.13. outline the simple relationship between territorial expansion and 
non-violence (measured as 1 − 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) over time, showing an overall positive relationship 
and indicating that greater state capacity is associated with non-violence, following Pinker 
(2011), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Rotberg (2002) and Richani (2010). For example, Aragon 
and Venice grew in state capacity over the 12th and 13th centuries and had low regicide rates, as 
did Denmark, Austria and Venice in the 14th and 15th centuries. In contrast, Denmark and 
Bulgaria failed on both accounts in the 13th century, and Granada in the 14th century. However, 
investigating sub-periods reveals no relationship before the 10th century and even a negative 
although weaker relationship after 1500. The latter negative relationship was mostly caused by 
the two Austrian outliers of the 16th and 18th centuries, when the Habsburgs were particularly 
successful in consolidating territory.  
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C.3.2. The Regicide Dataset 
We built our regicide dataset on the foundations of Eisner’s (2011) study33 and then 
expanded it using a variety of sources; namely, Morby’s (1898) “Dynasties of the World” and 
Bosworth’s (1996) “The New Islamic Dynasties” as well as other individual biographies and 
encyclopaedia entries. This compilation finally resulted in a dataset of 4066 rulers, spanning 
the period 500-1900 CE and covering all European countries. Where conflicts arose between 
our sources, we included all rulers that were mentioned; taking care to exclude any duplicates 
which often arose due to translated names or alternative naming conventions.  
We included all rulers with the title of King or Queen and any equivalent or higher-
ranking position such as Emperor, Tsar or Sultan; as well as any Dukes, Doges or Prince-
Bishops that we could find. We believe that our dataset is near complete for all high-ranking 
rulers and although the same level of completeness was not possible for lesser rulers, in part 
due to less thorough recordkeeping, they are widely distributed across both space and time, 
making us confident that ruler ranks do not affect our trends in regicide systemically. 
Additionally, several controls for ruler status and ability to set policy are discussed and 
employed in section C.3.3. 
Since Europe and Asia form one contiguous land mass, there is still some debate about 
its definition, but the most widely accepted view is that the border is formed by the Ural 
Mountains and the Caspian Sea.34 Accordingly, we include Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and 
 
33 Eisner’s study included 1513 rulers. 
34 Europe and Asia form one contiguous land mass with intricately interlinked histories, making delimiting our 
geographical definition of Europe challenging. The centuries’ long debate over the continental border began 
because ancient Greek geographers had little knowledge of any regions north of the Black Sea, assuming that 
the Sea of Azov or the river Don led to some kind of ocean beyond (Bassin 1991). This classical view of 
cartography was undisputed well into the Middle Ages, long after it had become clear to Europeans that a vast 
landscape existed between the Sea of Azov and the Arctic Ocean, which are over 2000 kilometres apart. 
Thereafter, the debate took on a largely political nature as European noblemen formed and propagated the idea 
of a civilised, Christian Europe which was superior to the Asian territories further east (Bassin 1991). 
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western Russia in our sample. Turkey was included because its capital, Istanbul 
(Constantinople, Byzantium) lies mostly in Europe; its inclusion is also justified by the 
influence that Turkish societies have had on the Balkan states and on Greece from the Byzantine 
era to the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, all of Russia’s monarchs that we include in our dataset 
ruled well within Russia’s classically European territories and our country level regressors also 
refer to the traditionally European domain of Russia. Armenia and Georgia are also included, 
partially because of the presence of Christianity.35 
The reasons for choosing our timeline are also straightforward; we wished to make use 
of as large a period as possible without skewing our results and eroding the integrity of the 
relationship that regicide shares with interpersonal violence. Consequently, we begin our 
analysis in 500 CE to eliminate the (Western) Roman Empire and end in the year 1900, before 
the two World Wars. We propose that including the Roman Empire would have led to numerous 
complications as it encompassed a high share of Europe and exhibited famously high rates of 
regicide. We then end our analysis in 1900, because the 20th century has undergone drastically 
shifting borders while European principalities tended to transition either into democracies or 
dictatorships. Both of these periods would have suffered from a far lower cross-sectional 
density in observations, as few monarchies remained. 
Using these regional and chronological delimiters, we assembled our dataset by 
accumulating general information such as dates of birth and death, reign dates and the causes 
 
Consequently, continental borders were creatively drawn using combinations of many rivers such as the Volga, 
Kama or Ob, as well as the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains. These are still used today. 
35 Christianity was present in Armenia from the 1st century and became Armenia’s official state religion in 302 
AD under Tiridates III (Parry 2010). The Armenian language also has Indo-European roots. The Kingdom of 
Greater Armenia also stretched into the Kingdom of Cilicia (now in southern Turkey) and into the Russian 
Caucasus territories of today. Lastly, we included Georgia because of its historical links to Christianity (Parry 
2010) and because of the strong self-determination of modern Georgians to be classified as Europeans; as seen 
in surveys conducted since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gogolashvili 2009). 
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of death for 4066 rulers from across 34 European principalities. Conquest meant that the borders 
of principalities continually shifted over this period – consequently, we have some degree of 
disparity between our regicide indicator and the other variables that make up our empirical 
analysis in section C.4., which are disaggregated to the modern country level. Therefore, we 
allocated principalities to countries based on the location of their capitals.  
Rulers died in a number of different ways, blurring the distinction between regicide and 
natural or accidental death. Throughout the data collection process, we made use of three 
classifications and three definitions before deciding which was the most theoretically appealing. 
Our most narrow definition is made up of cases where the ruler was clearly assassinated, such 
as King Canute IV of Denmark who was killed by rebels following a tax revolt, after fleeing 
from Vendsyssel and hiding in a church in Odense. The rebel group was led by Canute’s 
brother, who succeeded him and became King Olaf I. Narrowly defined; we have 442 cases of 
regicide, or 11.89% of all rulers.36  
The intermediate definition consists of these clear assassinations as well as deaths 
described as dubious. We label cases as dubious when historical accounts imply or strongly 
conject that a ruler was killed, or if the ruler was poisoned or imprisoned at the time of their 
death. Deaths during imprisonment seem to make up a small but consistent and widespread 
proportion of cases and are almost unanimously accompanied by reports of starvation or 
unlikely ‘accidents’. Likewise, poisonings are also included here, despite most cases seeming 
to be clear cut assassinations. In addition to the 442 narrowly defined cases of regicide, we have 
another 182 that are labelled dubious, meaning that 624, or 16.78%, of all rulers fall under this 
intermediate definition. 
 
36 Percentages are calculated after subtracting the 348 cases where we have no evidence concerning a ruler’s cause 
of death. 
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Finally, we have documented a further 218 cases of death in battle and add these to our 
intermediate indicator in order to classify what we term broad regicide. Consequently, 842 
rulers fall under this definition, making up 22.65% of the total. 
From figure C.5., these definitions seem to reflect similar trends at the European level, 
suggesting that they reflect somewhat consistent proportions of broadly defined regicide. The 
only deviations seem to be that the proportion of deaths in battle is unusually high whenever 
violent peaks form in any of the three series. 
For the remainder of this paper we refer to intermediate regicide and simply name it 
‘regicide’. The reason for including dubious cases in our variable of interest is that, in our 
opinion, cases of poisoning or death in imprisonment still reflect interpersonal violence and that 
the benefits of expanding the variability of our dataset by 182 regicide cases outweighs any 
noise that may be introduced by the possibility of a few false positives – keeping in mind the 
consistent ratio of dubious regicide to narrow regicide. However, the rationale for our proxy 
becomes less clear when including deaths in battle. Though civil war accounts for the vast 
majority of battle deaths and may reflect interpersonal violence in certain instances, 
international conflicts often simply stemmed from the whim of a foreign power and would have 
reflected external causes rather than interpersonal violence. We take the more cautious 
approach of dropping battle deaths from the regicide indicator entirely instead of attempting to 
separate civil and international conflicts, as any influence that civil conflicts may have on 
interpersonal violence is not entirely clear. 
However, this more conservative approach also comes with an advantage – it allows us 
to use the proportion of rulers killed in battle as a control variable for more organised violence. 
This may be important due to the possibility of contagion from civil or external conflict to 
interpersonal violence. Although the presence of rulers killed in battle does not encompass all 
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battles from across all countries and centuries under study, it provides a convenient metric for 
this purpose; particularly as we have recorded a not insignificant 218 deaths in battle. 
 
C.3.3. Other Right-Hand-Side Variables 
While individual psychology is undoubtedly the key component in understanding 
singular acts of violence – with the psychological condition of a particularly charismatic leader 
perhaps even causing large deviations in short term trends – strong states should be able to 
create a “monopoly of legitimate violence” and thus restrict the extent of interpersonal violence 
using their police forces or militaries, according to Weber (1919). Conversely, predatory leaders 
could stimulate violent conduct and trigger a positive correlation between regicide and 
territorial state capacity.  
Additionally, we assess whether certain economic, environmental and social factors 
affect long term interpersonal violence by generating social unrest and political instability. We 
test the relationships between regicide and territorial state capacity, income, agricultural 
productivity and certain measurements of institutional quality on the right-hand side; 
controlling for several factors such as battles and principality fractionalisation. We also include 
certain elite controls that may be important in estimating regicide but not necessarily important 
determinants of elite violence. 
The impact of nomadic invasions from Central Asia is also investigated here. The 
invasions of the Hungarians, Mongols, Huns and other nomadic groups had enormous effects 
on Europe’s violence environment, possibly causing spillovers into interpersonal violence 
(Keywood and Baten 2019). Their superior equestrian-based tactics allowed them to gain large 
territories very quickly, providing shocks to the territorial state capacities of even the strongest 
of Europe’s principalities (Adshead 2016). For example, the Holy Roman Empire could not 
defeat the Hungarians for nearly two centuries before the Battle of Lechfeld in 955 CE (Bowlus 
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2006). Likewise, in the 13th century, the powerful and now European Kingdom of Hungary 
offered little resistance to Mongol invasions (Sinor 1999).37  
In an attempt to capture some of the effects of these invasions on elite violence and 
territorial state capacity, we use the distance to Central Asia as another right-hand-side variable. 
Of course, not all of the nomadic invasions that Europe experienced originated in the same 
place, so we use the inverse distance from each principality to Avarga, Mongolia, the location 
of the first capital of the Mongolian Empire.  
Since distance is invariant and fixed effects regressions cannot be run with time-
invariant regressors, we only include this proximity variable in a random effect specification 
(table C.3.). However, using a Hausman test and comparing the results to those from an 
alternative random effects specification which mirrors the fixed effects model in table C.1., we 
contend that no biases are introduced by failing to include individual fixed effects.  
Our next variable of interest is income, as higher income has been hypothesised as 
reducing violence as well as elite violence (Baten et al. 2014). Many recent economic history 
studies use urbanisation rates as a reliable proxy of income among early societies where 
alternative GDP measurements are unavailable (Bosker et al. 2013; De Long and Shleifer 1993; 
Acemoglu et al. 2005; Nunn and Qian 2011; Cantoni 2015; Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014). We 
expect increased income to be negatively associated with interpersonal violence, as outside 
options to violent conduct arise with financial freedom. Individuals and societies with greater 
incomes will have faced fewer problems of scarcity and would therefore have experienced less 
social unrest. 
Additionally, in their study of violence based on cranial traumata and weapon wounds, 
Baten and Steckel (2018) found evidence that rates of interpersonal violence first declined in 
 
37 The Hungarians had already settled in today’s Hungary by late 9th century and had, by the beginning of the 11th 
century, abandoned their nomadic lifestyles in favour of a more settled, somewhat urban lifestyle. 
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urban centres. This lends support for the hypothesis that income is negatively associated with 
violence, provided that the income-urbanisation relationship holds, or that city walls and local 
government prevented violence. Bosker et al. (2013) theorise that one of the reasons for this 
widely researched income-urbanisation relationship is due to agricultural productivity. Their 
hypothesis suggests that productive agricultural sectors are required in order to support large 
urban centres, as these are unable to produce their own agricultural products; making 
agricultural productivity particularly important in the absence of today’s efficient trading 
systems and without technologies such as refrigeration. Throughout our timeline, agriculture 
would have contributed to a very large share of each economy, as is characteristic among 
developing states. Relative decline in the importance of the agricultural sector only began to 
change with the industrial revolution, after which sectors such as manufacturing began to grow 
disproportionately. However, most of Europe only began to industrialise well after the inception 
of the industrial revolution in late 18th century England, meaning that this income-urbanisation 
relationship should have held throughout our period of study (Baten 2016). 
However, many studies have also found that levels of violence were higher in urban 
centres over the 20th century, chiefly citing the losses of personal networks and societal support 
structures that are associated with living in small rural villages (Baten et al. 2014). The lack of 
communal support may have put pressure on resource acquisition and failed to prevent 
individuals from falling into poverty, thereby increasing both theft and violence. Additionally, 
the impersonal structure of cities may have increased incentives to appropriate resources from 
others and may have diminished any sense of community security that may have existed in rural 
villages, also potentially leading to violence. Through our analysis, we hope to gain some 
insight into which effect is dominant among early societies. 
We constructed our urbanisation variable using Bosker et al.’s (2013) estimates of urban 
populations – urban centres defined as cities with a population of at least 5000 inhabitants – 
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and calculated urbanisation rates using McEvedy and Jones’ (1978) measurements of country 
populations by century. As Bosker et al.’s (2013) urban population estimates end in 1800; these 
were then augmented with urbanisation rates from the Clio Infra database for the 19th century. 
Next, we also make use of temperature in order to proxy for agricultural output. 
Agricultural output is a dimension of income that is less reflected by urban growth, but it could 
still determine the opportunity costs of violence for elites. This is particularly important in the 
context of the ‘Little Ice Age’. The ‘Little Ice Age’ has come to be known as a period of general 
cooling throughout the Northern Hemisphere and particularly in Europe between about 1300 
and 1850, with its most severe period in the 16th and 17th centuries (Mann 2002a). Alternatively, 
it refers to the period between what is known as the ‘Medieval Climatic Optimum’ – a relatively 
warmer period from about 900 to 1300 CE – and the warmer modern period that began around 
the time of the industrial revolution (Mann 2002b). The ‘Little Ice Age’ was characterised by 
exceedingly cold winters during which rivers were said to have frozen while crop yields were 
decimated, even in relatively temperate European regions such as the Mediterranean states 
(Mann 2002a). The sources for these events have been mainly anecdotal in nature until fairly 
recently. However, more recent studies in historical climatology have provided economic 
historians with a plethora of long run temperature series from a variety of sources. These include 
evidence from tree rings, corals, ice-core isotopes and pollen assemblages, comparing them to 
the existing anecdotal evidence where possible (Guiot and Corona 2010). These sources also 
tend to be exceptionally consistent regardless of which indicators are used (Guiot and Corona 
2010). 
To estimate agricultural output, we employ temperature reconstructions from Guiot and 
Corona (2010), who consider all of the above methods to reconstruct annual summer 
temperatures for all of Europe in a 5x5 degree grid pattern over the last 1400 years. These are 
then applied to each of our principality units based on the grid nodes closest to their historical 
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capitals. These temperature series are measured as the deviation in degrees Celsius from the 
1961–1990 mean at each node (Guiot and Corona 2010).38 
So far, we have described the potential ways in which environmental and social factors 
could be associated with rates of violence, but institutional factors could also potentially play a 
role. To that end, we use variables geared specifically towards regicide, namely autonomy and 
the mode of succession, and various religious variables which may reflect some degree of 
institutional quality for the society as a whole. We define autonomy as a ruler’s unhindered 
ability to make decisions and to dictate policy – for example, Transylvania would not be 
considered a completely autonomous state while it was subject to tributes to the Ottoman 
Empire. We control for autonomy under the hypothesis that a ruler is more likely to be killed if 
their successor is able to act autonomously. Alternatively, rulers of subservient principalities 
may have been more likely to be killed by their overlords who would then be able to install 
more cooperative leaders. Further, a lack of autonomy may have created conflict over how to 
resolve the problem of an external state dictating local laws – possibly even in the context of 
an extractive tribute. This was famously the case in Wallachia, where Vlad III Dracul ended the 
tradition of tribute to the Ottoman Empire after his father’s assassination, and was later killed 
in battle against the Ottomans (Wright 2018). Both he and his father were killed amidst a 
complicated and fluctuating system of alliances, treaties and tributes between Wallachia, 
Hungary, Transylvania (under Hungarian administration) and the Ottoman Empire (Wright 
2018). 
Since the majority of rulers were killed by family members hoping to take the throne, 
we also control for mode of succession. Under electoral systems, these power-hungry relatives 
would have had a lower chance of being elected, decreasing the probability of regicide. We 
split this indicator into three levels: hereditary systems, ceremonial electoral systems and de 
 
38 See appendix for a note on smoothing. 
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facto electoral systems. The reason for this is because many principalities held elections among 
a group of the elite but then simply voted for the direct heir of the previous ruler – possibly out 
of fear of retribution from the ruling family, due to political ties or for continuance in policy. 
For example, this was the case in the Holy Roman Empire between 1453 and 1740, where a 
member of the House of Habsburg was always elected. However, even the ceremonial existence 
of elections reveals some kind of preference for shared decision making, which may have been 
associated with more inclusive institutions than under completely hereditary systems of 
succession. Consequently, we use a three part indicator variable rather than a dummy. 
Like the mode of succession, we anticipate that religion could have played a role in 
determining long term violence through possible cultural differences or differences in 
institutional quality. Therefore, we use an indicator variable for the majority religion in each 
principality, under the categories: Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Islam and Other. The 
‘Other’ category includes Paganism and tribal religions from times before each principality 
adopted one of Europe’s largest four modern religions. Additionally, we include dummy 
variables for religious diversity and religious transition. Religious diversity may have led to 
conflict and transition may have caused violence due to opposing forces trying to preserve old 
orders or instil new ones. Furthermore, we introduce a dummy variable for whether a country 
had a significant Jewish minority, as Jews often held above average income and human capital, 
despite being the targets of numerous forms of persecution throughout Europe over our 
timeline. 
We also control for fractionalisation, measured as three or more principalities 
overlapping with a particular modern country. Borcan et al. (2018) suggested using modern 
boundaries as a benchmark for historical principality size. In this manner, we also aim to control 
for conflict between principalities that may be driven by fractionalisation that is not explained 
by the other independent variables. 
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Since some studies describe a relationship between geographical factors and violence, 
we include certain geographical controls here. For example, Bohara et al. (2006) describes how 
more rugged terrain protects instigators of violent insurgencies, while Nunn and Puga (2012) 
assert that ruggedness protected certain West African regions from the Atlantic slave trade. 
Pinker (2011) also argued that mountainous terrain inhibits policing functions. Therefore, we 
include Nunn and Puga’s (2012) ruggedness measure. As discussed, access to agricultural 
resources could have an impact on violence, so we also include Nunn and Puga’s (2012) 
measures of fertile soil distribution as an additional control for agricultural productivity. 
Further, access to agricultural trade via sea could also have been important, so we also include 
their measure of the percentage of each country that lies within 100 km of ice-free coast. Since 
these geographical variables are time-invariant, they are only included in the random effects 
specification (table C.3.). 
Lastly, we use three dummy variables in order to capture the effects of periods in which 
major societal transformations took place; the Justinian Plague, the Great Plague and the second 
serfdom. The Great Plague and its devastation of Europe’s population in the 14th century has 
been thoroughly researched, and the subsequent societal upheaval could have played a role in 
impacting interpersonal violence through societal fear and resource scarcity. Scarcity would 
also have been compounded in cities, as they would have received limited imports, particularly 
as agricultural industries collapsed from a depleted labour force. The Justinian Plague could 
also have had a similar impact as it killed approximately 50 million people – an estimated 15% 
of the world’s population – in what is now Turkey and throughout the Mediterranean states 
between the 6th and 8th centuries (Caspermeyer 2016). Finally, we use the second serfdom as a 
case study in order to test whether inequality has had a significant impact on regicide and 
interpersonal violence. We assess the second serfdom using a dummy variable for Eastern 
European countries in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, and in Russia for the 19th century; as 
serfdom in Russia was only abolished under Tsar Alexander II in 1861. 
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C.4. Methodology and Results 
Having presented a variety of hypotheses, we test whether these potential correlates 
share significant relationships with regicide. We first employ a standard fixed effects 
specification in order to account for any omitted variable bias that may be caused by the absence 
of any relevant time-invariant variables. As a robustness measure against time trends within 
each variable, we also use time fixed effects throughout our analysis in addition to individual 
fixed effects, although the issue of stationarity does not seem affect regicide across panels (table 
A.C.7.). Our fixed effects specification is as follows: 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝜓𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡
 
(
(1) 
 
Where αi are country fixed effects, γt are two-century fixed effects, ψit is a vector of 
control variables and εit is an error term. We also employ cluster-robust standard errors as we 
do not expect within-principality observations to be entirely independent of one another; 
potentially due to common cultural, climatic or geographic features which may influence 
within-region rates of interpersonal violence.  
Table C.1. shows the results of the fixed effects regression. Immediately we can see that 
territorial state capacity enters all regressions both significantly and negatively, with a stable 
coefficient of around -0.08. This can be interpreted as a one percentage point increase in a 
state’s growth rate being associated with a 0.08 percentage point decrease in regicide. 
Alternatively, a one standard deviation increase in the state growth rate is associated with a 5.5 
percentage point decrease in regicide. Since this interpretation is somewhat unorthodox, the 
first difference specification, used below, allows for a more natural interpretation. Broadly, this 
result confirms the Pinker (2011), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Richani (2010) hypotheses that 
strong state capacities have a violence-reducing effect. 
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The fixed effects specification offers two additional conclusions. First, principalities 
where Orthodoxy is the majority religion seem to be about 20 percentage points more violent, 
on average, even after implementing principality fixed effects and clustering by principality. 
Secondly, the regression provides some evidence that fractionalisation is negatively related to 
regicide, which contradicts the theory of competing groups enacting violence against one 
another, although this it is only significant at the 10% level of significance. 
For a more natural interpretation of the expansion variable and as a robustness check 
against spurious correlation that may arise from variables that follow a unit root process, we 
also perform first difference regressions in table C.2. First difference regressions, like fixed 
effects, have the advantage of eliminating omitted variable bias caused by absent time invariant 
variables, but are also effective in eliminating spurious correlations from time trends 
(Wooldridge 2012). However, this comes at a cost as differencing removes much of the 
variation in the variables, attenuating standard errors and potentially leading to type-2 errors 
(Wooldridge 2012). As such, it is a somewhat harsh robustness test in a panel setting. 
 
𝛥𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒 =  𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽3𝛥𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝛥𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑘𝜓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
(
(2) 
 
Again, we see that the coefficients for territorial state capacity are negative and 
significant, and slightly larger than under the fixed effects specification, approximately -0.095 
on average. Therefore, a one percentage point increase in state capacity is associated with a 
0.095 percentage point decrease in interpersonal violence. Alternately, a one standard deviation 
increase in territorial state capacity is associated with approximately a 6.6 percentage point 
decrease in regicide. 
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Aside from territorial state capacity, the only other variable to enter the first difference 
model significantly is religious transition. On average, changes in majority religion are 
associated with an 11-percentage point higher regicide rate. Some of the strongest examples of 
these periods occurred during the protestant reformation, where our data shows France, Austria 
and England to have undergone the strongest transition effects. 
In order to include the proximity to invasion term, we also run a random effects model 
(table C.3.). Initially, there is a significant positive relationship between invasion proximity and 
regicide, but this disappears once territorial state capacity enters the model. This either suggests 
that territorial state capacity was more important for elite violence than the invasions, or that 
the invasions affected elite violence through territorial state capacity. Although the coefficient 
for territorial state capacity remains stable at between -0.06 and -0.07, only weak evidence of 
relationships between other right-hand-side variables and regicide exist. 
Overall, the evidence from tables C.1. to C.3. points towards a robust inverse 
relationship between territorial expansion and regicide, and consequently provide evidence that 
state capacity may have had a restraining effect on elite violence. However, despite the strong 
and stable coefficients the relationship is not necessarily causal, since reverse causality from 
regicide to state capacity may apply. 
 
C.5. Conclusion 
We provide new evidence on the history of elite violence by using Eisner’s (2011) 
method of measuring regicide and identify relationships between European homicide and 
regicide between the 6th and 19th centuries CE. This link is motivated by the close relationship 
that it appears to share with patterns in homicide and because the impacts of many of Europe’s 
historical events can be seen within the regicide series. 
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When comparing Eastern and Western Europe, we see that South-Eastern and North-
Eastern Europe clearly exhibited higher rates of regicide than Western and Central Europe did 
over the initial and latter parts of our period of study period. We then see a clear divergence of 
North-Eastern Europe during the Mongolian invasion period whereas the south-east diverged 
during the 15th to 19th centuries. 
Fixed effects and first difference strategies are then employed in order to analyse the 
relationship between territorial state capacity and long run interpersonal elite violence in Europe 
between the 6th and 19th centuries, finding a robust negative association. Although we cannot 
claim that the results are causal, this implies that state capacity, reflected by territorial state 
capacity, likely had a restraining effect on interpersonal violence. The relationship appears to 
be driven by the period between the 10th and 15th centuries. 
This result contributes to the literature about the emergence of modern tax states, and 
Tilly’s (1975) hypothesis that “war generated states”. Many authors argue that the state’s 
capacity to tax developed as a result of military conflict, such as France during the Hundred 
Years’ war. The hypothesis suggests a positive correlation between state capacity and elite 
violence in the early period. We interpret the fact that we find a negative relationship as support 
of the Pinker (2011) hypothesis that higher state capacity, and the value systems it introduced, 
resulted in lower interpersonal violence. One potential explanation for Tilly’s findings for 
France, since it was a low-violence kingdom at the time of the Hundred Years’ War, could be 
that the war acted as a catalyst in exposing potential weaknesses, and that taxing its citizens 
was necessary in order for France to remain a military power. 
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
126 
 
C.6. References  
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. 2012. Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and 
poverty. Washington D.C., Crown Books. 
Acemoglu, D. K. & Wolitzky, A. G. 2011. The economics of labor coercion. Econometrica, 
79 (2): 555–600. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J., 2005. The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade, 
institutional change, and economic growth. The American Economic Review, 95 (3): 
546–579. 
Acemoglu, D., Ticchi, D. & Vindigni, A. 2010. Persistence of civil wars. Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 8(2-3): 664 – 676. 
Adshead, S. 2016. Central Asia in world history. London, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Africa, T. Urban Violence in Imperial Rome. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 2(1): 
3–21. 
Bassin, M. 1991. Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of 
Geographical Space. Slavic Review, 50(1): 1–17. 
Baten, J. & Steckel, R. 2018. Multidimensional Patterns of European Health, Work, and 
Violence over the Past Two Millennia, in Steckel, R., Larsen, C. S., Roberts, C. A. & 
Baten, J. 2018. The Backbone of Europe: Health, Diet, Work and Violence over Two 
Millennia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baten, J. 2016. A history of the global economy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Baten, J., Bierman, W., Foldvari, P. & van Zanden, J. 2014. Personal security since 1820. In 
van Zanden, J., Baten, J., Mira d’Ercole, M., Rijpma, A., Smith, C. & Timmer, M. 
2014. How was life?: Global well-being since 1820. Paris, OECD publishing. 
Bates, R. 2001. Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development. New York, 
W. Norton & Co. 
Bell, S., Cingranelli, D., Murdie, A. & Caglayan, A. 2013. Coercion, capacity, and 
coordination: Predictors of political violence. Conflict Management and Peace 
Science, 30(3): 240–262. 
Berend, N. 2001. At the gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and 'Pagans' in medieval 
Hungary, C. 1000-C. 1300. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Besley, T. & Persson, T. 2009. The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and 
politics. American Economic Review, 99(4): 1218 – 44. 
Besley, T. & Persson, T. 2011. Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development 
Clusters. Princeton University Press. 
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
127 
 
Blum, J. 1957. The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe. The American Historical Review, 62 
(4): 807–836. 
Borcan, O., Olsson, O. & Putterman, L. 2018. State history and economic development: 
evidence from six millennia. Journal of Economic Growth, 23(1): 1 – 40. 
Bosker, M., Buringh, E., van Zanden, J. L. 2013. From Baghdad to London: Unravelling 
Urban Development in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, 800–1800. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 95 (4): 1418–1437. 
Bosworth, C. 1996. The New Islamic Dynasties. Columbia University Press, New York. 
Bowlus, C. R. 2006. The battle of Lechfeld and its aftermath, August 955: The end of the age 
of migrations in the Latin West. Abingdon-on-Thames, Routledge. 
Buringh, E. & Van Zanden, J. 2009. Charting the rise of the west: Manuscripts and printed 
books in Europe, a long-term perspective from the sixth through eighteenth centuries. 
The Journal of Economic History, 69(2): 409–445. 
Cantoni, D. & Yuchtman, N. 2014. Medieval universities, legal institutions, and the 
commercial revolution. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2): 823–887. 
Cantoni, D., 2015. The economic effects of the protestant reformation: Testing the weber 
hypothesis in the German lands. Journal of the European Economic Association, 
13(4): 561–598. 
Caspermeyer, J. 2016. Reconstructing the Sixth Century Plague from a Victim. Molecular 
Biology and Evolution, 33(11): 3028–3029. 
Claessen, J. & Hagesteijn, R. 2012. On state formation and territorial expansion: a dialogue. 
Social Evolution & History, 11(1): 3 – 19. 
De Long, J. & Shleifer, A. 1993. Princes and merchants: European city growth before the 
industrial revolution. The Journal of Law and Economics, 36(2): 671–702. 
De Waal, T. 2011. Georgia’s Choices: Charting a Future in Uncertain Times. Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Washington D.C. 
Diehl, P. & Goertz, G. 1988. Territorial changes and militarized conflict. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 32(1): 103 – 122. 
Dincecco, M. 2015. The rise of effective states in Europe. The Journal of Economic History, 
75(3): 901 – 918. 
Eisner, M. 2001. Modernization, Self-Control and Lethal Violence: The Long-term Dynamics 
of European Homicide Rates in Theoretical Perspective. British Journal of 
Criminology, 41(4): 618–638. 
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
128 
 
Eisner, M. 2011. Killing kings patterns of regicide in Europe, A.D. 600–1800. British Journal 
of Criminology, 51 (3): 556–577. 
Eisner, M. 2014. From Swords to Words: Does Macro-Level Change in Self-Control Predict 
Long-Term Variation in Levels of Homicide? Crime and Justice, 43(1): 65–134. 
Elias, N. 1939. Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische 
Untersuchungen. Ed. 1. Verlag Haus zum Falken, Basel. 
Fearon, J. & Laitin, D. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political 
Science Review, 97(1): 75–90. 
Fortin, J. 2010. A tool to evaluate state capacity in postcommunist countries, 1989-2006. 
European Journal of Political Research, 49(5): 654–686. 
Gennaioli, N. & Voth, H. 2015. State Capacity and Military Conflict. Review of Economic 
Studies, 82(4): 1409–1448. 
Gogolashvili, K. 2009. The EU and Georgia: The choice is in the context. In: Gogolashvili, 
K., Huseynov, T. & Mkrtchyan, T. (Eds.), The European Union and the South 
Caucasus: Three Perspectives on the Future of the European Project from the 
Caucasus. Vol. 1. Bertelsmann-Stiftung, New York, pp. 92–129. 
Guiot, J. & Corona, C. 2010. Growing season temperatures in Europe and climate forcings 
over the past 1400 years. PloS one, 5(4): 1–15. 
Hanson, J. & Sigman, R. 2011. Measuring state capacity. In Assessing and Testing the 
Options. Prepared for the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association. 
Hausman, J. 1978. Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6): 1251–1271. 
Heldring, L. 2019. State Capacity and Violence: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide. 
Review of Economic Studies (forthcoming). 
Hendrix, C. 2010. Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the 
study of civil conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3): 273–285. 
Herbst, J. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hoffman, P. 2012. Why was it Europeans who conquered the world? The Journal of 
Economic History, 72(3): 601 – 633. 
Hoffman, P. 2015. What do states do? Politics and economic history. The Journal of 
Economic History, 75(2): 303 – 332. 
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
129 
 
Keywood, T. & Baten, J. 2019. Elite Violence and Elite Numeracy in Europe from 500 to 
1900 CE: A Co-Evolution? CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14013. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3464542. 
Kocher, M. 2010. State capacity as a conceptual variable. Yale Journal of International 
Affairs, 5(1): 137 – 137. 
Kocs, S. 1995. Territorial disputes and interstate war, 1945-1987. The Journal of Politics, 
57(1): 159 – 175. 
Koepke, N., Baten, J., 2008. Agricultural specialization and height in ancient and medieval 
Europe. Explorations in Economic History, 45(2): 127–146. 
Kula, W. 1976. An Economic Theory of the Feudal System. London: NLB Printing Services 
Lake, D. & O’Mahony, A. 2004. The incredible shrinking state: Explaining change in the 
territorial size of countries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(5): 699 – 722. 
Lussier, P., Corrado, R. & Tzoumakes, S. 2012. Gender Differences in Physical Aggression 
and Associated Developmental Correlates in a Sample of Canadian Preschoolers. 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 30(5): 643–671. 
Mann, M. 2002a. Little ice age. Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change 1, 504–509. 
Mann, M. 2002b. Medieval climatic optimum. Encyclopedia of Global environmental change 
1, 514–516. 
McEvedy, C. & Jones, R. 1978. Atlas of World Population History. Penguin Books, London. 
Meeus, W. & Raaijmakers, Q. 1986. Administrative Obedience: Carrying Out Orders to Use 
Psychological‐Administrative Violence. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
16(4): 311–324. 
Morby, J. 1989. Dynasties of the World. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
North, D., Wallis, J. & Weingast, B. 2009. Violence and social orders: A conceptual 
framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Nunn, N. & Qian, N. 2011. The potato’s contribution to population and urbanization: 
Evidence from a historical experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2): 
593–650. 
Nüssli, C. 2010. Euratlas: History of Europe. Available: http://euratlas.com/ [Accessed 29 
Nov. 2018]. 
O'Brien, P. 2011. The nature and historical evolution of an exceptional fiscal state and its 
possible significance for the precocious commercialization and industrialization of 
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
130 
 
the British economy from Cromwell to Nelson. The Economic History Review, 64(2): 
408 – 446. 
Ogilvie, S. & Edwards, J. 2000. Women and the second serfdom: Evidence from early 
modern bohemia. The Journal of Economic History, 60(4): 961–994. 
Ottervik, M. 2013. Conceptualizing and measuring state capacity. QoG Working Paper Series, 
20, 20. 
Parry, K. 2010. The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity. Vol. 31. John Wiley & 
Sons, New York. 
Pinker, S. 2011. The Better Angels of our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its 
Causes. Penguin UK, London. 
Ravn, M. & Uhlig, H. 2002. On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of 
observations. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84 (2): 371–376. 
Richani, N. 2010. State Capacity in Postconflict Settings: Explaining Criminal Violence in El 
Salvador and Guatemala. Civil Wars, 12(4): 431–455. 
Rotberg, R. 2002. The new nature of nation‐state failure. Washington quarterly, 25(3): 83 –
96. 
Russell, J. 1971. Population in Europe 500-1500. Collins Clear-Type Press, Glasgow. 
Sinor, D. 1999. The Mongols in the West. Journal of Asian History, 33(1): 1–44. 
Soifer, H. 2008. State infrastructural power: Approaches to conceptualization and 
measurement. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43(3-4): 231–251. 
Spencer, C. 2010. Territorial expansion and primary state formation. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 107(16): 7119 – 7126. 
Steffensmeier, D. & Allan, E. 1996. Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered Theory of 
Female Offending. Annual Review of Sociology, 22(1): 459–487. 
Steinert, H. 2003. The Indispensable Metaphor of War: On Populist Politics and the 
Contradictions of the State's Monopoly of Force. Theoretical Criminology, 7(3): 
265–291. 
Tilly, C. 1975. Reflections on the history of European statemaking. In: Tilly, C. & Ardant, G. 
(eds) The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
UNODC. 2019. Global Study on Homicide. United Nations, Vienna. 
Vardys, V. & Sedaitis, J. 1997. Lithuania: The rebel nation. New York, Routledge. 
Weber, M. 1919. Politics as a vocation. Philadelphia, Fortress Press. 
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
131 
 
Wolff, R. 1949. The ‘Second Bulgarian Empire’. Its Origin and History to 1204. Speculum, 
24(2): 167–206. 
Wright, K. 2018. Disgust and Desire: The Paradox of the Monster. Leiden, Brill Radopi. 
 
 
 
 
  
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
132 
 
C.7. Tables and Figures 
 
Figure C.1. Regicide vs Homicide 
Note: Centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. Dashed lines indicate interpolations where 
homicide data is unrecorded. Grey circles indicate simultaneous increases. Sources: Homicide data from Eisner 
(2014). 
 
Figure C.2. Timeline of Regicide and Nobilicide (Nobilicide from Battles) 
Note: Centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. 
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Figure C.3. Regicide versus Nobilicide (Nobilicide from Battles) 
Note: Centuries are rounded up and abbreviated, i.e. 15 refers to the 15th century. Regional disaggregation 
follows Cummins (2017) where S. Europe refers to Southern Europe, C. Europe refers to Central Europe and N. 
Europe refers to Northern Europe. Source: Nobilicide data from Cummins (2017). 
 
Figure C.4. Regicide and the Second Serfdom 
Note: Regicide for the early medieval period in Eastern Europe was omitted here, as its 50% regicide rate relies 
on small N and would have obscured the graphic. 
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Figure C.5. Defining Regicide 
Note: centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. 
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Figure C.6. European Regicide: 6th – 19th Century 
Note: The darker colours demonstrate greater elite violence.  
 
 
  
a) 6th – 9th Century b) 10th – 13th Century 
  
c) 13th  – 15th Century d) 15th – 19th Century 
 
Figure C.7. European Regicide by Period 
Note: The darker colours demonstrate greater elite violence.  
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Figure C.8. Non-Violence and Territorial State Capacity (6th to 19th Century CE) 
Note: Non–violence is measured by 1-proportion of killed rulers 
 
 
 
Figure C.9. Non-Violence and Territorial State Capacity (6th to 9th Century CE) 
Note: Centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. Non–violence is measured by 1-proportion 
of killed rulers. 
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Figure C.10. Non-Violence and Territorial State Capacity (10th to 11th Century CE) 
Note: Centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. Non–violence is measured by 1-proportion 
of killed rulers. 
 
 
Figure C.11. Non-Violence and Territorial State Capacity (12th to 13th Century CE) 
Note: centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. Non–violence is measured by 1-proportion of 
killed rulers. 
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Figure C.12. Non-Violence and Territorial State Capacity (14th to 15th Century CE) 
Note: centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. Non–violence is measured by 1-proportion of 
killed rulers. 
 
 
Figure C.13. Non-Violence and Territorial State Capacity (16th to 19th Century CE) 
Note: centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. Non–violence is measured by 1-proportion of 
killed rulers. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide 
                      
Territorial State Capacity -0.0781*** -0.0772*** -0.0752** -0.0786** -0.0754** -0.0744* -0.0746* -0.0803** -0.0857*** -0.0803** 
  (0.0266) (0.0251) (0.0285) (0.0319) (0.0340) (0.0366) (0.0369) (0.0347) (0.0270) (0.0347) 
Temperature   -0.0722 -0.0721 -0.0622 -0.0824 -0.118 -0.118 -0.0774   -0.0774 
    (0.132) (0.133) (0.137) (0.139) (0.136) (0.136) (0.134)   (0.134) 
Urbanisation     -0.0663 -0.0406 -0.0282 -0.00776 -0.00634 -0.0497   -0.0497 
      (0.201) (0.281) (0.283) (0.253) (0.249) (0.327)   (0.327) 
Mode of Succession                     
(Base=Hereditary)                     
● Partially Elected       0.0281 0.0200 0.00787 0.00803 -0.00244   -0.00244 
        (0.0587) (0.0621) (0.0488) (0.0503) (0.0700)   (0.0700) 
● Fully Elected       -0.0523 -0.0672 -0.0506 -0.0502 -0.0471   -0.0471 
        (0.0510) (0.0526) (0.0539) (0.0556) (0.0747)   (0.0747) 
Battle           0.434 0.436 0.192   0.192 
            (0.338) (0.344) (0.321)   (0.321) 
Autonomy             -0.00594 -0.0430   -0.0430 
              (0.0472) (0.0354)   (0.0354) 
Fractionalisation         -0.0634 -0.0613* -0.0609* -0.0616   -0.0616 
          (0.0377) (0.0341) (0.0351) (0.0529)   (0.0529) 
Religion                     
(Base=Catholic)                     
● Islamic               -0.0285 -0.0263 -0.0285 
                (0.0824) (0.0541) (0.0824) 
● Orthodox               -0.178** -0.200*** -0.178** 
                (0.0780) (0.0610) (0.0780) 
● Protestant               -0.0912 -0.107 -0.0912 
                (0.0774) (0.0719) (0.0774) 
● Other               -0.0708 -0.0902 -0.0708 
                (0.111) (0.0717) (0.111) 
Jewish Minority               0.0162 -0.00807 0.0162 
                (0.0612) (0.0552) (0.0612) 
Religious Diversity               0.0207 0.0254 0.0207 
                (0.0500) (0.0491) (0.0500) 
Religious Transition               0.0101 0.0194 0.0101 
                (0.0578) (0.0543) (0.0578) 
Black Plague 0.00245 0.00289 0.00119 -0.00543 -0.00328 -0.0166 -0.0160 -0.0289 -0.0157 -0.0289 
  (0.0541) (0.0535) (0.0536) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0548) (0.0555) (0.0612) (0.0620) (0.0612) 
Justinian Plague 0.0837               0.102   
  (0.108)               (0.0995)   
Second Serfdom 0.0386 0.0399 0.0367 0.0893 0.0987 0.0670 0.0662 0.0541 0.0388 0.0541 
  (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.116) (0.114) (0.110) (0.110) (0.0865) (0.0810) (0.0865) 
Constant 0.279*** 0.293*** 0.294*** 0.316*** 0.354*** 0.330*** 0.335*** 0.386*** 0.307*** 0.386*** 
  (0.0834) (0.0952) (0.0962) (0.0905) (0.0750) (0.0714) (0.0884) (0.0952) (0.107) (0.0952) 
                      
Observations 109 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 109 106 
Within R2 0.231 0.209 0.210 0.222 0.231 0.260 0.260 0.308 0.313 0.308 
Number of Principalities 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Principality FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by principalities) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                      
Table C.1. Fixed Effects Regressions 
 
 
 
 
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
140 
 
                    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  ΔRegicide ΔRegicide ΔRegicide ΔRegicide ΔRegicide ΔRegicide ΔRegicide ΔRegicide ΔRegicide 
                    
Territorial State Capacity -0.097** -0.093** -0.085* -0.082* -0.085** -0.090** -0.089** -0.107** -0.103** 
  (0.043) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) 
ΔTemperature   -0.0129 -0.0254 -0.0202 -0.0212 -0.0461 -0.0465   -0.0829 
    (0.117) (0.121) (0.115) (0.112) (0.113) (0.114)   (0.125) 
ΔUrbanisation     -0.317 -0.322 -0.380 -0.342 -0.347   -0.336 
      (0.238) (0.244) (0.241) (0.241) (0.245)   (0.342) 
Mode of Succession                   
(Base=Hereditary)                   
● Partially Elected       -0.056 -0.069 -0.083 -0.084   -0.083 
        (0.120) (0.125) (0.130) (0.131)   (0.144) 
● Fully Elected       -0.0212 -0.033 -0.027 -0.027   -0.003 
        (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)   (0.070) 
Fractionalisation         0.068 0.0712 0.0703   0.0688 
          (0.060) (0.062) (0.064)   (0.072) 
ΔBattle           0.346 0.343   0.363 
            (0.294) (0.294)   (0.294) 
Autonomy             0.011   -0.004 
              (0.106)   (0.098) 
Black Plague -0.018 -0.016 -0.041 -0.039 -0.055 -0.064 -0.065 -0.001 -0.045 
  (0.084) (0.094) (0.106) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.088) (0.101) 
Justinian Plague - - - - - - - - - 
                    
Religion                   
(Base=Catholic)                   
● Islamic               -0.081 -0.125 
                (0.099) (0.104) 
● Orthodox               -0.046 -0.066 
                (0.057) (0.075) 
● Protestant               -0.109 -0.065 
                (0.100) (0.125) 
Jewish Minority               0.008 0.034 
                (0.057) (0.062) 
Religious Diversity               0.017 0.012 
                (0.050) (0.054) 
Religious Transition               0.110* 0.119* 
                (0.065) (0.060) 
Constant 0.011 0.006 0.015 0.027 0.017 0.022 0.012 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.103) (0.044) (0.103) 
                    
Observations 62 59 59 59 59 59 59 62 59 
Number of Principalities 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
R-squared 0.113 0.112 0.122 0.128 0.147 0.169 0.169 0.159 0.220 
Adjusted R2 -0.052 0.064 0.057 0.027 0.030 0.036 0.016 0.032 -0.051 
Principality FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Time FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by principalities) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                    
Table C.2. First Differences Regressions 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide 
                          
Invasion Proximity 8.599** 6.070 5.798 5.538 4.212 3.384 3.553 3.733 4.996 6.921 16.85** 12.14 
  (5.018) (5.315) (5.232) (5.246) (5.359) (5.633) (5.915) (5.994) (7.092) (7.173) (7.581) (8.304) 
Territorial State Capacity  -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.063** -0.062** -0.061** -0.062** -0.062** -0.064** -0.062** -0.062** -0.066** 
   (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.025) (0.033) 
Temperature   -0.0538 -0.0547 -0.0417 -0.0527 -0.0602 -0.0611 -0.0424 -0.0650  -0.0437 
    (0.132) (0.132) (0.136) (0.136) (0.134) (0.135) (0.131) (0.136)  (0.131) 
Urbanisation    -0.201 -0.236 -0.186 -0.163 -0.157 -0.205 -0.217  -0.250 
     (0.155) (0.194) (0.198) (0.192) (0.191) (0.246) (0.194)  (0.239) 
Mode of Succession             
(Base=Hereditary)             
● Partially Elected     0.0997* 0.0932 0.0880 0.0884 0.105 0.0929  0.0891 
      (0.0567) (0.0587) (0.0622) (0.0668) (0.0652) (0.0653)  (0.0583) 
● Fully Elected     -0.0278 -0.0331 -0.0326 -0.0318 -0.0212 -0.00820  0.00509 
      (0.0347) (0.0378) (0.0390) (0.0411) (0.0512) (0.0417)  (0.0511) 
Fractionalisation      -0.0317 -0.0323 -0.0320 -0.0358 -0.0333  -0.0389 
       (0.0428) (0.0432) (0.0443) (0.0413) (0.0433)  (0.0425) 
Battle       0.108 0.124 0.0450 0.190  0.136 
        (0.268) (0.270) (0.256) (0.280)  (0.272) 
Autonomy        -0.0169 -0.0191 -0.0269  -0.0313 
         (0.0526) (0.0541) (0.0561)  (0.0566) 
Religion             
(Base=Catholic)             
● Islamic         0.0241  -0.0311 -0.00364 
          (0.0662)  (0.0722) (0.0651) 
● Orthodox         -0.0514  -0.0766 -0.0813 
          (0.0697)  (0.0611) (0.0613) 
● Protestant         -0.0399  0.0343 -0.0312 
          (0.0677)  (0.0570) (0.0675) 
● Other         0.0456  -0.0247 0.0234 
          (0.125)  (0.113) (0.119) 
Jewish Minority         -0.00934  -0.0421 -0.0142 
          (0.0534)  (0.0402) (0.0523) 
Religious Diversity         0.0125  0.0373 0.0287 
          (0.0405)  (0.0431) (0.0448) 
Religious Transition         0.00742  -0.0209 -0.00741 
          (0.0561)  (0.0581) (0.0581) 
% Within 100 km. 
of ice-free coast         0.0007 0.0010 0.0009 
           (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
% Fertile soil          0.0027 0.0023 0.0031 
           (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0022) 
Ruggedness          0.0009 0.0002 0.0006 
           (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
Black Plague 0.0441 0.0392 0.0414 0.0390 0.0400 0.0433 0.0402 0.0376 0.0491 0.0378 0.0703 0.0421 
  (0.0622) (0.0549) (0.0552) (0.0553) (0.0573) (0.0556) (0.0554) (0.0548) (0.0582) (0.0559) (0.0640) (0.0608) 
Justinian Plague 0.0277 0.0373         0.0773  
  (0.113) (0.0929)         (0.0899)  
Second Serfdom -0.00387 0.0181 0.0190 0.00650 0.0454 0.0490 0.0468 0.0457 0.0368 0.0191 0.0351 0.00640 
  (0.0936) (0.104) (0.104) (0.100) (0.0966) (0.0989) (0.101) (0.1000) (0.0757) (0.0986) (0.0850) (0.0775) 
Constant 0.291*** 0.308*** 0.325*** 0.327*** 0.333*** 0.345*** 0.340*** 0.355*** 0.351*** 0.134 0.0743 0.0960 
  (0.0656) (0.0679) (0.0796) (0.0795) (0.0773) (0.0737) (0.0789) (0.0982) (0.100) (0.153) (0.161) (0.179) 
                          
Observations 109 109 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 109 106 
Between R-squared 0.3455 0.3025 0.3218 0.3355 0.3545 0.3318 0.3062 0.3001 0.3217 0.3453 0.3644 0.3489 
No. Principalities 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Principality FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by principalities)     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
                          
Table C.3. Random Effects Regressions 
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C.8. Appendix 
The following descriptive statistics provide an overview of the distribution of our data 
and aid in the interpretations of regressions. 
            
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
      
Autonomy 110 0.8818 0.3243 0 1 
Battle 109 0.0562 0.0759 0 0.3333 
Territorial State Capacity 110 0.1787 0.6921 -0.8464 3.6140 
Fractionalisation 110 0.2545 0.4376 0 1 
Great Plague 110 0.1364 0.3447 0 1 
Invasion Proximity 110 0.00019 0.00001 0.00017 0.00021 
Jewish Minority 110 0.3364 0.4746 0 1 
Justinian Plague 110 0.0182 0.1342 0 1 
Mode of Succession 110 0.6545 0.9030 0 2 
Regicide 109 0.1689 0.1692 0 0.7143 
Religion 110 1.8364 1.3377 1 5 
Religious Diversity 110 0.3818 0.4881 0 1 
Religious Transition 110 0.1727 0.3797 0 1 
Second Serfdom 110 0.0364 0.1881 0 1 
Temperature 107 0.0136 0.2216 -0.5894 0.5834 
Urbanisation 110 0.0854 0.0973 0 0.4708 
      
            
Table C.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
C.8.1. Sampling and Proxy Measurement Error 
One of the advantages of using regicide as an indicator of interpersonal violence over 
homicide is that we have access to near complete dynastic lists and are not subject to sampling 
biases from overlooked information. However, small sample sizes may induce strong deviations 
in regicide and misrepresent the relationship between it and interpersonal violence. 
Figure A.C.1. indicates the total number of rulers per century and shows that there were 
hundreds of rulers across all time periods. The lowest numbers are available for the early Middle 
Ages in Eastern Europe (ca. 30 per century). This means that low observation density is unlikely 
to have caused spurious conclusions when conducting analyses on European or on regional 
levels. Since the trends that we study are disaggregated to the regional or European level, and 
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since our regressions take all of Europe into account, we see no reason why this potential for 
error in approximating interpersonal violence would lead to systematic biases. Nevertheless, as 
a precaution against this kind of measurement error, we require a minimum of five rulers per 
principality, per century in all of our analyses. 
 
Figure C.14. Rulers per Century 
Note: centuries are rounded up, i.e. 1500 refers to the 15th century. 
 
C.8.2. Female Rulers 
Considerable research has shown that women display lesser violent tendencies than men 
(Lussier et al. 2012; Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996). Consequently, female rulers may have 
provoked fewer rivals looking to obtain the throne, as they may have caused fewer disputes 
leading to regicide. As a result, we also considered investigating whether female rulers were 
killed as often as their male counterparts. Unfortunately, our entire dataset only contains 138 
female rulers from across all countries and periods, so we are reluctant to construct a female 
regicide rate or attempt to use the proportion of female rulers as a regressor. Further, the 
patriarchal organisation of most early societies might mean that the presence of female rulers 
reflects the effect of improved institutional quality rather than any gender specific effect on 
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violence. In our sample, only ten female rulers (7.25%) were killed, five of which fall under the 
dubious regicide classification. Although this figure is less than half the overall regicide rate of 
16.78%, the number of observations provides limited statistical evidence that violence levels 
were lower under the authority of female rulers. Table A.C.2. lists all female rulers in our 
dataset that were killed. 
          
Ruler Principality Regicide Dubious End of Reign 
     
Amalasuintha Ostrogoths 1 0 534 
Joanna Duchy of Durazzo 0 1 1368 
Joanna I Naples 1 0 1382 
Maria I Hungary 0 1 1385 
Margaret I Denmark 0 1 1412 
Chiara Zorzi Duchy of Athens 1 0 1454 
Blanche II Navarre 0 1 1464 
Lady Jane Grey England 1 0 1553 
Bona Sforza d'Aragona Milan 0 1 1557 
Mary I Scotland 1 0 1567 
          
Table C.5. Regicide among Female Rulers 
 
C.8.3. Smoothing Temperature Data 
To convert the annual temperature records into centennial estimates in order to suit the 
periodicity of our data, we apply a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a lambda value of 500 000. This 
extracts the longer run trends from each series, removing any noise which is due to the relatively 
high frequency of the data. Though λ = 500 000 is a much higher value than that  recommended 
by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual periodicity, we argue that a 1400 year series is 
exceptionally long and that it consequently displays characteristics of higher frequency data; 
requiring more smoothing than is usual for time series estimates. Additionally, the trends 
obtained using this parameter provide a balance between the noisy estimates of the annual data 
and what could be identified as over-smoothing. Finally, we take a simple average of this long 
run trend for each century. 
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C.8.4. Regicide Maps with Battle Deaths 
In order to show that the discussion of regional trends in section C.2.4. is not biased by 
using our intermediate definition of regicide (unambiguous and dubious assassinations) as 
opposed to our broad definition (the intermediate definition plus battle deaths), we compare the 
intermediate- and broad regicide maps here.  
 
Figure C.15. European Regicide and Battle Deaths: 6th – 19th Century 
The broadly defined map of the entire sample period is almost identical to the 
intermediate case. Aside from many countries increasing by one level of regicidal intensity, the 
only striking difference is that Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and Ireland become vastly 
more violent. Likewise, Austria, Germany and Poland seem somewhat more violent when battle 
deaths are included, but these countries are still among the least violent that we study. 
In the period 500–900 (figure A.C.3., panel a), the differences are also only very slight. 
When battle deaths are included, the United Kingdom and Spain increase in regicidal intensity 
by one level, whereas Croatia and Turkey experience decreases of one level each.  
Battle deaths in the High Middle Ages (panel b) are the root cause of the differences in 
the maps that cover the entire sample period, with northern Europe becoming far more violent. 
As mentioned, the Vikings and Norsemen had a disproportionately high ratio of battle deaths 
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to intermediate regicide, resulting in much higher levels of broad regicide and distorting the 
northern countries in our map. Aside from the northern countries – and Austria, Germany and 
Poland – the increases in regicidal intensity that occur after including battle deaths appear quite 
uniform. 
  
a) 6th – 9th Century b) 10th – 13th Century 
  
c) 13th  – 15th Century d) 15th – 19th Century 
 
Figure C.16. European Regicide and Battle Deaths by Period 
 
In the late Middle Ages (panel c), declines in Norwegian and Swedish battle deaths 
during the formation of the Kalmar Union (1397) largely reduced the disparities between the 
regicide maps under our two definitions. However, battle deaths in the United Kingdom and 
Iceland remain disproportionately high, as they do in Germany. These deviations probably 
affect our discussion of regicide through European history the most of our four periods.  
During the early modern period (panel d), the inclusion of battle deaths seems to have 
increased regicidal intensity in the Czech Republic, Georgia and Serbia, while decreasing it in 
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Romania and particularly in Ukraine. Other than these geographically diverse examples, the 
maps under the two definitions are markedly similar. 
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C.8.5. Hausman Test 
To motivate the random effects specification with the proximity-to-invasion variable in 
table C.3., we compare table C.1.’s results to an equivalent random effects specification (table 
A.C.4.) using Hausman tests. These tests conclude that the random effect assumption – the 
individual specific effects being uncorrelated to the independent variables – holds in all ten 
cases. Therefore, the results which include the new proximity indicator in table C.3.’s random 
effects specification should not be subject to omitted variable bias from omitted, time-invariant 
factors. Additionally, the remaining results from tables C.3. and A.C.4. are also nearly identical, 
suggesting that no other right-hand-side variables (other than Orthodox Christianity) are 
correlated to invasion proximity 
          
Hausman Tests 
Model Degs. Freedom χ2 P-Value Conclusion 
1 10 3.45 0.9688 RE 
2 10 3.95 0.9496 RE 
3 11 4.50 0.9530 RE 
34 13 4.62 0.9826 RE 
5 14 4.41 0.9924 RE 
6 15 6.95 0.9590 RE 
7 16 6.48  0.9820 RE 
8 23 28.11 0.2115 RE 
9 9 6.52  0.6868 RE 
10 23 13.88 0.9301 RE 
 
Table C.6. Hausman Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Territorial State Capacity and Violence, 500 – 1900 CE. 
149 
 
                      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide 
                      
Territorial State Capacity -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.067*** -0.066** -0.065** -0.065** -0.065** -0.064** -0.066** -0.069** 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.019) (0.031) 
Temperature   -0.0565 -0.0571 -0.0429 -0.0558 -0.0645 -0.0651 -0.0511 -0.0744 -0.0601 
    (0.129) (0.130) (0.135) (0.135) (0.133) (0.134) (0.130) (0.136) (0.132) 
Urbanisation     -0.190 -0.212 -0.156 -0.140 -0.136 -0.223 -0.174 -0.235 
      (0.162) (0.202) (0.202) (0.193) (0.192) (0.250) (0.196) (0.257) 
Mode of Succession                     
(Base=Hereditary)                     
● Partially Elected       0.093* 0.084 0.080 0.081 0.115* 0.090 0.107 
        (0.055) (0.058) (0.061) (0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.066) 
● Fully Elected       -0.0349 -0.0407 -0.0390 -0.0384 -0.0252 -0.0239 -0.0122 
        (0.0337) (0.0363) (0.0371) (0.0388) (0.0471) (0.0416) (0.0513) 
Fractionalisation         -0.0374 -0.0378 -0.0377 -0.0398 -0.0405 -0.0464 
          (0.0407) (0.0410) (0.0415) (0.0381) (0.0429) (0.0424) 
Battle           0.126 0.138 0.0392 0.207 0.129 
            (0.264) (0.266) (0.251) (0.280) (0.267) 
Autonomy             -0.0135 -0.0200 -0.0192 -0.0232 
              (0.0525) (0.0543) (0.0555) (0.0571) 
Religion                     
(Base=Catholic)                     
● Islamic               0.0401   0.0206 
                (0.0683)   (0.0678) 
● Orthodox               -0.0271   -0.0433 
                (0.0697)   (0.0658) 
● Protestant               -0.0358   -0.0320 
                (0.0667)   (0.0686) 
● Other               0.0630   0.0548 
                (0.126)   (0.127) 
Jewish Minority               -0.00323   -0.000188 
                (0.0500)   (0.0523) 
Religious Diversity               0.00958   0.0191 
                (0.0395)   (0.0421) 
Religious Transition               0.0112   0.00334 
                (0.0570)   (0.0577) 
Black Plague 0.0302 0.0323 0.0301 0.0302 0.0344 0.0323 0.0307 0.0505 0.0271 0.0373 
  (0.0533) (0.0535) (0.0535) (0.0548) (0.0531) (0.0531) (0.0528) (0.0582) (0.0546) (0.0593) 
Justinian Plague 0.0430                   
  (0.0912)                   
Second Serfdom 0.0401 0.0412 0.0291 0.0695 0.0701 0.0652 0.0642 0.0481 0.0509 0.0433 
  (0.0964) (0.0958) (0.0937) (0.0867) (0.0891) (0.0897) (0.0894) (0.0693) (0.0882) (0.0688) 
% Within 100 km. of ice-
free coast                 0.000342 0.000408 
                  (0.000602) (0.000629) 
% Fertile soil                 0.00235 0.00215 
                  (0.00157) (0.00185) 
Ruggedness                 0.00133 0.00102 
                  (0.00119) (0.00107) 
Constant 0.325*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.346*** 0.359*** 0.353*** 0.365*** 0.361*** 0.188 0.195 
  (0.0693) (0.0803) (0.0804) (0.0781) (0.0734) (0.0766) (0.0957) (0.0990) (0.131) (0.155) 
                      
Observations 109 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Between R-squared 0.266  0.285   0.299  0.320  0.300  0.273  0.268 0.324 0.300 0.322  
No. Principalities 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Principality FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                      
Table C.7. Comparative Random Effects Regressions for the Hausman Test 
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C.8.6. Spatial Models 
To control for spatial spillovers, we also use Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) and Spatially 
Lagged X (SLX) models, in tables A.C.5. and A.C.6., below. A full description of the 
methodology is provided in section B.10.3. This SAR model includes principality and time 
fixed effects and only differs from the fixed effects specification in section C.4. through the 
inclusion of the spatially lagged regicide variable, rho, to control for spillovers of interpersonal 
violence. The results found under the model are comparable to those from the fixed effects 
specification, although with a few key differences. First, the coefficients for expansion are 
slightly smaller than under fixed effects, though still significant. Second, the coefficients for 
urbanisation become significant with a negative sign, indicating that income and urbanisation 
are correlated to interpersonal violence in neighbouring regions, although the spatially lagged 
regicide variable remains insignificant. Ceremonial systems of succession then share a positive 
relationship with regicide, which is unexpected. Lastly, there is some evidence that coastal 
regions are more violent, which is contrary to the theory that coastal regions have better access 
to traded goods, although coastal regions may also suffer more from military spillovers.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide 
  sar sar sar sar sar sar sar sar sar sar 
                      
Territorial State Capacity -0.0535** -0.0555** -0.0516** -0.0515** -0.0507** -0.0512** -0.0512** -0.0514** -0.0584** -0.0594** 
  (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0245) (0.0233) (0.0232) 
Temperature   0.0663 -0.00858 -0.00678 -0.00785 -0.00658 -0.0107 -0.0194 -0.00558 -0.0139 
    (0.0805) (0.0800) (0.0800) (0.0794) (0.0777) (0.0809) (0.0836) (0.0797) (0.0800) 
Urbanisation     -0.563*** -0.566*** -0.535*** -0.532** -0.540** -0.549** -0.467** -0.478** 
      (0.202) (0.202) (0.206) (0.212) (0.211) (0.213) (0.198) (0.206) 
Mode of Succession                     
(Base=Hereditary)                     
● Partially Elected       0.113** 0.111* 0.111* 0.109* 0.119* 0.0868* 0.0893 
        (0.0577) (0.0578) (0.0579) (0.0578) (0.0621) (0.0508) (0.0545) 
● Fully Elected       -0.00728 -0.00875 -0.00914 -0.00968 -0.000468 0.00358 0.0126 
        (0.0384) (0.0388) (0.0390) (0.0389) (0.0401) (0.0380) (0.0398) 
Fractionalisation         -0.0181 -0.0174 -0.0167 -0.0198 -0.0373 -0.0436 
          (0.0435) (0.0437) (0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0452) (0.0454) 
Battle           -0.00168 -0.00674 -0.00565 0.0990 0.119 
            (0.245) (0.246) (0.244) (0.257) (0.258) 
Autonomy             0.0125 0.00939 0.00649 0.00210 
              (0.0566) (0.0561) (0.0546) (0.0549) 
Religion               -0.0166     
(Base=Catholic)                     
● Islamic               0.0110   -0.00555 
                (0.0620)   (0.0638) 
● Orthodox               -0.0300   -0.0296 
                (0.0610)   (0.0597) 
● Protestant               -0.0677   -0.0520 
                (0.0615)   (0.0625) 
● Other               0.0287   0.0189 
                (0.103)   (0.102) 
Jewish Minority               0.0129   0.0178 
                (0.0412)   (0.0420) 
Religious Diversity               0.0115   0.0327 
                (0.0433)   (0.0467) 
Religious Transition               -0.0257   -0.0370 
                (0.0469)   (0.0464) 
% Within 100 km. of ice-free coast               0.000972* 0.00114** 
                  (0.000536) (0.000552) 
% Fertile soil                 0.00206 0.00220 
                  (0.00147) (0.00156) 
Ruggedness                 0.000752 0.000607 
                  (0.00107) (0.00110) 
Black Plague 0.0250 0.0264 0.0247 0.0248 0.0257 0.0264 0.0278 0.0227 0.0211 0.0161 
  (0.0564) (0.0556) (0.0527) (0.0530) (0.0528) (0.0522) (0.0527) (0.0526) (0.0516) (0.0518) 
Justinian Plague -0.0442 -0.0434 -0.0295 -0.0318 -0.0321 -0.0324 -0.0325 -0.0315 -0.0200 -0.0188 
  (0.0814) (0.0812) (0.0771) (0.0772) (0.0770) (0.0761) (0.0764) (0.0745) (0.0759) (0.0734) 
Second Serfdom 0.00306 0.000706 -0.00859 -0.00389 -0.00438 -0.00423 -0.00371 -0.0130 -0.00416 -0.0144 
  (0.0752) (0.0736) (0.0688) (0.0686) (0.0681) (0.0680) (0.0678) (0.0666) (0.0629) (0.0632) 
rho 0.00425 0.00510 0.00819 0.00632 0.00708 0.00663 0.00624 0.00793 0.0120 0.0126 
  (0.0644) (0.0645) (0.0634) (0.0640) (0.0642) (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0650) (0.0645) (0.0660) 
Sigma2_e 0.0323*** 0.0318*** 0.0284*** 0.0282*** 0.0279*** 0.0276*** 0.0273*** 0.0262*** 0.0250*** 0.0238*** 
  (0.00584) (0.00584) (0.00511) (0.00509) (0.00486) (0.00487) (0.00480) (0.00442) (0.00431) (0.00397) 
                      
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
Number of Principalities 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Principality FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by principalities)   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
                      
Table C.8. Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) with Time and Principality Fixed Effects. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide Regicide 
  slx slx slx slx slx slx slx slx slx 
           
Territorial State Capacity -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.060*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Temperature  0.075** 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.023 
   (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
Urbanisation   -0.507*** -0.509*** -0.509*** -0.524*** -0.524*** -0.520*** -0.508*** 
    (0.186) (0.188) (0.194) (0.188) (0.193) (0.186) (0.184) 
Mode of Succession          
(Base=Hereditary)          
● Partially Elected    0.106* 0.105* 0.105* 0.102* 0.085 0.071 
     (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.080) (0.078) 
● Fully Elected    -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 0.009 
     (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.039) (0.038) 
Fractionalisation     -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.019 -0.032 
      (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.042) (0.041) 
Battle      -0.057 -0.058 -0.054 0.035 
       (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) 
Autonomy       0.017 0.009 0.002 
        (0.058) (0.059) (0.057) 
Religion (Base=Catholic)          
● Islamic        -0.089 -0.096 
         (0.085) (0.082) 
● Orthodox        -0.049 -0.049 
         (0.059) (0.057) 
● Protestant        -0.061 -0.050 
         (0.06) (0.057) 
● Other        -0.027 -0.022 
         (0.097) (0.093) 
Jewish Minority        0.024 0.026 
         (0.045) (0.044) 
Religious Diversity        0.019 0.032 
         (0.044) (0.042) 
Religious Transition        -0.017 -0.027 
         (0.043) (0.041) 
% Within 100 km. of ice-free coast        0.001*** 
          (0.000) 
% Fertile soil         0.002*** 
          (0.001) 
Ruggedness         0.001* 
          0.000 
Black Plague 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.005 0.004 
  (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.032) 
Justinian Plague -0.021 -0.022 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 0.007 
  (0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.049) 
Second Serfdom 0.006 0.003 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.013 
  (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) 
Theta -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001) -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) 
Constant 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.167*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
           
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
Number of Principalities 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Principality FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by principalities) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                    
Table C.9. Spatially Lagged X Model (SLX) with Time and Principality Fixed Effects. 
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Instead of controlling for regicide spillovers, our SLX model controls for territorial state 
capacity in neighbouring regions (using theta). The idea is that increased territorial state 
capacity elsewhere may either cause interpersonal violence to move to our example principality, 
or decrease violence due to better a control of violence there. However, theta is never 
significant, and the results are nearly identical to those from the SAR model, the only difference 
being the small but significant and positive coefficients for fertile soil and ruggedness. Overall, 
despite the spatial terms never being significant themselves, changes in the coefficients of 
certain control variables provide some evidence that spatial correlations play a small role at a 
principality level. 
 
C.8.7. Unit Root Tests 
To ensure that our results are not reliant on common trends, we run panel unit root tests. 
We use the Phillips–Perron test since it is one of the few panel tests that is able to circumvent 
the duel problems of unbalanced panels and gaps in the time-series; which arise where 
principalities were dissolved and later resurfaced, e.g. Norway before and after the Kalmar 
Union. Table A.C.7. outlines the results, showing that only the urbanisation variable with zero 
lags follows a unit-root process. Therefore, our inclusion of time fixed effects and the first 
difference model should rule out any adverse effects of unit roots. 
            
Lags Regicide Territorial 
State Capacity 
Temperature Urbanisation Battle 
  P-Value P-Value P-Value P-Value P-Value 
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.2393 0.0000 
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
            
Phillips–Perron Panel Unit Root Test 
 
Table C.10. Panel Unit Root Tests 
  
 
  
  
 
 
D. To Fly to Quality or Disinvest? The Dilemma of Political 
Violence and Investor Sentiment. 
 
 
Abstract 
In times of uncertainty and heightened risk, conventional wisdom dictates that investors 
amend their portfolios to increase their holdings in short term bonds and reduce their exposures 
to equity, aiming to earn real returns or restrict losses. Political uncertainty, however, provides 
an interesting conundrum since the safest short-term bonds are issued in the form of Treasury 
bills – by government – the source of the risk. In this paper, event study methodology is 
employed using assassinations in 56 countries since 1970. While investors do tend to disinvest 
from equity, no significant effect is detected for short-term bonds. However, exchange rate 
depreciations are also found, implying that investors tend either to favour cash holdings over 
equity or else move their investments abroad.  
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D.1. Introduction 
Traditional financial literature recommends that investors substitute stocks for defensive 
assets such as bonds and Treasury bills when they perceive greater risk environments, following 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), as investors aspire to earn returns that are more 
predictable or to restrict losses (Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965, and Mossin 1966). Asset managers 
largely adhere to this principle, despite empirical literature yielding mixed evidence on its 
practical validity (Fama and French 2004, Dempsey 2013). 
When the source of risk is political, however, do investors still blindly follow 
convention and purchase Treasury bills, in search of the fabled ‘risk-free rate’? If not, do they 
reallocate their holdings offshore or do they prefer to disinvest and wait for political uncertainty 
to subside? This problem is tackled through a series of event studies, using the sudden nature 
of assassinations to detect sharp escalations in political uncertainty and their impacts on 
financial markets in 56 countries since 1970. 
Political uncertainty is a fundamental factor for investors to consider when constructing 
their portfolios. In this paper, since assassinations are used to capture the effects of political 
risk, investors are likely to respond to future policy uncertainty or to the threat of potential 
violence from the group or individual that carried out the assassination. Of course, this risk of 
violence could apply to personal safety, to any tangible investments or to the institutions that 
administer them. These fears may have particularly large impacts since the downside risk to an 
investment is potentially unlimited, depending on the extent of political or macroeconomic 
fallout from an assassination; as opposed to impacts from minor threats comparable to increased 
inflation forecasts, for example. 
One problem that arises when studying the impact of political risk on investor behaviour 
is that it is difficult to measure because investors account for uncertainty, at least partially, in 
accordance with the efficient market hypothesis. Under the strong form of the hypothesis, prices 
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reflect all available information and are updated immediately when new information becomes 
available, meaning that anticipated changes in political risk will already be ‘priced in’ and have 
no discernible impact on investor behaviour (Fama 1971). For example, an election outcome 
should have no effect if the polls had already accurately forecasted the result and there had been 
no reason to believe that they would be wrong. In reality, different markets seem to experience 
varying degrees of efficiency, but a weak or semi-strong form of the hypothesis seems to be 
most prevalent in political contexts, meaning that most publicly available information is priced 
in (Jacque 1981). 
As assassinations are unexpected events that are largely exogenous by nature, since 
governments expecting threats are able to implement vast security measures to avoid them, this 
paper uses assassinations to assess the rationality of investor reactions to political risk. 
Additionally, how investors allocate their holdings influences the levels of financing that are 
available to firms or national treasuries, affecting the ability of firms to grow and develop 
certain industries or the ability of governments to provide public services and direct fiscal 
policy. 
The extent to which governments protect their officials is the subject of countless books 
and films, which, although often exaggerated and based on presidents or other higher-ranking 
figures, highlight the protective resources that can be executed in response to perceived threats. 
This is not only the case in wealthy countries that can afford large security units but rather a 
universal trait, since governments of poorer countries have tended to prioritise security to a 
greater degree, often using their militaries or police forces for personal security (see Ball et al. 
2003: 264, on personal and political security in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa). Therefore, 
the advantage of using assassinations to detect sharp escalations in political risk is that they are 
unexpected and can help to isolate the impact of political risk on investor behaviour.  
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D.2. Literature review  
Literature on political risk and financial markets has tended to focus on events that signal 
political risk and analysed how they have affected exchange rate movements and equity markets 
in terms of both return and volatility. Indeed, Kim and Mei (2001) suggest that political events 
are the most important, or at least the most common factors that influence stocks in Hong Kong. 
They employ a GARCH ‘components jump volatility filter’ to identify dates where the Hang 
Seng Index undergoes sharp adjustments before relating these ‘jumps’ to prevailing events, 
observing a close relationship between these ‘jump dates’ and political news. Additionally, 
Voth (2002) finds that between half and two-thirds of stock market volatility during the Great 
Depression in Western Europe was due to political uncertainty, emphasising that the Russian 
Revolution occurred just over a decade beforehand and that investors were particularly sensitive 
to the potential consequences of political risk, following the impacts of communism for private 
ownership. 
Although small, a body of literature that specifically studies the relationship between 
political risk and financial markets through unanticipated acts of violence does exist. For 
example, Zussman and Zussman (2006) indirectly assess the effectiveness of Israeli 
counterterrorism policy through an event study by considering stock market responses to the 
targeted assassinations of Palestinian terrorist leaders since 2000. They observe no effect until 
separating the targets into military and political leaders, finding that the assassinations of 
political leaders resulted in a 1 percent loss for investors in equity, on average, while 
assassinating military leaders led to gains of between 0.5 and 1 percent in the immediate 
aftermath. Zussman and Zussman (2006) therefore conclude that political assassinations are 
perceived as counterproductive for counterterrorism by investors, but military assassinations do 
seem to be effective. This distinction is probably because military assassinations impede 
military capabilities while political assassinations may provoke retaliation.  
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More recently, Incerti and Incerti (2019) examined the stock market impacts of 
‘irregular’ regime changes – namely coups, assassinations and resignations – in a global event-
study setting since 1901. Using an event study approach, they detect positive impacts from 
resignations of about 4%, which persist for approximately two months, on average; but negative 
returns after coups and assassinations of about 2%, lasting approximately six months. 
The cases of Pakistan and the Arab Spring have also received some attention in the 
contexts of stock markets. Mahmood et al. (2014) and Nazir et al. (2014) both used event studies 
and found that a variety of political events and acts of violence from 1998 to 2013 and 1999 to 
2011, respectively, had negative impacts on the Karachi Stock Exchange and resulted in 
increased volatility. The magnitude of these impacts also depended on the types of events that 
occurred. Likewise, Chau et al. (2014) and Abdelbaki (2013) found negative return and 
increased volatility effects on Middle Eastern and North African stock markets following 
uprisings and protests during the Arab spring. They used GARCH methods and VECM models 
with impulse response functions, respectively. However, Chau et al. (2014) only found large 
impacts for Islamic stock indices (“Shariah-compliant Islamic financial assets”) and little or no 
effect for conventional stock market indices, emphasising the roles of investor expectations and 
ideology. 
Departing from the literature on the stock market impacts of political risk, Fatehi (1994), 
recognising the challenges in quantifying political risk, proposed that capital flight could be 
used as a simple but reliable proxy. In his paper, he uses regression analysis with lags to detect 
the effects of various sources of political instability, including political assassinations, on 
capital flight from 17 Latin American countries to the US between 1954 and 1982. Although 
these results were rather heterogeneous, many indicators – including political assassinations – 
had robust impacts with response times in excess of a year. Similarly, as part of a study to 
determine whether exchange rate uncertainty and socio-political instability, both individually 
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and jointly, affect private investment in eight Latin American countries from 1975 to 1999, 
Escaleras and Thomakos (2008) also find that socio-political factors have lasting impacts on 
exchange rate uncertainty, persisting for a year or longer. However, the effect of assassinations 
is insignificant once riots and violent demonstrations are controlled for. More directly, Bouraoui 
and Hammami (2017) examine exchange rate volatility using a political instability index 
derived from events such as terrorist attacks, labour strikes, violent protests and political 
assassinations in five Middle Eastern countries during the Arab Spring. They use autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) and vector auto-regressive (VAR) models with impulse response 
functions, finding elasticities of between 0.13 and 0.36, depending on the country. These 
impulse response functions indicated that the effects last between 12 and 18 months.  
There has not been much research on the impacts of political risk on bond markets, but 
Oosterlinck (2003) finds that only political factors caused structural breaks in French bond yield 
series during World War II. Additionally, Ferguson (2006) found that European bond yields 
were sensitive to political events between 1843 and 1880, but this was no longer the case 
between 1881 and 1914. 
Overall, literature on the effect of political risk on financial markets seems to show that 
investors respond by disinvesting in equity and then either by moving their holdings to bonds 
or else more stable destinations offshore. 
 
D.3. Data 
The assassination data for this paper come from the Global Terrorism Database. The 
database provides detailed information of over 190,000 violent events, including 20,000 
assassinations from around the world since 1970. The Oxford Dictionary (2019) defines an 
assassination as the “murder [of] (an important person) for political or religious reasons”, 
necessitating that this paper use a subset of the database in order to adhere to the problem of 
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political risk. As such, only the assassinations of members of ‘general government’ and 
‘diplomatic government’ are included, while categories such as religious, business, police, 
journalistic or military assassinations are excluded. After matching the assassinations with the 
financial data, 1,767 cases across 107 countries remain.39 
The financial data come from the Globaӏ Financiaӏ Database. The database affords 
centuries of financial and macroeconomic data at various geographical and administrative 
levels and at various periodicities. For example, United Kingdom’s FTSE All-Share Return 
Index extends back to 1694 on a monthly basis, with daily data available since 1964. However, 
since most series are not available at daily periodicities globally and since 1970, monthly data 
is used. Additionally, all financial series under study are inflation adjusted, in order to examine 
the real impacts of political risk. 
The first of the financial series utilised to investigate the impact of political risk is the 
total return on equity holdings from the largest stock exchange within each country. This is 
defined as the monthly equity return after all dividends are assumed to be reinvested, as 
calculated in equation 1. Since the research question here is whether investors move their 
holdings from equity to short term bonds in uncertain times, despite the political nature of the 
risk, this is a natural point of departure. Regardless of how investors choose to reallocate their 
holdings in response to political risk, a negative impact on equity return is expected. 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  
(𝑃𝑖𝑡 −  𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
 (1) 
Where P refers to stock price, D to dividends, i to each stock exchange and t to each 
month. After attempting to detect a departure from equity holdings, I examine the impact of 
assassinations on proxies of the risk-free rate. The risk-free rate is best approximated by short-
 
39 Note, the final sample sizes are greatly reduced, since only assassinations with valid (‘exogenous’) estimation 
windows are analysed. 
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term bond yields; and by yields on Treasury bills in particular (Dimson et al. 2002). Therefore, 
the preferred risk-free rate proxy for this paper is the 3-month Treasury bill yield, since this is 
the shortest-term Treasury bill yield within the financial database. When unavailable, the risk-
free rate series were supplemented by alternative short- or long term government bonds (these 
have also been widely used as risk-free rate proxies, e.g. Hodges et al. 1997; Mukherji 2011), 
or else central bank discount rates or interbank rates (used by Dimson et al. 2002) when they 
are closely related to Treasury bill yields in overlapping periods (e.g. figure A.D.1.). A negative 
impact of assassinations on bond yields implies an increase in demand for short-term 
government bonds, which would provide evidence of investors ignoring the political nature of 
risk in seeking the risk-free rate. Conversely, a positive impact on bond yields is associated 
with a decline in demand for short-term government bonds.  
The next series under study is the equity risk premium, the theoretical ‘reward’ for 
incurring risk. This is a particularly interesting metric since it reflects the willingness of 
investors to maintain their level of exposure to risk, at least with regard to equities. The equity 
risk premium is also the best predictor of the prospective risk-premium, an important metric for 
estimating future returns, the cost of equity capital and company valuations (Dimson et al. 
2002). This means that a negative impact on the equity risk premium following an assassination 
could signal a long run distaste for risk. Conversely, no significant impact on risk premium 
could indicate either that investors see the period of heightened risk as temporary, or that they 
are convinced of the persistence of the equity premium puzzle – that equity outperforms even 
its risk adjusted return – possibly as a result of habit persistence (Mehra and Prescott 1985; 
Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Constantinides 1990). 
The geometric risk premium is calculated here (equation 2), in accordance with Dimson 
et al. (2002). This has become standard in financial literature as using the arithmetic risk 
premium implicitly requires the assumption that the observations in the series are independent 
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of one another (Lütolf-Carroll & Pirnes 2009). Since Fama and French (1986), Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988), and Porterba and Summers (1988) detect negative autocorrelation in stock 
returns – due to short term overcorrections – this is not necessarily the case and the geometric 
method should be used.  
 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 =  (
1 + 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖𝑡
1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡
) − 1 (2) 
Then, as an alternative to the return on equity holdings, the impact of assassinations on 
the growth rate of market capitalisation is examined. In this way, a more precise impression of 
how investors change the proportions of equity in their portfolios can be obtained. Additionally, 
since the total equity return indicator from before includes dividend pay-outs and assumes that 
all dividends are reinvested, market capitalisation acts as an ideal robustness measure, as only 
dividends that are actually reinvested are appraised. 
Lastly, the impact of assassinations on the real US dollar exchange rate for each country 
is investigated. The US dollar is used for comparison as it is the most traded currency globally 
and the most widely held reserve currency, while the United States is the world’s largest 
economy and the home of the world’s two largest stock exchanges by market capitalisation.40 
Real exchange rate responses to assassinations would provide a first clue as to whether investors 
have incentives to move their holdings abroad or else make local investments even more 
attractive than before. A full answer to this question would require a complete analysis of 
spillover effects, but simple changes in exchange rates guide intuition. A real depreciation 
relative to the dollar would indicate that international investors earn reduced returns, ceteris 
paribus, and make flights to safety more likely. Conversely, a real exchange rate appreciation 
increases returns for international investors, providing incentives to increase their holdings in 
local assets, ignoring the impact of political risk on those assets. 
 
40 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ 
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D.4. Methodology 
Event studies are now common in academic research, particularly within financial 
literature at the firm or even stock level. James Dolley (1933) is widely credited for conducting 
the first event study in an academic setting, in his paper which considered the impact of stock 
splits on equity prices, largely finding a common upward effect. However, the aim of Dolley’s 
paper was to outline the corporate procedures involved in stock splits rather than develop an 
event study methodology, meaning that the methodology he used was very straightforward, 
simply comparing the changes in price per share with the ratio of each stock split before and 
after the event. 
Event study methodology then evolved somewhat. Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et 
al. (1969) effectively provided the procedure that is the academic standard today, in their 
respective studies of how stock prices are affected by the release of accounting reports and by 
stock splits that have been adjusted for increased dividend pay-out ratios. Since then, most 
refinements have been introduced to deal with study-specific challenges; such as including 
controls for common market trends when studying firm-level impacts (Ashley 1962), as well 
as the development of robustness tests such non-parametric techniques (Brown and Warner, 
1980). Additionally, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) studied the differences in event study 
characteristics under monthly and daily periodicities while Fama and French (1993, 2015) 
introduced their three and then five-factor asset pricing models, adjusting for certain risk factors 
and thereby developing more sophisticated baselines which can be used as fairer comparisons 
for post-event outcomes. 
The basic setup is as follows: first, an estimation window is established, from which the 
processes that we are interested in can be observed under ordinary conditions. The period 
immediately preceding the event is used, since it provides the most recent information without 
being biased by the event itself. This paper uses the 24 months prior to, and not including, the 
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event as the estimation window. Although Brown and Warner (1980) use a 38-month window, 
in this paper, excluding events with ‘endogenous estimation windows’ reduces sample sizes 
significantly. Endogenous estimation windows are defined as estimation windows that contain 
at least part of the event window for a previous event, thereby invalidating the assumption that 
they represent returns under normal circumstances, which can be used as baselines from which 
to estimate abnormal returns during the subsequent event window. Therefore, the 24-month 
estimation window, here, is a compromise between sample size and the stability of the pre-
event benchmarks. However, a sensitivity analysis described in the appendix shows that 
estimation windows of up to 48 months yield highly consistent results. 
Next, the event window is determined, the period beginning with the event and either 
lasting the duration that the effect of the event is expected to continue to have an impact, or else 
a specific duration dictated by the study. The response functions from figure D.3., discussed 
below, guided decision-making here, indicating that an event window of 12 months is 
appropriate for this study. Again, a sensitivity analysis is conducted and comparable results are 
found for event windows as small as 3 months, although a more detailed analysis is left to a 
later discussion. 
The setup can be summarised by figure D.1., below, where 𝑡1 is the event itself, 𝑡0 to 𝑡1 
is the estimation window, 𝑡1 to 𝑡2 is the event window, and the periods before 𝑡0 and after 𝑡2 
are not considered.  
 
Figure D.1. Timing of an Event 
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Once the estimation and event windows have been set, baseline returns are calculated 
over the estimation window and used as counterfactuals with which to calculate ‘abnormal’ 
returns in the event window. Many methods of estimating ‘normal’ returns exist, although the 
‘constant mean return model’ from equation 3 is used here. 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (3) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 are the actual returns in the event window, 𝜇𝑖 refers to the mean return over 
the estimation window and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is an error term. Despite its simplicity, the constant mean return 
model typically provides similar outcomes to those from more sophisticated models (Brown 
and Warner 1980, 1985). This is potentially because future returns are inherently difficult to 
predict, in accordance with the efficient market hypothesis. 
As a robustness test, a ‘market return model’ is also used; the main results of which are 
reported in tables D.4. to D.6. This model controls for common market trends.  
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
Where 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market return and 𝛼𝑖 is the constant mean return after controlling for 
the market return. 
Since this study is conducted at an international level, the market return is defined as a 
global median return. The median is used here rather than the mean, because a global market is 
potentially susceptible to many unknowns, as well as outliers and measurement error, which 
could produce improbable results if economic or financial crises took place elsewhere, for 
example. However, there is a precedent for using world markets, set by authors such as Solnik 
(1974), Harvey (1991), Grauer et al. (1976) and Du and Hu (2015). Nevertheless, in order to 
make it a more suitable baseline, the market return is separated into three groups based on 
income categories (United Nations 2014). Although increasingly sophisticated baselines could 
be calculated using factor models (Fama and French 1993, 2015), the benefits of doing so are 
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limited at best, and imprecisely estimated factors could even bias the results (MacKinlay 1997). 
Therefore, only the constant mean return and market models are used in this study. 
After estimating these ‘normal’ return series for the event window, abnormal returns are 
simply calculated by subtracting the expected normal return from the actual, realised return. 
 𝐴𝑅 𝑖𝜏 =  𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝜏) (5) 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 are the estimated abnormal returns, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 are the actual returns and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
are the expected ‘normal returns’. Note that 𝜏 differs from t; t refers to the date whereas 𝜏 refers 
to the number of periods (months) from the event.  
Next, the abnormal returns are summed together to form cumulative abnormal returns, 
the total effect of the event on the returns over the event window.  
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 (6) 
Where T refers to the duration of the event window. 
Finally, the impact of the events is tested for significance. Each individual event can be 
tested by using a t-test. 
 𝑡 =  
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝜏̂
𝑁
 / 
𝜎𝐴𝑅𝜏̂
√𝑁
 (7) 
Where N is the number of months in the event window and 𝜎𝐴𝑅𝜏̂  is the standard 
deviation of the abnormal return series. 
Alternatively, to test for the significance of all events simultaneously and, therefore, to 
estimate the impact of assassinations on each of the series of interest, the cumulative abnormal 
returns are simply regressed on a constant.  
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 =  𝜑𝑖𝑇 + 𝑣𝑖𝑇 (8) 
Where 𝜑𝑖𝑇 is a constant term and 𝑣𝑖𝑇 is a stochastic error term. 
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As a gauge of robustness, regressions following equation 8 are run with robust standard 
errors, bootstrapped standard errors (with 50 replications) and quantile regression. 
 
D.5. Results and Discussion 
D.5.1. Constant Mean Return and Market Models 
The results are derived from a sample of 198 assassinations across 99 countries, 
although data availability for each event analysis differs by financial indicator. Figure D.2. 
shows that the following results describe the financial responses to assassinations worldwide, 
across both developed and developing countries. Additionally, of countries that could be 
matched to the financial data with exogenous estimation windows, Kenya, Israel, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Mexico and South Africa experienced the most political assassinations between 1970 
and 201741. 
From table D.1., which uses the constant mean return model, we already obtain a clear 
outline of this paper’s overall findings. Investors who hold instruments that track the local stock 
market lose, on average, 0.88% of their holdings over the 12 months after an assassination. This 
is corroborated by the change in stock market capitalisation, which loses 0.95% over the same 
investment horizon. Together, these two results provide clear initial evidence that investors do 
tend to adapt their portfolios and reallocate their holdings away from equity, in line with 
traditional financial theory, although the coefficients are perhaps smaller than expected; 
approximately half of those obtained by Incerti and Incerti (2019). Figure D.3. illustrates that 
both equity return and market capitalisation require 14 to 16 months to return to equilibrium, 
 
41 For a description of assassinations across countries, independent of financial data and/or exogeneity, see figures 
AD2 and AD3. 
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on average, although market capitalisation seems to make a near complete recovery after six 
months before experiencing a second negative shock. This is explained in section D.5.2. 
 
 
Figure D.2. Matched Assassinations with Exogenous Estimation Windows 
 
That investors withdraw from equity holdings was rather predictable, since they were 
always bound to act in response to heightened political risk; the more interesting question is, to 
where do they, on average, reallocate their funds? Table D.1. shows no significant impact on 
either the risk-free rate or the equity risk premium, although the signs of their coefficients are 
positive and negative, respectively. The small positive coefficient from the risk-free rate would 
have signalled an increased yield on Treasury bills, had it been significant, which would have 
been associated with a decline in the demand for government bonds. In addition to indicating 
that the return on equity holdings is negative, the insignificance of the negative coefficient for 
the risk premium indicates that, in these risky periods, the return on equity effect is made 
unclear by the risk-free rate effect. Consequently, evidence from government bond yields is 
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inconclusive as to the destination of investor holdings, following periods of heightened political 
risk. 
Nonetheless, the coefficient from the real US dollar exchange rate may provide the 
solution to this destination problem. The exchange rate variable is the real US dollar exchange 
rate, meaning that, on average, countries experience a real exchange rate depreciation of 6.61%, 
relative to the US dollar. This depreciation provides evidence that investors withdraw from the 
country entirely, perhaps signalling flight to quality, rather than reallocating their holdings from 
stocks to government bonds. This exchange rate depreciation seems to require a full two years 
to return to pre-assassination levels, on average, emphasising its severity (figure D.3.). 
Although two years is a very long time when considering exchange rate movements, Escaleras 
and Thomakos (2008), Bouraoui and Hammami (2017) and Fatehi (1994) all find response 
times between 12 and 24 months in their studies of the impacts that assassinations and other 
indicators of political risk have on exchange rates. 
Continuing to the results from the regressions that used bootstrapped standard errors in 
table D.2., the above results are reinforced. However, the results from the quantile regression 
model, though largely similar, present an insignificant coefficient for the exchange rate and cast 
doubt on the flight to quality conclusion from before. 
Turning to the market return model, the previous results are largely upheld in the robust 
standard error and bootstrapped standard error specifications (tables D.4. and D.5.)42. The only 
differences from the conclusions of the constant mean model are that the negative impacts of 
political assassinations on both equity return and stock market capitalisation are far smaller – 
though still significant – and that the 12-month exchange rate depreciation is about twice as 
large as before. Here, the return on equity holdings is -0.38% and stock market capitalisation 
 
42 Note: In order not to compare vastly difference countries, market baselines were calculated using the income 
groups from table A.D.25. 
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loses -0.32% of its value, while the exchange rate undergoes a depreciation of 11.55% on 
average. The response functions from the market model indicate similar durations for the 
financial indicators to return to pre-assassination levels. However, there appear to be certain 
outliers in the risk-free rate series, which cause strange fluctuations in the response function for 
the risk-premium, casting doubt on the stability of the market model results for the risk-free 
rate and risk premium. 
The quantile regression specification in table D.6., though supportive of all previous 
evidence on return to equity and stock market capitalisation, now produces a 5.68 percentage 
point exchange rate depreciation – approximately the same as under the constant mean return 
model – as well as a significant coefficient for the risk-free rate of 1.58%. Though only 
significant at a 90% level of confidence, it would be tempting to infer that these results provide 
some evidence of increased bond yields and thus decreased demand for government bonds, but 
the response functions from figures D.3. and D.4. again undermine this conclusion. 
Overall, this analysis provides strong evidence of withdrawal from equity as well as 
tentative evidence of reallocation overseas, while bond holdings remain unaffected. 
 
D.5.2. Results by Income Group 
After assessing the impact of assassinations and political risk on investor reallocations 
from equity, a natural question to ask is whether the results are consistent across cases. If 
exchange rate depreciations take place and signal flights to quality, how do economically and 
financially developed – ‘quality’ – investment destinations differ from those that generally offer 
higher returns at the cost of greater risk? To investigate, the previous results are split by income 
groups (United Nations 2014) and estimated by using the constant mean return model. In order 
to detect varying response times between income groups; these results are also reported using 
12, 6 and 3-month event windows. 
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Over a 12-month horizon, the effect of assassinations on equity returns is clearly driven 
by lower middle- and low-income countries (table D.7.) with an average return of -1.35%, while 
high-income countries undergo no significant impact. This is reinforced by a -2.32% decline in 
market capitalisation for lower- and middle-income countries (table D.9.), while no impact is 
experienced by upper middle- and high-income countries. There is no significant impact on risk 
premia or the risk-free rate for any income group. Additionally, lower middle- and low-income 
countries experience a 14.42% exchange rate depreciation, while upper middle-income 
countries saw depreciations of 10.75%, on average.  
Additionally, the response functions from figure D.5. reveal quicker recoveries for 
higher-income countries, especially for the exchange rate and market capitalisation indicators. 
The exchange rate reverts to the pre-assassination level after two years for lower middle and 
low-income countries, on average, while it only requires about 10 months for high-income 
countries. Additionally, the two-phase response function for market capitalisation is explained 
here: lower and low-income countries experience the strongest impact of assassinations after 
about a year and return to pre-assassination levels after 20 months. Conversely, upper middle-
income countries experience the strongest impact after 4 months and already undergo a partial 
recovery after 8 months, recovering fully after 16 months. This disparity in response times 
creates the two-phase pattern. Additionally, the recovery period for equity return remains at 
about 12 to 16 months, although the magnitude of the impact is much smaller for higher-income 
countries, as discussed above. 
Over a 6-month event horizon, at -0.78%, the impact on equity return is smaller for 
lower middle- and low-income countries (table D.12.). Upper middle-income countries 
experience an impact of -0.9% whereas, for high-income countries, it is -0.45%. Some evidence 
of decreased market capitalisation and an exchange rate depreciation for lower- and low-income 
countries persists, but no other indicators show any level of significance after 6 months. 
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Finally, over a 3-month event window, no significant impact on equity return is found 
for lower- and low-income countries, but upper middle-income countries yield a significant 
coefficient of -0.69% while high-income countries experience a return of -0.37%. No other 
significant results are obtained over a three-month window. 
In sum, this analysis of income categories is largely consistent with the previous results, 
as lower-income countries seem to experience greater impacts of assassinations, especially 
when considering equity return and exchange rates. However, these effects are more persistent 
for lower-income countries than for economies that are more developed. Since high-income 
countries are often associated with better institutions, investors could see assassinations there 
as isolated events, with future policy largely being set by the same organising bodies and 
remaining consistent in future. Conversely, assassinations in lower-income countries could be 
perceived as greater risks, since the successors of the assassinated individuals may wish to 
change policy, especially if institutions are weak. 
 
D.6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the responses of investors to political risk. In uncertain times 
when investors perceive a higher risk environment, traditional financial theory suggests that 
they should withdraw their holdings in equity and instead favour short-term bonds, seeking the 
risk-free rate. However, political uncertainty provides an interesting dilemma, since the safest 
short term bonds are issued in the form of Treasury bills – by government – which is the source 
of the risk.  
The paper uses a series of event studies in an effort to resolve this dilemma and assess 
the rationality of investor decisions, using the assassinations of political leaders as examples of 
largely exogenous political shocks. The key findings of this study indicate that investors do 
indeed withdraw their holdings in equity, on average depleting stock market capitalisation just 
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over 1% and, resulting in losses of nearly 1% for those who remain invested in equity. But to 
where they reallocate their holdings remains unclear. Since no significant impact on bond yields 
for risk-free rate proxies are found, no conclusions about any change in the demand for 
government bonds can be made. However, there is consistent evidence of exchange rate 
depreciations of about 6%, on average, following an assassination; thereby suggesting that 
investors may react by withdrawing their holdings from the affected country entirely. 
Finally, to test the consistency of these results among developed and developing 
countries, the effects of assassinations are investigated by income classification, revealing that 
the impacts of political assassinations are larger and more persistent for developing countries. 
The reasons for these disparities could have their origins in investor perceptions of local 
institutional quality and the possible implications of political assassinations for the setting of 
future policy. If institutions are weak and future policy uncertain, then investors may prefer to 
reallocate their holdings to traditionally safer markets. Therefore, setting clear and long-term 
policy agendas may help to alleviate the volatility of future capital flows in developing 
countries. 
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D.8. Figures and Tables 
D.8.1. Event Study Regressions 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium Market Capitalisation Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
           
Assassination -0.880*** -1.297 -0.945** 0.377 6.607* 
  (0.307) (1.226) (0.412) (1.130) (3.502) 
           
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
           
Table D.1. OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium Market Capitalisation Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
           
Assassination -0.880*** -1.297 -0.945*** 0.377 6.607** 
  (0.322) (1.210) (0.327) (1.308) (3.351) 
           
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
           
Table D.2. OLS with Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium Market Capitalisation Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
           
Assassination -0.888** -1.083 -0.685** -0.248 2.008 
  (0.385) (0.797) (0.322) (0.417) (2.073) 
           
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
           
Table D.3. Quantile Regression 
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Figure D.3. Response Functions to Assassinations (Constant Mean Return Model) 
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D.8.2. Market Baseline43 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium  Market Capitalisation Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
           
Assassination -0.384*** 0.717 -0.315*** -0.715 11.55*** 
  (0.118) (1.606) (0.117) (1.789) (3.373) 
           
Observations 109 89 79 98 85 
Countries 56 45 40 48 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
           
Table D.4. OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium  Market Capitalisation Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
           
Assassination -0.384*** 0.717 -0.315*** -0.715 11.55*** 
  (0.127) (1.510) (0.122) (1.741) (3.691) 
           
Observations 109 89 79 98 85 
Countries 56 45 40 48 43 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
           
Table D.5. OLS with Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium  Market Capitalisation Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
           
Assassination -0.451*** -1.323 -0.368** 1.583* 5.682** 
  (0.133) (0.863) (0.150) (0.912) (2.438) 
           
Observations 109 89 79 98 85 
Countries 56 45 40 48 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
           
Table D.6. Quantile Regression 
 
 
 
43 Income groups were used to calculate market baselines (United Nations 2014). 
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Figure D.4. Response Functions to Assassinations (Market Model) 
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D.8.3. Event Analysis by Income Category (12 Month Event Window) 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -1.208*** -1.349** -1.100 -0.469 
  (0.450) (0.533) (0.688) (0.398) 
          
Observations 60 26 34 48 
Countries 32 16 16 24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.7. Equity Return 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -2.305 0.357 -4.251 -0.242 
  (2.274) (2.160) (3.597) (0.805) 
          
Observations 45 19 26 43 
Countries 21 10 11 22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.8. Risk Premium 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -1.480** -2.322** -0.941 -0.352 
  (0.653) (1.078) (0.817) (0.472) 
          
Observations 41 16 25 37 
Countries 19 7 12 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.9. Market Capitalisation 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination 0.604 -1.454 2.181 0.104 
  (1.983) (1.995) (3.153) (0.747) 
          
Observations 53 23 30 44 
Countries 25 11 14 23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
Table D.10. Risk-Free Rate 
To Fly to Quality or Disinvest? The Dilemma of Political Violence and Investor Sentiment.  
184 
 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination 12.137** 14.424** 10.749** -0.119 
  (6.017) (6.766) (8.843) (0.747) 
          
Observations 45 17 28 37 
Countries 21 7 14 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
Table D.11. Exchange Rate 
 
 
 
 
D.8.4. Event Analysis by Income Category (6 Month Event Window) 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -0.846*** -0.775* -0.900** -0.449* 
  (0.299) (0.420) (0.425) (0.263) 
          
Observations 60 26 34 48 
Countries 32 16 16 24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.12. Equity Return 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -0.275 0.396 -0.764 -0.414 
  (1.341) (1.181) (2.173) (0.520) 
          
Observations 45 19 26 43 
Countries 21 10 11 22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.13. Risk Premium 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -0.996* -1.596 -0.612 -0.246 
  (0.520) (0.925) (0.618) (0.292) 
          
Observations 41 16 25 37 
Countries 19 7 12 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.14. Market Capitalisation 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -0.853 -1.038 -0.711 0.139 
  (1.013) (1.047) (1.616) (0.431) 
          
Observations 53 23 30 44 
Countries 25 11 14 23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.15. Risk-Free Rate 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination 8.648 10.259* 7.669 0.168 
  (5.582) (5.577) (8.385) (1.472) 
          
Observations 45 17 28 37 
Countries 21 7 14 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
Table D.16. Exchange Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Fly to Quality or Disinvest? The Dilemma of Political Violence and Investor Sentiment.  
186 
 
D.8.5. Event Analysis by Income Category (3 Month Event Window) 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -0.579** -0.435 -0.689** -0.366* 
  (0.232) (0.319) (0.332) (0.183) 
          
Observations 60 26 34 48 
Countries 32 16 16 24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.17. Equity Return 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -0.0215 0.125 -0.129 -0.423 
  (0.878) (0.567) (1.475) (0.320) 
          
Observations 45 19 26 43 
Countries 21 10 11 22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.18. Risk Premium 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -0.877* -1.303 -0.604 -0.182 
  (0.476) (0.919) (0.522) (0.164) 
          
Observations 41 16 25 37 
Countries 19 7 12 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D.19. Market Capitalisation 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination -0.712 -0.551 -0.837 0.137 
  (0.627) (0.486) (1.052) (0.253) 
          
Observations 53 23 30 44 
Countries 25 11 14 23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
 
Table D.20. Risk-Free Rate 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Middle & Lower 
Income 
 Lower Middle & Low 
Income 
 Upper Middle Income  High-Income 
          
Assassination 7.892 9.335 7.016 0.120 
  (4.511) (5.717) (6.438) (1.124) 
          
Observations 45 17 28 37 
Countries 21 7 14 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
Table D.21. Exchange Rate 
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Figure D.5. Response Functions to Assassinations by Income Categories 
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D.9. Appendix 
D.9.1. Time Decompositions 
Despite the earlier result that more developed, higher-income countries experience 
shorter and less severe effects after an assassination, the decades of the 1990s and 2000s seem 
to drive the results, as in Girardi (2018) on elections and financial markets. This is 
counterintuitive, as global development has changed the world radically over the last half 
century and, intuitively, we would expect the effects to have decreased over time.  
In table A.D.1., the main results before and after 1998 are shown, since 1998 is the mean 
year in the database. 
  Equity Return Risk Premium Market Capitalisation Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Pre 1998 Post 1998 Pre 1998 Post 1998 Pre 1998 Post 1998 Pre 1998 Post 1998 Pre 1998 Post 1998 
                      
Assassination -0.786** -1.091* -1.512 -0.516 -0.450 -2.594** 0.795 -1.338 7.275 4.231 
  (0.372) (0.549) (1.509) (1.526) (0.421) (1.040) (1.359) (1.471) (4.403) (3.219) 
                      
Observations 75 33 69 19 60 18 78 19 64 18 
Countries 43 25 40 15 35 14 46 15 37 14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
                
Table A.D.1. 1998 Cut-off Date 
 
Next, to emphasise that the main results are driven by the 1990s and 2000s, 
regressions are run for each decade separately. 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
            
Assassination -0.613 -0.358 -1.119* -2.155** -0.831 
  (0.544) (0.732) (0.582) (0.901) (0.688) 
            
Observations 25 29 25 13 16 
Countries 23 23 23 12 15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
            
Table D.22. Equity Return 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
            
Assassination -0.0290 -3.308 -0.539 -3.667 2.521 
  (1.462) (3.099) (2.550) (2.110) (2.311) 
            
Observations 23 27 21 9 8 
Countries 21 22 19 9 8 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
            
Table D.23. Risk Premium 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
            
Assassination -0.0967 -0.190 -0.785 -4.196** -1.723 
  (0.326) (0.766) (0.833) (1.383) (1.596) 
            
Observations 17 22 23 9 7 
Countries 16 19 21 9 7 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
        
            
Table D.24. Market Capitalisation 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
            
Assassination -0.491 1.984 0.581 0.363 -3.602 
  (1.345) (2.854) (2.111) (1.975) (2.602) 
            
Observations 26 31 23 9 8 
Countries 24 26 21 9 8 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
            
Table D.25. Risk-Free Rate 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
            
Assassination 0.798 4.481 14.37 5.998 3.010 
  (4.874) (3.514) (10.62) (6.147) (2.188) 
            
Observations 18 24 24 9 7 
Countries 17 21 22 9 7 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
            
Table D.26. Exchange Rate 
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D.9.2. Endogenous estimation results 
Throughout the paper, only assassinations with ‘exogenous’ estimation windows are 
included. Since event studies require stable baselines, cases with previous events in their 
estimation windows provide instable baselines and therefore yield biased estimates of abnormal 
returns. The following estimations with ‘endogenous’ estimations windows show no significant 
results except for an impact on stock market capitalisation about 3 times larger than under the 
constant mean return model and nearly 10 times that of the market model. 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.148 -0.420 -2.927* -0.108 -1.180 
  (0.111) (0.430) (1.664) (0.462) (1.531) 
            
Observations 557 481 443 508 443 
Countries 56 41 40 45 42 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.27. OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium 
Market Cap 
Capitalisation 
Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.148 -0.420 -2.927* -0.108 -1.180 
  (0.103) (0.449) (1.624) (0.400) (1.522) 
            
Observations 557 481 443 508 443 
Countries 56 41 40 45 42 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.28. OLS with Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Equity Return Risk Premium 
Market Cap 
Capitalisation 
Risk-Free Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.0532 -0.140 -0.165 0.0409 -0.0136 
  (0.0614) (0.0861) (0.419) (0.0273) (0.217) 
            
Observations 557 481 443 508 443 
Countries 56 41 40 45 42 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.29. Quantile Regression 
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D.9.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
The following section emphasises the consistency of the results from the main paper, 
despite the chosen estimation and event windows often being improbable. Overall, this 
sensitivity analysis reinforces the finding that investors withdraw from stock markets following 
an assassination, but the effect on exchange rate depreciation is less clear. 
36 Month Estimation Window with a 12 Month Event Window 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.701** -1.200 -0.997** 0.472 5.136 
  (0.309) (1.302) (0.431) (1.238) (3.481) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.30. Robust Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.701** -1.200 -0.997*** 0.472 5.136 
  (0.304) (1.131) (0.307) (1.186) (3.987) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.31. Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.815** -1.177 -0.514 -0.0361 0.895 
  (0.405) (0.758) (0.393) (0.432) (2.249) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.32. Quantile Regression  
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48 Month Estimation Window with a 12 Month Event Window 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.742** -1.368 -1.204*** 0.715 5.153 
  (0.310) (1.701) (0.430) (1.635) (3.742) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.33. Robust Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.742** -1.368 -1.204*** 0.715 5.153 
  (0.326) (1.613) (0.368) (1.418) (4.001) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries  56 43 39 48 41 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.34. Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.750** -1.225* -0.728* -0.0246 0.732 
  (0.357) (0.700) (0.373) (0.527) (2.128) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries  56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.35. Quantile Regression 
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24 Month Estimation Window with a 3 Month Event Window 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.485*** -0.218 -0.547** -0.327 4.385* 
  (0.152) (0.473) (0.263) (0.362) (2.550) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries  56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.36. Robust Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.485*** -0.218 -0.547** -0.327 4.385 
  (0.150) (0.418) (0.237) (0.361) (2.730) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.37. Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.439** -0.431* -0.224 -0.132 0.638 
  (0.190) (0.238) (0.144) (0.130) (0.986) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.38. Quantile Regression 
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24 Month Estimation Window with a 6 Month Event Window 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.670*** -0.343 -0.640** -0.403 4.822 
  (0.203) (0.727) (0.308) (0.587) (3.153) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.39. Robust Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.670*** -0.343 -0.640* -0.403 4.822 
  (0.213) (0.649) (0.341) (0.582) (3.555) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.40. Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.575** -0.727 -0.356** -0.150 1.121 
  (0.252) (0.512) (0.165) (0.229) (1.155) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.41. Quantile Regression 
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48 Month Estimation Window with 3 Month Event Window 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.441*** -0.241 -0.633** -0.202 3.910 
  (0.154) (0.496) (0.263) (0.409) (2.585) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.42. Robust Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.441*** -0.241 -0.633*** -0.202 3.910 
  (0.159) (0.498) (0.235) (0.429) (2.698) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.43. Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Equity Return Risk Premium Market 
Capitalisation 
Risk Free-Rate Exchange Rate 
            
Assassination -0.235 -0.208 -0.289* -0.0893 0.180 
  (0.190) (0.236) (0.148) (0.134) (1.051) 
            
Observations 108 88 78 97 82 
Countries 56 43 39 48 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table D.44. Quantile Regression 
 
  
To Fly to Quality or Disinvest? The Dilemma of Political Violence and Investor Sentiment.  
200 
 
D.9.4. Risk-Free Rate 
Since 3-month Treasury bill yields were not available for the entire duration of the study 
for each country, alternative risk-free rate proxies were often required, as outlined above. 3-
months Treasury bills were always selected, when available, and spliced with the alternative 
risk-free rate series that most accurately resembled it in overlapping periods. Figure A.D.1. 
outlines how similar these yields were over time and further motivates the use of alternative 
risk-free rate proxies. 
 
  
United Kingdom France 
  
South Africa India 
 
Figure A.D.1. Selected Risk-Free Rate Comparisons 
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D.9.5. Income Classifications 
      
ISO 2 Code Country   UN Classification 
   
ar Argentina   upper middle-income 
au Australia   high-income 
at Austria   high-income 
bd Bangladesh   lower middle and low-income 
be Belgium   high-income 
br Brazil   upper middle-income 
ca Canada   high-income 
cl Chile   high-income 
cn China   upper middle-income 
co Colombia   upper middle-income 
cy Cyprus   high-income 
eg Egypt   lower middle and low-income 
fr France   high-income 
de Germany   high-income 
el Greece   high-income 
in India   lower middle and low-income 
id Indonesia   lower middle and low-income 
ir Iran   upper middle-income 
ie Ireland   high-income 
il Israel   high-income 
it Italy   high-income 
jm Jamaica   upper middle-income 
jp Japan   high-income 
jo Jordan   upper middle-income 
ke Kenya   lower middle and low-income 
kr Korea, Republic of high-income 
kg Kyrgyzstan   lower middle and low-income 
lb Lebanon   upper middle-income 
mx Mexico   upper middle-income 
ma Morocco   lower middle and low-income 
np Nepal   lower middle and low-income 
nl Netherlands   high-income 
ng Nigeria   lower middle and low-income 
pk Pakistan   lower middle and low-income 
pa Panama   upper middle-income 
py Paraguay   lower middle and low-income 
pe Peru   upper middle-income 
ph Philippines   lower middle and low-income 
pt Portugal   high-income 
rs Serbia upper middle-income 
za South Africa  upper middle-income 
es Spain   high-income 
lk Sri Lanka  lower middle and low-income 
se Sweden   high-income 
ch Switzerland   high-income 
sy Syria   lower middle and low-income 
tw Taiwan   high-income 
th Thailand   upper middle-income 
tt Trinidad and Tobago high-income 
tn Tunisia   upper middle-income 
ug Uganda   lower middle and low-income 
ua Ukraine   lower middle and low-income 
uk United Kingdom  high-income 
us United States  high-income 
uy Uruguay   high-income 
ve Venezuela   upper middle-income 
   
      
Table D.45. Country List and UN Development Classifications 
Note: These are the countries for which assassinations took place, according to the Global Terrorism Database, 
for which financial data could be matched. 
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D.9.6. Assassination Maps 
 
Figure D.6. Matched Assassinations with Endogenous Estimation Windows 
 
 
Figure D.7. All Political Assassinations (1970 – 2017) 
  
  
 
 
E. Summary and Outlook 
 
Literature on the processes that induce economic development has yielded theories 
emphasising the roles of institutional design, geography, gender equality and human capital. 
Violence, however, has largely been treated as an outcome of development rather than a 
contributing factor (McIlwaine 1999; Enamorado et al. 2014). On an individual level, violence 
is largely driven by psychological factors, but these cannot explain regional or societal 
disparities. Therefore, the first of three studies in this dissertation contributes to the literature 
by finding a causal effect of elite violence on elite human capital. The inverse relationship that 
is derived is an important result, since human capital encourages technological innovation and 
is an important driver of economic growth (see Becker 1962; Mincer 1984; Acemoglu and Dell 
2010; and Barro 2001). Further, chapter B also contributes to the Great Divergence debate and 
shows that at its origins were rooted in violence, at least to a certain degree, from as far back as 
the 14th century. 
The second chapter’s chief contribution is that of the regicide indicator. Eisner’s (2011) 
idea was heavily expanded upon in this paper as we include more than 4000 rulers from across 
Europe between the 6th and 19th centuries and provide a wider-ranging and longer-term 
indicator for violence than has been available previously. Since empirical evidence of violence 
from before the 19th century is only available sporadically and for parts of Western Europe, the 
regicide indicator opens up entirely new avenues of violence research. Europe undoubtedly has 
the most complete and far-reaching dynastic lists of all world regions, as well as the most 
detailed biographical accounts of rulers from which the regicide indicator is constructed. 
Nevertheless, documenting rulers has been a universal phenomenon throughout history, 
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meaning that this chapter sets a precedent which could also be followed in future studies of 
other world regions and perhaps even help to explain patterns of development elsewhere. This 
chapter then goes on to study the role of state capacity in elite violence, using ‘territorial state 
capacity’, following the divergent hypotheses of researchers such as Pinker (2011) and Tilly 
(1975). The empirical evidence shows a negative relationship between territorial state capacity 
and regicide, illustrating that state capacity likely had a largely pacifying role on trends and 
regional differences in interpersonal elite violence, at least since the High Middle Ages. 
Finally, as a means of providing a more rounded impression of the consequences of elite 
violence, and of assassinations in particular, the dissertation proceeded to investigate how 
shocks to political risk have caused investors to react in terms of global asset allocation since 
1970. How investors allocate their holdings influences the levels of financing available to firms 
or national treasuries; affecting the ability of firms to grow and develop their own industries as 
well as the ability of governments to provide public services and to direct fiscal policy. 
The setting of political risk and assassinations provides an interesting conundrum, as 
financial doctrine dictates that investors reallocate their holdings from stocks to sovereign 
bonds, while governmental institutions are the source of increased risk in the aftermath of 
political assassinations (Markowitz 1952). The results obtained from an event analysis illustrate 
that investors tend to disinvest from equity following political assassinations but refrain from 
pursuing traditional risk-free instruments. Subsequent exchange rate depreciations likely 
indicate that investors prefer to move their holdings abroad, signalling that, on average, 
investors do not act blindly and simply follow financial doctrine. In order to make a stronger 
conclusion about the destination of financial flows subsequent to political assassinations, an 
ideal extension to this study would employ spatial methods to examine financial spillovers in 
conjunction with exchange rate impacts.  
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The study also reveals that developing countries tend to experience more severe and 
persistent financial market effects in the aftermath of political assassinations. Because 
developing countries are associated with weaker institutions, investors may believe that existing 
political and macroeconomic policies could be threatened by the successor of an assassinated 
individual. Conversely, due to stronger political institutions, investors may see political 
assassinations in developed countries as isolated events with the continuance of existing 
policies guaranteed. This suggests that setting clear and long-term policy agendas may be 
beneficial for governments of developing countries and help to alleviate the volatility of future 
capital flows. 
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